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Abstract 
GPS is the most widely used satellite navigation system. By design, there is no 
provision for real time integrity information within the Standard Positioning Service 
(SPS). However, in safety critical sectors like aviation, stringent integrity performance 
requirements must be met. This can be achieved using special augmentation systems or 
at the user sensor level through Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) or 
both. RAIM, which is considered as the most cost effective method relies on data 
consistency, and therefore requires redundant measurements for its operation. An 
external aid to provide this redundancy can be in the form of an Inertial Navigation 
system (INS). This should enable continued performance even during RAIM holes 
(when no redundant satellite measurements are available). However, the integrated 
system faces the risk of failures generated at different levels of the system, in the 
operational environment and at the user sensor (receiver) level. 
This thesis addresses integrated GPS/INS architectures,, the corresponding 
failure modes and the sensor level integrity algorithms used to protect users from such 
failure modes. An exhaustive literature review is conducted to identify the various 
failure modes. These are then grouped into classes based on their characteristics and a 
mathematical (failure) model is specified for each class. For the analysis of failures, a 
simulation of a typical aircraft trajectory is developed, including the capability to 
generate raw measurements from GPS and the INS. The simulated GPS and INS 
measurements for the aircraft are used to evaluate the perforinance of the current 
integrity algorithms. Their performances are assessed for the most difficult case of 
failures; slowly growing errors (SGE), and shown to be inadequate (i. e. a considerable 
period of time is required for detection). This is addressed by developing a new 
algorithm based on the detection of the growth rate of a typical test statistic (assuming a 
single failure at a time). Results show that the new algorithm detects slowly growing 
ramp-type errors faster than the current methods, with a forty percent improvement in 
the time it takes to detect the worst case SGE. The algorithm is then extended to include 
detection of multiple SGEs for which a new tightly coupled method referred to as the 
"piggyback architecture" is proposed. This method provides the novel capability of 
detecting all failures including those affecting the INS. The proposed algorithms are 
validated with real GPS and INS data. In this way, the integrity performance of the 
integrated system is enhanced against the worst case failures with a detection time that 
V 
is beneficial for the achievement of stringent time-to-alert requirements. A practical 
implementation would then comprise of the use of the rate detector algorithm alongside 
the current methods or the piggy back architecture. 
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1- Introduction 
Navigation is a cornerstone of many transportation systems including aviation. This 
chapter presents the background to the systems currently used for aircraft navigation 
before identifying the major research issues in the field at present. The specific aims and 
objectives of this thesis are then described before the chapter ends with a "roadmap" 
outlining the structure of the content of this thesis. 
1.1. Background 
Aircraft navigation is currently achieved by a combination of a variety of systems that 
are space based, aircraft based and ground based (Galloti, 1998). Space based systems 
such as GPS, GLONASS and Galileo (Seeber, 2003) consist of satellites and ground 
based supporting infrastructure to perform the navigation function. In general, these 
have the ability to perform globally irrespective of the location of the aircraft. The 
aircraft based systems (including inertial navigation system (INS), radar, Air Data 
System (ADS) (Kayton, 2003)) operate autonomously onboard; acquiring 
measurements and using them to generate the information required for aircraft 
navigation. Purely ground based systems (including Instrument Landing System (ILS), 
Microwave Landing system (MLS), Very high frequency Omni-Ranging system (VOR) 
, Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) (Kayton, 2003) are located and maintained 
mainly in the surroundings of the airport to guide aircraft both en route (e. g. the VOR, 
DME) and in the initial and final phases of flight (e. g the ILS, MLS). Ground based 
systems, although operational for decades are expensive and have operational 
limitations. These pose problems in terms of their high maintenance costs and the limits 
they impose on the use of aircraft in their vicinity especially for the landing phase. The 
latter results in problems for an increased level of air traffic. 
The rapid increase in air traffic is creating congestion in the air traffic network with 
undesirable impacts, such as flight delays, increased levels of risk to safety, 
environmental pollution and noise. In 1983, the Council of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) determined that the technologies and procedures 
supporting Air Traffic Management (ATM) were fast approaching their limits. Note for 
example, that reliance on ground-based systems for navigation, limits aircraft to 
specific, pre-defined routes. This is because an aircraft has to be present in the range of 
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the signals emitted by ground based systems to utilise their signals. Accordingly, ICAO 
established a special committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) to develop a 
plan and programme for future ATM. This resulted in the Communication Navigation 
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) concept (Whelan, 2001b). The 
FANS committee proposed the use of digital technologies, including satellite systems, 
and varying levels of automation to achieve a seamless global ATM. This should have a 
positive impact of increasing airspace capacity that is needed due to growth in the 
number of aircraft and operations over time (Van Tudler, 1996). For example, removing 
the limitation of aircraft following specific paths should result in a drastic increase in 
airspace capacity. Hence, the trend is now towards the use of space-based systems for 
aircraft navigation. 
Currently GPS is the only fully operational Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). 
Other major systems are GLONASS (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya 
Sistema) developed by the former USSR and Galileo (Seeber, 2003). The former is not 
fully operational and the latter is under development. 
To utilise space based systems effectively, the CNS/ATM concept moves away from the 
previous practice. Previously, it was the practice that performance requirements were 
governed by the typical equipment used. This has now been replaced by an approach 
based on the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) concept (ICAO Standards and 
Recommended Practices - SARPS, 2004). This concept is based on specifying 
navigation performance for a certain phase of flight irrespective of the instrument 
utilised. This essentially streamlines the process of transition of air navigation from 
ground based to space based systems. The RNP concept captures the performance of a 
navigation system in terms of the four parameters defined below. 
I. I. I. ICAO Requirements for Air Navigation 
The ICAO requirements are defined in terms of accuracy, availability, integrity and 
continuity (ICAO SARPS, 2004), where; 
Accuracy is the difference between the estimated position and the true position. System 
Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information 
supplied by the total system, while continuity is the capability of the system to perform 
its function without unscheduled interruptions during the intended operation. The 
availability of a system is characterised by the proportion of time during which reliable 
navigation information (meeting the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements) 
is 
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presented to the crew, autopilot or other flight management systems. When a navigation 
system satisfies the specifications (quantities) that are assigned to these parameters, it is 
certified to be used in aviation. Hence, the requirement set also acts as a design driver 
for future space based systems. The accuracy specification for the various phases of 
flight are listed in Table 2-2 and integrity specifications are listed separately in Table 
2-6, as integrity is the subject of this thesis. 
The performance specification that is most related to safety is integrity (Ochieng et al., 
2003). It includes the ability of the navigation system to provide timely and valid 
warnings to users when the system must not be used for the intended operation or phase 
of flight. A navigation system is required to deliver a warning (or an alert) of any 
malfunction (as a result of a specified alert limit being exceeded) to users within a given 
period of time (time to alert). The alert limit is defined as a position error. Integrity risk, 
also referred to as the probability of misleading information, is defined as the 
probability that the navigation positioning error exceeds the alert limit and that the event 
is not detected. Two more definitions are relevant in this context. 
Position Failure is defined to occur whenever the difference between the true position 
and position as determined by a navigation equipment exceeds the applicable alert limit. 
Probability of Missed Detection is the probability of not detecting a position failure 
within time to alert. 
These specifications are defined for all phases of flight (Table 2-6) and, as expected, are 
most stringent for the landing phase. To meet these specifications, modem navigation 
systems can be utilised such as GPS. GNSS must therefore satisfy these requirements 
in order to be used to support aircraft navigation for the whole (gate-to-gate) or a part of 
a flight profile. This thesis concentrates on GPS as it is the only currently fully 
operational GNSS. It should be noted here that GNSS refers to a worldwide position 
and time determination system that uses satellite ranging signals to determine user 
location. It encompasses all satellite ranging technologies, including GPS and its 
augmentations; Satellite Based Augmentations Systems (SBAS) or Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (GBAS). 
1.1.2. GPS and Integrity Monitoring 
GPS is currently the primary satellite based navigation system. It enables users 
equipped with suitable receivers to determine their position and time by using signals 
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from four or more satellites. It consists of three segments; space, control and user. The 
space segment contains the satellites that generate and transmit the navigation signals. 
The control segment is responsible for the overall control and operation of the system 
using a number of monitor (tracking stations), a Master Control Station (MCS) for 
system control and generation of the navigation messages, ground antennas that upload 
the navigation messages to the satellites, and communications capability linking the 
various components. The user segment consists of users equipped with GPS receivers 
(Hofmann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). 
The signals used by users are contaminated by different types of errors that occur at 
various stages of the system, the operational environment and the user receiver. Some of 
the important types of errors are satellite clock effors, satellite orbit effors, the 
ionospheric effors, the tropospheric errors and multipath effors. The nominal behaviour 
of these errors are well understood in the GPS literature. Many good references can be 
consulted in this respect such as Hofmann-Wellenhof et al. (2001), Kaplan (2005) and 
Seeber (2003). However, in addition to these nominal effors, failures (i. e. abnormal 
behaviour) can arise at different levels of the signal processing chain (satellite to user). 
These failures can be due to a malfunction of the system components or by blockage in 
the signal transmission. Examples include strong atmospheric variations that delay the 
signal and intervention of external signals that result in interference or jamming of the 
signal. 
There are two different navigation services of GPS; the Standard Positioning Service 
(SPS) and the Precise Positioning Service (PPS). The PPS is a military service that 
cannot be accessed by unauthorised users. It has a real-time capability for monitoring 
malfunctions (failures). However, for the SPS, GPS does not provide real time 
information about the integrity of the signals and consequently the performance of the 
SPS is lower than that of the PPS as given in GPS Standard Positioning Service 
Performance Standard (Department of Defence, 2001). Clearly, this has the potential 
that misleading navigation information (as a result of a failure) is used for the 
navigation which may result in catastrophic consequences. Hence, integrity monitoring 
is required if the SPS is to be used for safety and liability critical applications. 
There are currently two methods utilised to provide integrity information about the 
signals; these are the use of special augmentation systems or Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) and its variations (Ochieng et al., 2003). Special 
augmentation systems consist of ground based stations that receive signals from GPS 
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satellites and generate information to enhance the performance of GPS signals, and 
ground based or satellite based transmitters to broadcast this information to the users. 
Hence, this requires enormous effort in terms of development and maintenance cost to 
support these systems. Examples of special augmentation systems are the European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), the Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) and the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS). EGNOS and 
WAAS are satellite based augmentation systems while LAAS is a ground based system 
(Federal RadioNavigation Plan, 2005). 
RAIM takes the form of a computer algorithm which checks the consistency of 
measurements received by exploiting measurement redundancy, the geometrical 
configuration of the satellites relative to the user, knowledge of nominal error behaviour 
and the user requirements. It can be placed alongside the original positioning algorithms 
in the receiver (Brown and McBurney, 1988). Compared to a stand-alone GPS 
positioning algorithm, an extra measurement is required for a typical RAIM algorithm 
to be effective. RAIM is an efficient and cost effective method but is not without 
limitations. It is not always possible to have redundant satellite measurements available, 
resulting in one or more RAIM 'holes'. In such cases, an effective alternative is to use 
external aiding. An Inertial Navigation System (INS) is a candidate system to provide 
such aiding (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). 
The INS is a form of a Deduced Reckoning (DR) system. Due to its stand-alone nature 
and complementary characteristics to space based systems, it has been used to enhance 
the accuracy of GPS for a long time and to provide backup during GPS outages (Cox, 
1998). During the last two decades, the use of INS for integrity monitoring of the GPS 
has been explored also (Brenner, 1987). However, the performance of the integrated 
(GPS/INS) system does not meet the aviation requirements particularly for the worst 
case failure modes like slowly growing errors (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). 
INS is based on using incremental measurements obtained from sensors, such as 
gyroscopes and accelerometers, to update the initial navigation 
information. The initial 
navigation parameters are obtained from external sources such as 
GPS or a pre-surveyed 
position. A digital computer is used to process the measurements 
from the sensor. Due 
to sensor properties, the error in the INS output grows with time. 
When compared to 
GPS, which has bounded error growth (i. e. long term stability), these systems are 
complementary in nature. Hence GPS and INS can be 
integrated to provide improved 
navigation perfonnance (Grewal et. al., 2001). 
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1.1.3. Integrity Monitoring of integrated GPS/INS integrated Systems 
An INS can be integrated with GPS in different ways, referred to as loosely coupled, 
tightly coupled and ultra-tightly (UT) coupled systems (Gautier, 2003). Loosely coupled 
systems are the simplest of the couplings and a position domain solution of GPS is used 
with a Kalman filter arrangement to estimate errors in the INS. A Kalman filter is a set 
of mathematical equations that provides an efficient computational means to estimate 
the states (or errors) of a process in a way that minimises the mean of the squared effors. 
The error estimates are then used as corrections to the INS output, giving improved 
position solutions. In a tightly coupled system, raw measurements of GPS are used in 
the Kalman filter and this is therefore a form of measurement domain coupling. The 
third type UT, or deep integration, consists of coupling raw signals from the GPS 
receiver with raw INS measurements in complex filtering arrangements. These filters 
can be cascaded Kalman filters or other types of non-linear filters (Gustafson and 
Dowdle, 2003; Kim et al., 2003). There are benefits of complex couplings in terms of 
accuracy in a jamming or a noisy environment. However, with respect to integrity, the 
effect of failures generated at the various levels of the two systems may be more 
significant than traditional couplings. 
There are failure modes related to INS, GPS and the integration mechanisms which are 
real threats to the integrity of the integrated system. To detect these failure modes, 
integrity monitoring algorithms are required for the integrated systems. Conceptually, 
these integrity algorithms for an integrated system are similar to those used for a stand 
alone GPS (Diesel and King, 1995). However, an essential difference is the use of a 
Kalman filter in the integrated system. The earlier integrity algorithms for GPS were 
designed with a least squares (LS) positioning algorithm in mind (e. g. Lee, 1986). When 
these were modified to suit the integrated system, the Kalman filtering approach was 
chosen instead of the traditional least squares method. 
Generally, two classes of integrity algorithms for an integrated system were 
developed. 
These are similar to GPS integrity algorithms and may thus 
be divided into the so-called 
range domain (or measurement domain) and position 
domain methods (Lee, 1986). This 
classification is based on the usage of specific variables 
for the determination of system 
integrity and is built on GPS integrity literature. 
However, another type of class has subsequently been proposed. 
This considers whether 
the measurements utilised are from the current epoch or whether 
historical 
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measurements are also utilised. Hence, the two classifications are snapshot and 
sequential (Nikiforov, 2002). Sequential methods are designed at the expense of 
additional computations in order to address a class of failure modes that grow slowly 
with time (i. e. called slowly growing errors or (SGEs)). These errors are typical of clock 
failures in a GPS satellite vehicle and are also present in an INS (Busca et al., 2003; 
Titterton and Weston, 2004). Integrity monitoring in the presence of slowly growing 
errors (SGEs) is a major challenge when aircraft navigation is based on GPS/INS 
integration (Lee and OLaughlin, 1999). 
Existing algorithms take a long time (in order of tens of minutes) to detect such types of 
errors (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999,2000). The most popular of these are Multiple 
Solution Separation (MSS) by Brenner (1995) and Autonomous Integrity monitoring by 
Extrapolation Method (AIME) by Diesel and King (1995). After the onset of failure, an 
alert should be generated within the time limit as dictated by the Time-to-Alert (TTA) 
requirement for the specific phase of flight. Hence, an early detection of failure is 
required especially for the phases of flight with short TTA requirements (e. g 6 second in 
the landing phase) (ICAO SARPS, 2004). A number of issues identified within this area 
of research are presented below. 
Current Research Issues 
In the existing research literature, the following shortcomings have been found with 
respect to the analysis of integrity for an integrated GPS/INS system. 
There is no comprehensive approach that addresses the integrity problem from 
the viewpoint of failure mode analysis (Van Dyke et al., 2003). 
After the switching off of Selective Availability (SA) the scope of usage of GPS 
in various phases of civilian flight has increased. SA is the intentional 
degradation of the GPS SPS accuracy by United States of America Department 
of Defence. However, an integrated failure mode approach is required to ensure 
safety of aviation. 
Failure mode analysis for the integrated system has not been addressed in the 
current literature although failure modes of GPS has been the subject of recent 
research (Ochieng et al., 2003; Van Dyke et al., 2003; Van Dyke et al., 2004). 
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* In the context of INS, failure modes analysis of the recent Micro-Electro- 
Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology based navigation sensors has not been 
caffied out. 
* There is no comprehensive approach to enable consideration of failure modes in 
simulation analysis as no guidance is available for the simulation of various 
types of failure modes. 
* There is no comparative analysis among the various architectures of the 
integrated system with regard to their abilities to provide integrity monitoring 
and their resistance to failure modes. 
9 The problem of Slowly Growing Errors (SGEs) is not addressed extensively as it 
poses a challenge in terms of its detection time especially for the approach and 
landing phases of flight (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). SGEs are typical of 
satellite clock failure and are also present in the INS (see section 4.5.1). 
* There is no provision in the existing integrity algorithms for integrated GPS/INS 
systems to isolate failures in the INS. In the case of multiple failures in GPS, 
these can be detected but when there is a failure in the INS it cannot be isolated. 
Hence, a comprehensive review of failure modes of the integrated system is needed. 
These failure modes should then be categorised so that they can be used to analyse the 
performance of the current integrity algorithms to verify the findings in the current 
literature with respect to 'difficult' failure modes. This should then be followed by the 
development of advanced algorithms needed to detect worst case failure modes 
sufficiently quickly so as to satisfy the ICAO integrity requirement (ICAO SARPS, 
2004). In order to achieve this, the shortcomings of the existing integrity algorithms, 
including the relatively late detection of slowly growing errors and the inability to 
isolate a failure in INS, should therefore be addressed. 
1.3. Aims and Objectives 
Given the background above, the aim of this thesis is to design robust integrity 
algorithms for an integrated GPS/INS system that circumvents the weaknesses of 
existing algorithms (such as late detection and consideration of INS failures). The 
following five objectives have been formulated to achieve this aim: 
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Review available air navigation systems and reflect on the transition from land- 
based navigation systems to space-based navigation systems. This should 
facilitate the identification of the best combination of navigation systems to meet 
the integrity requirements provided by the ICAO. This includes a detailed 
analysis of GPS and INS and possible coupling architectures to consider the 
utilisation of these systems for safety critical applications with particular 
reference to integrity monitoring. 
2. Review extensively the failure modes of the individual and the integrated 
systems,, and then categorise the behaviour of the failure modes according to 
their impact on the potential integrity requirements. 
3. Analyse the integrity algorithms used with GPS only and those used with 
integrated GPS/INS systems to gauge their capability to detect the failure modes 
identified. This analysis is to include the proposal and subsequent demonstration 
of effective integrity algorithms. 
4. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current sensor level integrity 
monitoring algorithms, including 'difficult' failure modes and failure scenarios. 
5. Propose and demonstrate (by simulation and real data) the power of the 
enhanced and/or new algorithms and methods to effectively address the 
'difficult' failure modes and scenarios identified above. 
Although the approach and methods presented in this thesis are generic in nature, the 
specific case of integrity of GPS/INS integration for aviation application is discussed. 
The outline of the research to fulfil these objectives is as presented below. 
1.4. Outline of this Thesis 
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. Chapter one provides the background to the 
study, its aims and objectives, and the outline of the thesis. 
In chapter two,, a variety of air navigation systems are described. The evolution of flight 
and phases of flight is described. This is followed by a brief history and description of 
air navigation system technologies. The description considers all currently available air 
navigation systems, their principles of operation and their current status. The systems 
are also classified in terms of the location of the source of the positioning signal i. e. as 
space based systems, aircraft based systems and ground based systems. The chapter 
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further discusses the required navigation performance for different phases of flight. The 
focus of this thesis is on the integrity requirements as this is the parameter most relevant 
to safety. Hence, the chapter ftirther describes the integrity requirements as defined by 
the ICAO. The current integrity methods for ground based systems are also discussed. 
This chapter ends with a consideration of providing integrity for GPS using external 
navigation aids such as INS. 
Chapter three describes the components and integration of GPS and INS,, and their 
integration as used in air navigation. After providing the concepts of satellite based 
navigation, the architecture of GPS is described. Important topics in GPS related to this 
thesis are also explained including the atomic clock, dilution of precision and 
atmospheric models. INS is also described including the construction of a typical 
gyroscope and accelerometer. This is followed by a description of the integration of the 
two systems by categorising into the different coupling architectures commonly referred 
to as loosely coupled systems, tightly coupled systems and deeply integrated systems. 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of existing integrated systems. 
In chapter four, an extensive review of the failure modes for GPS, INS and the 
integrated GPS/INS system is presented. A brief explanation of GPS error behaviour is 
followed by tabulation of failure modes of GPS. These are initially defined from the 
literature. However, a number of additional failure modes are also considered, that 
became apparent during the course of this research. Next, INS error behaviour is 
explained and its failure modes are tabulated in three categories; software failure modes, 
hardware failure modes and MEMS based failure modes. When INS and GPS are 
integrated, failure modes also arise due to the nature of the coupling. These are also 
compiled in the form of a table. In this way, important results about the integrated 
system can be inferred. The failure modes are then categorised according to their 
behaviour to form failure mode classes. These classes not only provide a useful 
mechanism to support the development of mathematical models but also help in the 
selection of 'difficult' failure modes. From this analysis, slowly growing errors (SGEs) 
are found to be the class of errors that are most difficult to detect. An error is the 
variation or deviation from the original value and becomes a failure when it crosses a 
designated limit. A failure mode is an error that has the potential to become a failure. 
Chapter five describes the existing methods of integrity monitoring considered in this 
research. The methods for ensuring the integrity of individual INS and GPS systems are 
explained first. Various categories of INS integrity monitoring methods are described 
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along with the issues that are specific to the recently emerging category of MEMS- 
based INS. Integrity monitoring of GPS is addressed in the literature in two different 
categories. These are integrity monitoring in the presence of single fault and in the 
presence of multiple faults. The unification of various integrity monitoring schemes is 
described. This is followed by a discussion of the methods for monitoring the integrity 
of the three integration (GPS/INS) architectures. In the case of tightly coupled systems, 
existing methods including the Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) method, the 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation Method (AIME) and Generalised 
Likelihood Ratio (GLR) method are covered. While in the case of the deeply integrated 
system, the GPS-Inertial (GI) RAIM method is described. Scope for further work is 
described that involves circumventing the limitations of current systems through the 
handling of SGEs and consideration of INS faults. 
Chapter six describes the development of a simulation platform in order to test the 
existing and proposed algorithms. After a brief overview of the simulation concept, 
important aspects of the aircraft trajectory simulation are described. This is followed by 
the description of the simulation developed for GPS. This includes the description of the 
simulation of different components of GPS and an explanation of the error models used. 
The simulation of INS is described next along with the derivation of the formulae 
required to represent the raw measurements of the accelerometers and gyroscopes. This 
is followed by a description of the simulation of the integrated system. Different types 
of error models are required for the various integration schemes employed in the 
simulation. These are explained in the context of the simulation. 
Chapter seven describes the simulation process used to assess the performance of the 
existing integrity algorithms. Characteristic plots are used to validate the simulation by 
verifying the underlying concepts. This includes the error behaviour of INS, GPS and 
the integrated system throughout the aircraft trajectory. After this, analyses of the test 
statistics of a typical integrity algorithm are carried out. This is done for both effor-free 
INS and for gyro-based error bias. The behaviour of the test statistics is then shown for 
slowly growing errors of different magnitudes. From this, it is concluded that the 
behaviour of the test statistics follows that of the error. Different plots from the 
implementation of the two integrity algorithms are shown for the detection of errors and 
for determining their horizontal protection limits. It is also shown how these algorithms 
behave when an error is introduced in the INS. The chapter ends with the description of 
limitations of the existing integrity algorithms. 
II 
Chapter eight discusses the development of enhanced algorithms for monitoring the 
integrity of the integrated system. It considers two main algorithms. The first algorithm 
is based on the detection of the rate of change of the test statistics and is referred to in 
this thesis as the rate detector algorithm. This is especially suited to the detection of 
SGEs. The simulation results for detection of a very slowly growing effor show a 
substantial improvement in detection time as compared to the conventional algorithms. 
The second part of the proposed algorithm deals with the situation when there are 
multiple failures. Algorithms to detect multiple failures are considered in the literature. 
However, none of these consider INS failure in an integrated environment. The newly 
proposed algorithm provides the isolation of INS and GPS measurements and hence can 
detect a fault in the INS. Various improvements offered by this algorithin are discussed. 
This is followed by a simulation analysis of the multiple failure scenario. It is shown 
that the proposed algorithm not only detects multiple failures in GPS measurements but 
can also detect faults in the INS. 
Chapter nine describes the use of real data to validate the algorithms proposed in this 
research. The characteristics of GPS and IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) data are 
described. This is then followed by the details on the profile of real data. The results for 
the rate detector algorithm and for the newly proposed piggyback scheme (for the 
detection of multiple failures) are then presented for the case of SGEs. Comparison is 
also made with the results for the existing algorithms. The conclusions drawn from the 
comparison of real data and simulation analysis are then discussed. 
Chapter ten presents conclusions and recommendations for further research. The thesis 
ends with a list of publications arising out of this research. 
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2. Air Navigation 
2.1. Introduction 
Aircraft navigation has seen phenomenal growth after its advent approximately 100 
years ago. The drivers for this progress are military dominance and rapid increase in 
travel demand. Due to the rapid evolution of modem aircraft navigation systems, 
aviation requirements have been introduced in such a way that these are independent of 
the navigation technology utilised. These requirements are currently defined for four 
performance parameters; accuracy, availability, integrity and continuity. Of these, 
integrity is the parameter directly related to safety. This chapter traces both the 
evolution of the way in which air navigation performance is specified culminating in the 
concept of required navigation performance (RNP) developed by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) alongside the evolution of aircraft navigation systems 
and devices. The basic principles of operation of the navigation aids and their 
performances are explained, and compared to the relevant specifications for air 
navigation with a specific reference to integrity. 
2.2. Evolution of Air Traffic Procedures 
The Wright brothers' made the first heavier-than-air machine powered flight on 
December 17,1903 (Kayton, 2003). This experiment started the era of powered flight. 
Over the last 100 years there has been a substantial increase in air navigation due to the 
military use of aircraft and a large increase in travel demand worldwide. In the early 
days of the twentieth century, navigation of aircraft was performed by a human 
navigator with minimum conflicting traffic, flying over simple routes. However, 
considerable growth in air traffic and improvement in the relevant technologies resulted 
in high speed aircraft in congested airspace. Hence, flight procedures have seen a steady 
evolution over time. In this section the history of flight procedures is reviewed briefly. 
Aircraft were used for military purposes in World War 1. An international convention of 
air navigation was held in Europe in 1919, soon after World War I (Gilbert,, 1973). This 
convention recognised the right of a state with regard to maintaining sovereignty over 
its airspace. Another significant development, the commercial use of aircraft started in 
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the 1920s when mail planes became routine (Kayton, 2003). The earliest airways were 
lit by flashing lamps on towers. The airways connected cities with each city's roofs 
painted with its name. Flights were completed by visual means. 
In the USA, the Air Commerce Act was passed in 1926. Consequently by 1930, radio 
equipped airport traffic control towers became established by local municipal 
authorities. Instrument flying began in 1933 and by 1935 several airlines jointly formed 
the first Airway Traffic control (ATC) centres to safeguard their aircraft against midair 
collisions. The first ATC was formed in 1936 by the federal government of the USA 
(Gilbert, 1973). This pioneered the development of ATC procedures, rules and 
regulations and the establishment of a nationwide ATC system. The advent of radar 
during World War 11 started the era of next generation systems. This was marked by the 
operational use of radar and pilot to operator communication. This enabled the landing 
procedure called Ground Controlled Approach (GCA). 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was formed in 1947. It is an 
agency of the United Nations. Its charter is to foster the planning and development of 
International Air Transport. ICAO chose the US based Very high frequency Omni- 
Ranging systems (VOR) for navigation in overland airways after World War II. These 
were installed worldwide and are still the mainstay of overland civil navigation 
(Kayton, 2003). An elaborate system of ATC has evolved based on VOR. In this system 
the airspace was been divided into sectors in which human controllers are responsible 
for issuing instructions. En route airspace, terminal airspace and airport control zones 
each having their own radio frequencies and navigation aids, were defined (discussed in 
section 2.2). Most oceans were free flight areas (without external navigation 
information available), usually with flight information centres in the coastal regions. 
Congestion of airways was relieved at the beginning of the 1970s by area navigation (R- 
NAV) in which new signals from existing VORs and Distance Measuring Equipment 
(DME) were used to calculate departure from these airways and the distance along them 
(Kayton, 2003). These systems are known as point source systems (see Table 2.3). This 
concept was introduced because aircraft usually fly from one VOR to the other and 
finally to the destination airport. However, this created congestion along specific paths. 
Hence, the use of other navigation systems such as aircraft based Doppler radar was 
approved in order to meet the specified accuracies. Hence using these systems, aircraft 
can directly navigate to the destination airport (Nolan, 1994). 
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In the early 1960s the third generation of air traffic control systems started due to 
advances in automation and the advent of the space based navigation systems. The new 
vision of ATC was presented by ICAO in the early 1970s. This culminated in the 
establishment of the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) committee later in 1983 
(Whelan, 2001a). The committee was later superseded in 1989 by the FANS phase II 
committee. From the work of these committees the concept of Communication 
Navigation Surveillance/ Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) emerged (further details 
in section 2.4). An important aspect of the navigation plan supported by CNS/ATM is 
the use of space based navigation systems. In contrast to the air based and land based 
navigation systems (as discussed in section 2.3) space based navigation systems have 
the potential to be used throughout the flight profile. Hence, performance requirements 
were introduced related to each phase of flight (these are discussed in section 2.5). 
Today aircraft undergo typical phases of flight that are well defmed both in terms of 
operations and the required navigation performance (National Research Council, 1998). 
Figure 2-1 shows the typical phases of flight. These phases of flight are described in the 
next sub-sections, including where relevant the navigation systems currently used 
(details in Tables 2-3,2-4 and 2-5). 
2.2.1. Pre Flight Planning 
The time slot for the departure of a commercial aircraft is fmalised about three hours 
prior to the departure and is about ten to fifteen minutes long. The navigation 
information including navigation charts and weather reports are made available in the 
cockpit via the aircraft from a ground link. Weather information includes data on wind, 
visibility and humidity including the icing conditions along the intended route. Icing 
conditions are those atmospheric conditions that can lead to the formation of ice on the 
surface of an aircraft. Information on relevant air navigation facility outages, status of 
relevant special use airspace and anticipated traffic congestion and delays are provided 
also. 
The flight crew then develops the flight plan that enunciates whether the flight 
operations will be according to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight Rules 
(VFR). Further data in the flight plan include the aircraft identification, its make and 
model, planned true airspeed and cruising altitude; the origin, destination, and alternate 
airports; the planned departure time and estimated time en route; the planned route of 
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flight; the fuel on board and navigation capabilities onboard (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
At the planned departure time the aircraft starts taxiing. 
Climb ': Descent Cruise En route 
Initial 
Approach 
Final 
Approach Initial 
Climb 
Take off Landing Taxiing 
Figure 2-1: Flight Phases for Typical Aircraft trajectory 
2.2.2. Taxiing 
Taxiing is defined to begin when the aircraft manoeuvres towards the active departure 
runway and ends when it reaches the departure runway. The local controller clears the 
aircraft onto the departure runway. A Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screen in the 
cockpit shows the map of the runway and a thick line shows the route of the aircraft. 
The pilot manually steers the aircraft for taxiing or uses an autopilot. The flight 
management system (FMS) is updated with the initial position of the aircraft. This 
provides a reference for onboard deduced reckoning systems. The aircraft taxis to the 
threshold of the active departure runway to proceed to takeoff (Nolan, 1994). 
2.2.3. Takeoff 
The Takeoff phase starts when the aircraft is accelerated on the active departure runway. 
The aircraft is guided along the centreline manually or automatically, coupled to an 
autopilot typically receiving steering signals from an ILS (Instrument Landing System) 
localizer. The ILS was initially designed for landing but is also used in the takeoff stage 
(see Table 2-3). The aircraft attains the required takeoff velocity and is then pitched up 
gradually to become airborne. 
A number of measurements take place at the time of takeoff- 
a) The ground speed at which an aborted takeoff is possible (during the 
takeoff run) is compared to the actual ground speed as displayed by the 
navigation system. 
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b) The airspeed at which the nose is to be lifted is compared to the actual 
airspeed as displayed by the air-data navigation system. The altitude rate 
of the aircraft is measured and monitored by combined use of an INS and 
a baro-altimeter. 
At takeoff, the actual departure time is updated by the flight computer and is transmitted 
to the airline operations and the air traffic control. 
2.2.4. En Route 
The aircraft climbs to the cruising altitude. In the en-route phase, airways are defined by 
means of waypoints. These are defined by navigation aids over land and by latitude- 
longitude fixes over water. The definition of airways was revolutionized by the advent 
of the DME and high quality INS in the 1970s (Kayton and Fried, 1997). In the long 
term future, it is expected that an aircraft will follow the concept of free-flight (Galotti, 
1998). This is defined by a safe and efficient flight operation capability under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in which the crew have the freedom to select their path 
and speed in real time (Whelan, 2001 a). 
In a future autonomous airspace, an aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems 
will be free to change its route according to its needs. However, the risk of a collision 
must be sufficiently small to maintain and exceed existing safety standards. Currently, 
during all phases of flight, aircraft transponders provide altitude reports in response to 
the interrogation of Air Traffic control. About 200 miles from the destination, speed is 
reduced and the aircraft starts initial descent (Kayton and Fried, 1997). The terminal 
area starts at the end of the en route phase when the aircraft reaches the service area of 
the destination airport radar. 
2.2.5. Approach and Landing 
At the end of the en route phase, the air traffic controller instructs the pilot to turn the 
aircraft appropriately to intercept the radio waves of a VOR or a Non-Directional 
Beacon (NDB) near the destination airport. The approach phase begins with the 
acquisition of a NDB or a VOR signal near the airport. This is termed as Non Precision 
Approach (NPA). A NPA has electronic guidance only in the horizontal direction. it 
continues until the airport is in sight. Loran (Long Range Navigation) and 
GPS have 
also been approved for non-precision approaches at many airports 
in the United States 
(Galloti, 1998). Details on Loran are given in section 2.3. 
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In the precision approach, vertical guidance is also provided hence it is called Precision 
Approach with Vertical guidance (APV). It is of two types (based on accuracy 
specifications) APVI and APVII (see Table 2-2). During the precision approach and 
landing phase, the Decision Height (DH) is the height above the runway at which the 
approach must be aborted if the required visual reference is not obtained. The required 
visual reference may be a fully visible runway or a few identifiable lights on the 
runway. The better the landing aids, the lower the decision height. Decision heights are 
published for each runway at each airport. A precision approach may not be attempted 
unless the horizontal visibility, measured by a Runway Visual Range (RVR) instrument, 
meets the requirements (see Table 2-1). There are three types of landing categories 
defined for landing. Among these Category III is divided into three fin-ther sub- 
categories. Table 2-1 presents the DH and RVR requirements for each of the category 
and sub-categories. 
From Table 2-1, it can be seen that the decision height is shown in feet while the visual 
range is shown in metres (Whelan, 2001b). This is because these units are used 
conventionally for these quantities. Cat 11 landing must be conducted with a flight 
director or an autopilot for a complete automatic landing. Cat II precision approaches 
have the added requirement that the aircraft, its systems and the airport's landing aid 
should facilitate roll-out and taxiing of the aircraft under electronic control. There are no 
entries in the Cat III table because these have not been determined yet. However, work 
towards this direction is ongoing (Schuster and Ochieng, 2006). For low ceiling and low 
visibility approaches, an ILS is used. A Microwave Landing System (MLS) when used 
for precision approaches performs better than an ILS and has been approved by ICAO. 
The ILS and MLS are discussed further in section 2.3. 
During the landing phase aircraft go through two manoeuvres; flare and decrab. Flare is 
the landing manoeuvre during which the nose of the aircraft is gradually (not sharply! ) 
raised to overcome the aircraft downward momentum. During landings in the presence 
of crosswind, the aircraft is 'crabbed' at an angle with wings level so that its velocity 
vector is aligned with the ILS localizer signals. The alignment of the aircraft 
immediately prior to touchdown is called the decrab manoeuvre. Navigation during flare 
and decrab may be visual or the navigation set's electrical output may be coupled to an 
autopilot. A radio altimeter measures the height of the main landing gear above the 
runway for guiding the flare. The rollout is guided by the ILS localizer. In the case RVR 
is not established, the pilot conducts a missed approach. 
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Table 2-1: Decision Heights and Runway Visual Ranges for different landing 
categories (Whelan, 2001b) 
Landing Category Sub 
Category 
Decision Height (ft) Runway Visual Range 
(M) 
Category 1 200 550 
Category 11 100 300 
Category III A Below 100 200 
B Below 50 Less than 200 
C 
2.2.6. Missed Approach 
Due to poor visibility, poor alignment with the runway, equipment failure or conflicting 
traffic, a missed approach may be initiated by the pilot's option or at the request of an 
air traffic controller. The flight path and altitude profile for a missed approach are 
published on the approach plates of an airport. It consists of a climb to a predetermined 
holding position fix at which the aircraft awaits further instructions. For a missed 
approach, terminal area navigation aids are used such as the ILS (Nolan, 1994). 
2.2.7. Surface Movement 
The surface movement of the aircraft on the airport is a major limitation to airport 
capacity in instrument meteorological conditions. The navigation is carried out visually 
by the crew with visual monitoring support from the control tower and/or by means of a 
surveillance radar. This last phase of flight is similar to the initial taxiing operation and 
requires similar navigation instruments. 
For the phases of flight discussed above, the accuracy requirements defined by 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) are given in Table 2-2. This table 
shows that an aircraft needs to have equipment with the listed specifications 
for the 
particular phase of flight as discussed above. 
The evolution of flight procedures, the current status of the phases of 
flight and the 
corresponding navigation systems have been 
described in this section. The next section 
deals with the evolution of air navigation technology. 
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Table 2-2: Accuracy specification for different phases of flight 
Accuracy Specifications (ICAO 
-- 
Standards And Recommended 
Practices - SARPS, 2004) 
Phase of Flight Accuracy (95%) 
Oceanic 12.4 nmi 
En-route 2.0 nmi 
Terminal 0.4 mni 
NPA (Non Precision Approach) 220 m 
APVI 220 m (H) 20 m (V) 
APVII 16 m (H) 8m (V) 
CAT (Category) 1 16 m (H) 4-6 m (V) 
CAT 11 6.9 m (H) 2m (V) 
CAT 111 6.2 m (H) 2m (V) 
2.3. Evolution of Air Navigation Technology 
Navigation of an aircraft consists of the detennination of three variables in space and 
time. These are the position, velocity and attitude (or orientation) of the air vehicle. 
Navigation technology has evolved considerably over the last century. 
Navigation in aviation was carried out by visual means at the time of the invention of 
powered aircraft. The art of navigation started taking shape with the advent of long haul 
flights such as over the Atlantic. Early flights over the Atlantic were perfonned in the 
1920s. The navigation of such flights was carried out by a human navigator who used 
celestial fixes to obtain current position measurements (Kayton, 2003). 
Non-directional beacons (NDBs) were mainly used for flight from 1929-1948. These 
are essentially signal emitters located at the airports, with the airborne receivers having 
the capability to home in towards their direction. Any crosswind effect on the aircraft is 
corrected by use of a magnetic compass. The range of a typical NDB extends to 100 
miles and is not aPPrOPriate for long flights. In an aircraft, an Airborne Direction Finder 
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(ADF) is installed that takes bearings of the ground transmitters. The use of such point 
source systems is commonplace even after eighty decades of development. 
On long flights, airspeed measurement was resolved into its North-East components and 
position obtained by dead-reckoning. In the 1930s, British aircraft used mechanical 
computers equipped with a magnetic compass known as Course and Distance Calculator 
(CDC) (Ayliffe, 2001 a). During the era of World War 11, four types of dead reckoning 
were in use (Kayton, 2003) 
a) by measuring airspeeds using pitot tubes (to measure outside airpressure) and 
manually calculating position from them. 
b) calculation of position relative to the surveyed airport of departure or along a 
radio beam (whose over-flight was indicated by an audible null). 
c) analogue air data computers to derive true airspeed and altitude from pressure 
measurements obtained. 
d) celestial fixes were obtained using bubble sextants and a compass during long 
haul flights over the ocean. 
The heading of the aircraft was typically indicated by a magnetic compass. The 
magnetic compasses used were floated in alcohol to keep them level on the aircraft. 
Improvements on these were obtained by the use of a flux-gate magnetic compass. The 
heading from the compass was stored using mechanical instruments which have 
nowadays been replaced by expensive computers. However, magnetic compasses are 
not useful at high latitudes (Kayton, 2003). Gyrocompass technology was refined during 
World War II to provide better quality heading data worldwide. Based on these 
gyroscopes, a primitive INS called the Space Inertial Reference System (SPIRE) was 
developed in the late 1940s and used in transcontinental flight in 1953 (Ayliffe, 2001b). 
INS history is presented later in this section. 
By 1946, VOR had become the US standard for airway navigation. The principle of 
operation of the VOR is like that of the NDB (which is a point-source system) and is 
still the overland navigation aid for most of the world's aircraft (Kayton, 2003). 
Distance Measuring Equipment (DMEs) were also co-located with VORs to generate 
pulses for aircraft ranging. Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) were also developed at 
the same time to provide signals for landing operations. Another landing system in 
common use today i. e. Microwave Landing System (MLS) was conceived in the mid 
21 
1970s. This was necessary to circumvent the main weakness of the ILS which is its 
sensitivity to the terrain (e. g. reflecting surfaces) and the local atmospheric conditions 
(e. g. moisture content). This is achieved by the use of a narrow beam-width of the MLS. 
The ICAO recommended the MLS as the standard landing system in 1978 and planned 
the transition from the ILS to the MLS in 1998 (Kayton and Fried, 1997). However, due 
to the advent of GPS, this was not carried out as planned because of plans for the 
transition from ground based systems to space based systems (Whelan, 2001a). Point 
source systems suffer from errors depending on source location. Later on systems 
referred to as hyperbolic were developed to minimise this error. 
An early hyperbolic system was Loran. The first version of Loran was developed just 
before the outbreak of World War II (Kayton and Fried, 1997). Loran measures the 
difference in time of arrival of eight signals from station pairs. These are arranged in 
Master-Slave chains. Two or three slaves receive the coded pulses from the master and 
transmit their own eight pulse codes. The airborne receiver measures the time delay 
between receiving the master and slave pulses, thus locating the aircraft on a hyperbola 
whose foci are the master and slave transmitting antennas. 
Another hyperbolic system known as Omega was initiated in 1970 based on eight 
stations worldwide. It required continuous, uninterrupted reception from the point of 
takeoff hence was a DR system. It was switched off in 1997, as after the advent of GPS 
it was considered obsolete (Kayton, 2003). Radars were also developed on the basis of 
transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves. 
Airborne Radars were originally developed during World War II. These perform 
essentially the same function of visual mapping of the terrain by a pilot. Modem radars 
are known as Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR). They produce fine resolution images 
with narrow fields of view (Kayton and Fried, 1997). A SAR image is created by 
measuring the velocity of the aircraft precisely for several seconds while synthesizing 
the image from the Doppler-shifted radar returns (Kayton, 2003). Another form of radar 
that is employed to find the height above the ground is known as radar altimeter and is 
in common use. Alongside the development of radionavigation systems, inertial 
instruments exhibit a steady growth (Kayton, 2003). 
An INS contains sensors that measure acceleration and angular rate of the aircraft which 
are later processed to get the position, velocity and attitude 
information. The earliest 
inertial instruments and computers were mechanical by construction. These evolved 
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from the marine gyrocompass invented in 1905 (Kayton, 2003). Over the years, these 
bulky navigators were reduced to a smaller size, allowing them to be fitted onboard an 
aircraft. Redundant inertial navigators were used to detect excessive drift typically 
exhibited by an INS. The best of the systems were then used for aircraft navigation. 
These started to be updated by a VOR fix whenever available during the mid part of the 
twentieth century. 
Early INSs were platform based. In these systems, accelerometers were mounted on a 
mechanical platform maintained to a known orientation by gyroscopes and precise 
electric servo motors. The Attitude, Heading and Reference system (AHRS) is another 
type of INS which provides the three dimensional attitude of the aircraft. It does not 
have the capability of calculating the position solution. These were less expensive and 
were extensively used in general aviation aircraft. Presently, strapdown systems are 
more commonly used, in which the sensors are directly fitted to the body of the aircraft 
(Titterton and Weston, 2004). The INS is discussed further in Chapter 3. The most 
recent class of navigation systems is the space based navigation systems. 
Space based navigation systems were developed in the 1970s and 1980s and GPS 
attained its FOC (Full Operational Capability) in 1995. It is becoming the dominant 
navigation aid for air navigation and its use is currently approved for en route to non- 
precision approach phases of flight in many countries. The performance specifications 
for an approved GPS receiver are given in the Technical Standing Order (TSO) 
document No. C129 (Federal Aviation Administration, 1996). Furthermore, with the 
development of special augmentation systems, GPS is planned to be used in the 
precision approach and landing phases of flight. These augmentation systems include 
the US Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), the European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and the Local Area Augmentation System 
(LAAS) (Schlueter et al., 2006). WAAS and EGNOS are based on space based satellites 
and ground based monitor stations. The monitor stations monitor the GPS signals. The 
data from the monitor stations is processed by the Master control station to provide 
integrity information to the users via geo-stationery satellites. LAAS is based on a 
Differential GPS (DGPS) network around an airport to aid in the precision approach and 
landing phases of flight. GPS and DGPS are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Tables 2-3,2-4 and 2-5 present a summary of the current aircraft navigation systems. 
These tables represent the three classes of navigation systems according to the physical 
location of the source of navigation. The principle of operation, performance level and 
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limitations are presented for each navigation system along with its current status. Note 
that apart from the physical location of the source(s) of the navigation signals, 
navigation systems can also be classified according to their principle of operation, or 
their type of navigation output. In this thesis, the navigation systems are classified on 
the basis of the physical location of the source of the navigation signal. This is 
important with respect to the objective of this thesis for the following reasons 
a) This thesis addresses air navigation and the issue of transition from land based 
navigation systems to space based navigation systems. Hence, classification by 
physical location of the source is the logical categorisation to use. 
b) This thesis is concerned with safety which is quantified by the performance 
requirement known as integrity. Integrity is primarily assured through 
redundancy. Redundancy can be provided with maximum benefit when the 
systems providing redundancy are at different Physical locations. For example, 
in the case of the integration of GPS and INS, ionospheric scintillations (see 
section 3.3.3.1) would only affect the GPS range measurements and not the INS. 
Tables 2-3,2-4,2-5 and 2-6 refer to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
(RTCA) standards. This commission includes roughly 335 industry and academic 
organisations from around the world. It is a not-for-profit corporation that develops 
consensus-based recommendations regarding Communications, Navigation, 
Surveillance, and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system issues (see section 2.4). 
It has developed a number of standards for navigation systems (Kayton and Fried, 
1997). 
In addition to the land based systems described in Table 2-3, there are special systems 
for military use including the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Relative 
Navigation (JTIDS RelNav) and the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS). The 
principal of operation of these systems is similar to the hyperbolic systems. However, 
details on their performance are classified (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
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Table 2-3 gives an overview of the land-based systems used for current aircraft 
navigation, and includes systems used for homing towards an airport as well as those 
required for landing at an airport. The first five systems described are airport based 
while the others are different types of hyperbolic systems. These are the navigation 
systems that produces hyperbolic lines of position (LOPs) through the measurement of 
the difference in times of reception (or phase difference) of radio signals from two or 
more synchronised transmitters at fixed points. 
It can be seen that future continuation of use of the current air navigation systems is 
strongly influenced by the progress in space based systems. GNSS is planned to be used 
for all phases of flight. However, it must be acknowledged that other critical landing 
systems such as ILS or systems that can provide effective backup to GPS will be 
maintained. The potential of satellite based navigation systems to provide global 
coverage has driven the navigation research towards the use of GNSS for Civil Aviation 
(ICAO SARPS, 2004) (see Table 2-2). The ICAO defmed performance requirements for 
this purpose, are independent of equipment utilised but dependent on the particular 
phase of flight. Strategies for air navigation are driven by the European and North 
American sectors as these comprise 76% of the world's total air passenger traffic 
(Whelan, 2001 a). 
The information provided in Tables 2-3,2-4 and 2-5 on the current and future 
navigation system is shown graphically in Figures 2-2 and 2-3. 
Figure 2-2 shows the transition from ground based systems to space based systems as 
discussed in the US Federal RadioNavigation Plan (2005). The timeline for use of 
different navigation systems from 2002 until 2019 is shown along the x-axis while 
along the y-axis different navigation systems are shown. It is stated in the plan that the 
need for ground based navigation services will diminish and the number of federally 
provided ground based services will be reduced accordingly. The fully shaded bars 
show the systems that will remain in full use such as the DME, TACAN and ILS for 
CAT 11 and III. The tapering down of the bars shows the corresponding navigation 
systems that will be phased out gradually such as the NDB. Planned use of ffiture 
navigation systems such as LAAS and WAAS is also shown. For example, WAAS is 
planned to achieve full LPV performance in 2008 and the GLS (GNSS Landing 
Segment) by 2015. In the figure the use of GPS with Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) is not shown because no infrastructure is required to be built for 
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this purpose. This is because it is a user level algorithm that can be placed alongside the 
conventional GPS positioning algorithm with almost no extra cost. 
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Figure 2-2 : Proposed Civil Aeronautical Navigation and Landing Transition in the 
USA (Federal RadioNavigation Plan, 2005) 
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Figure 2-3 : Expected Navigation Infrastructure evolution until 2015 in Europe 
(Schlueter et al., 2006) 
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Similar plans are underway in the second biggest aviation sector i. e. Europe. These are 
shown in Figure 2-3. This figure is structured in a similar way as Figure 2-2 with the 
time-line along the x-axis and navigation systems along the y-axis. The introduction 
phase for the systems such as SBAS and MLS are shown by taper up bars. 
A major difference between the US and European plans is that of the status of GBAS. 
LAAS may be ready in the US far earlier than in Europe where it is just in the planning 
stage. However, the local establishments of Galileo will effectively provide services of a 
GBAS, when ready. Since, after the advent of Galileo it may not be necessary to build 
GBAS if it performs according to its planned specifications. The use of LORAN will be 
continued in the USA while there are no such plans (at the time of writing this thesis) in 
Europe. However, research in the UK is exploring the integration of GPS and LORAN 
(Hide et al., 2006). 
To streamline the transition from ground based navigation systems to space based 
navigation systems, it is necessary to specify the required navigation performance. 
These are discussed in the next section. 
2.4. Navigation 
Aviation 
Performance Requirements for 
Space based navigation systems were conceived in the 1960s and consequently their use 
for civil air navigation was recommended in 1972 by the ICAO in its 7 th Air Navigation 
Conference (Assad, 2000). ICAO formed a special committee in 1983 called the Future 
Air Navigation Systems (FANS) committee. The tasks of the committee were to 
(Whelan, 2001 a): 
a) study, identify and assess new technologies, including satellite technology and 
b) make recommendations for the future development of air navigation for civil 
aviation over a twenty five year period. 
The committee concluded in 1988 that the current ATC systems were incapable of 
supporting future civil air navigation needs and that satellite technology has the 
potential to provide the only viable solution. 
Subsequently the ICAO set up the FANS 11 committee in 1989 to monitor and 
coordinate the development and transition planning to the future air navigation systems. 
This committee completed its work in 1993 and introduced the CNS/ATM concept. The 
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CNS/ATM concept encapsulated the objectives of ICAO's FANS which are (Whelan, 
2001 a) to 
enhance communication links between aircraft and ATC 
improve pilot's ability to navigate the aircraft safely 
increase air traffic controller's capacity to monitor and survey flights 
apply more efficient and flexible air traffic management techniques 
The global air navigation plan is part of the CNS/ATM concept. In this plan, successful 
implementation of the GNSS would support seamless worldwide navigation for all 
phases of flight (Assad, 2000). The traditional method of carrying certain types of 
equipment is replaced by meeting the required navigation performance for the relevant 
phase of flight. This in effect, paves the way for the use of satellite based navigation 
equipment in aviation. The navigation aspect of CNS/ATM is covered by the definition 
of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) as described below. 
2.4.1. Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
RNP is a term defined by the ICAO and is a statement of the navigation performance 
for operation within a defined airspace, independent of the equipment utilised (ICAO 
SARPS, 2004). RNP specifications are defined for different phases of flight. For 
example, RNP-x means that for a particular phase of flight, x is the accuracy 
specification of the navigation equipment. This navigation equipment can be onboard, 
or outside the aircraft or a combination of both. The navigation performance parameter 
emphasized upon in the traditional definition of RNP is accuracy. Later a new term 
emerged referred to as RNP/RNAV where RNAV stands for Area Navigation. Figure 
2-4 shows the difference between RNP and RNP/RNAV. The left part of the figure 
shows the accuracy bound for the vertical position of an aircraft. The RNP-x parameter 
specifies that the aircraft navigation system must provide the vertical position of an 
aircraft with a required accuracy (defined by x) for 95% of the time. The reference for 
this accuracy is the true position (represented by the position of the aircraft in Figure 
2-4). The right side of the figure presents the situation for RNP-x/RNAV. There is a 
new containment region (also see Figure 2-5) which is two times the 95% accuracy 
bound (2x above and below the centreline). The aircraft navigation system can only 
cross the new bounds (the containment region) with a pre-defined probability (e. g. 
i o-5 /hr). 
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Figure 2-4: The difference between RNP and RNAV 
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Hence, the second term (RNAV) encompasses not only the accuracy for a certain phase 
of flight but also the integrity and continuity parameters of the flight. The benefits of 
RNP/RNAV over the conventional navigation are in terms of safety and operational 
efficiency. The benefits are given as below 
a) The introduction of accurate levels of RNP will help to maintain a 
predictable and orderly air traffic flow. 
b) The aircraft need not follow specific paths defined by source reference 
navigation equipment. Source reference navigation equipment is the 
equipment that generates signals according to its location and hence 
aircraft is bound to follow a certain course to use it. 
c) This concept provides seamless acceptance of space based navigation 
systems in aviation. With the increased navigation capability of the new 
equipment, airspace capacity can be increased. 
d) The RNP/RNAV concept also takes into account the obstacle clearance 
and hence is a significant step towards the concept of free flight. 
According to this concept, each aircraft would agree on a route before 
takeoff and then be free to change the route, after aircraft based conflict 
detection and resolution and inter-aircraft communication verify that the 
risk of collision is sufficiently low. 
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The aviation requirements defined in terms of accuracy, availability, integrity and 
continuity are described briefly below (Ochieng et. al., 2003). 
2.4.2. Accuracy 
Accuracy is defined as the degree of conformance of an estimated or measured position 
at a given time to a defined reference value. This term is treated differently when the 
transition from ground based systems to space based systems is considered. Stationary 
ground based systems such as the ILS or VOR have relatively repeatable characteristics 
so that once performance is measured during flight inspection, it is assumed that the 
accuracy does not change until the next inspection. The situation is different for GNSS. 
Due to the continuous orbiting of satellites and propagation of signals in the 
atmosphere, the system error characteristics change in location and time. The accuracy 
requirement of a GNSS is specified at the 95 th percentile i. e. for any estimated position 
at a specific location, the probability that the position error is within the accuracy 
requirement should be at least 95%. 
2.4.3. Integrity 
Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information 
supplied by the total system. This includes the ability of a system to provide timely and 
valid warnings to the user when the system must not be used for the intended operation. 
For this purpose, alert limits are defined for position errors for different phases of flight. 
These represent the largest position error values that should not be exceeded by the 
navigation system. The system should generate a warning if the limit is exceeded. 
Further this warning must be generated within an acceptable maximum time to alert. 
The requirements given for integrity are the integrity risk, alert limit and Time-To-Alert 
(TTA). Integrity risk, therefore, relates to the probability that a position failure occurs 
without generation of an alert within the TTA. The other relevant terminology is 
defined below 
Position Failure is defined to occur whenever the difference between the true position 
and the derived position exceeds the applicable alert limit. 
The Probability of Missed Detection is the probability of not detecting a position 
failure. 
The Probability ofFalse Alert is the probability of the indication of a positioning failure 
when a positioning failure has not occurred. 
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For GNSS, the integrity risk requirement is more stringent than for the ground based 
systems. This is due to the fact that failures in the GNSS signals can affect a much 
larger number of aircraft simultaneously in comparison to a ground based system. 
2.4.4. Continuity 
Continuity is the capability of the system to perform its function without unscheduled 
interruptions during the intended operation. The function of the navigation system 
includes not only accuracy but also integrity. Hence, the continuity of service relates to 
the capability of the navigation system to provide navigation output, with the specified 
accuracy and integrity, throughout the intended operation, assuming that it was 
available at the start of the operation. Continuity failure results from the generation of 
alerts that may be due to the rare fault-free performance or due to actual failures. Rare 
fault free alert is referred to an alert generated without presence of a fault and may be 
due to excessive noise. 
In effect, the continuity parameter shows the reliability of the system. It is hence related 
to the Mean Time Between Outages (MTBO) of the system. Continuity risk is 
associated with a failure that cannot be excluded before loss of detection function. 
Ranges of values are given for the continuity requirements. This is because it is 
dependent on many factors including intended operation, traffic density, complexity of 
airspace and availability of alternative navigation aids. 
2.4.5. Availability 
The availability of a system is characterised by the portion of time during which reliable 
navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot or other flight management 
system. The navigation service is said to be available if accuracy, integrity and 
continuity requirements are satisfied. The availability of GNSS depends on the relative 
geometry of the coverage area and available satellites and the potentially long time to 
restore a satellite in the event of a failure. This is in contrast to the availability of ground 
based systems that is ensured through self monitoring and by using field based 
monitors. Availability is characterised by MTBF and MTTR (Mean Time To Repair). 
These values for GNSS are not available as the design life of the system has not 
matured. Hence, the availability of GNSS is determined through design, analysis and 
modelling. 
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The performance requirements are implemented by using the concept of a protection 
zone. The protection zone that is required for the safety of the aircraft is shown in 
Figure 2-5. 
Protection Zone 
2 VAL 
Estimated 
Trajectory 
True Trajectory 
------ -- ----- -------- 
Acceptable Error 
si0or ing osi 'o si 
FFa' re 
L 
Density of 
AcceptablE 
Errors 
of 
ing 
e 
Figure 2-5: Aircraft containment within safety zone (source Nikiforov, 2002) 
As shown in the figure, if the aircraft goes out of the protection zone (a positioning 
failure) an alert should be raised with a high probability. Integrity and continuity are 
specified with respect to the containment region. The containment region is twice the 
value of the RNP i. e. if the RNP is 100 in the RNAV containment region is 200 in. Also 
RNP/RNAV has the functional requirements to signal the loss of RNP capability in the 
crew's primary field of view. The crew will be alerted when the Total System Error 
(TSE) is greater than the containment limit. 
TSE is the root sum square of the navigation source error, airborne component error, 
display error and flight technical error. The containment limit represents a probability of 
99.999% or better per flight-hour that an undetected fault has not occurred. The 
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Density of 
Nominal Errors 
containment continuity is the capability of the total system to satisfy the containment 
integrity required without unscheduled interruptions during the intended operation. 
A recent step by ICAO is the introduction of the Performance Based Navigation (PBN) 
concept (ICAO, 2006). PBN is being introduced to meet the increasing demands of 
airspace planners and aircraft operators. This is anticipated to harmonise the currently 
designated RNP and RNAV applications under one harmonised standard. A complete 
set of navigation specifications is being developed in close coordination with states, 
industry and airlines, based on the needs in different regions. 
The performance requirement that is directly related to safety is integrity. The fact that 
the GPS SPS does not provide means to monitor the integrity (in real time) precludes its 
use for safety critical applications. In the next section, integrity monitoring of critical 
navigation systems is described. Furthermore, the specifications of integrity as provided 
by the ICAO are presented also. 
2.5. Integrity Monitoring Requirements 
Integrity is the degree of trust that can be placed in the correctness of navigation 
information. This section presents in Table 2-6, the various methods and techniques 
used to monitor the integrity of the current navigation aids. 
Table 2-6: Integrity Monitoring of Navigation Systems 
Equipment Integrity Monitoring 
Instrument For an ILS, specifications are provided for the localizer and glide 
Landing slope. The lateral alignment accuracy required for localizer is 35 ft for 
System CAT 1,25 ft for CAT II and 10 ft for CAT III (see section 2.2.5 for 
(ILS) landing categories). This requirement is for the mean course line 
(shown by the ILS) beam which is a representation of the runway 
centreline. In case of a fault, the total period of radiation that can be 
tolerated outside the performance limits is 10 seconds, 5 seconds and 2 
seconds for the three categories respectively. For the glide slope, there 
are also a set of specifications along the centreline at different 
distances. For example, at a distance of 1000 ft from the landing 
threshold (along the centreline) the glide slope bend must be less that 5 
ft for 95% of the time for CAT 1. The probability of not radiating false 
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Equipment Integrity Monitoring 
guidance signals is 1-10-'(or 99.99999%) for CAT I and 
1- 0.5 x 10-' (or 99.99999995%) for CAT 11 and CAT III. 
The ILS signals are monitored by integral (built-in), internal and field 
monitors. A far field monitor is implemented to monitor the localizer 
signals for category III ILS. The continuously operating automatic 
monitor system provides warnings and undertakes the following 
actions in the case of perfonnance outside the designated limits 
a) Termination of the broadcasting a signal 
b) removal of navigation and identification components from the 
signal 
c) reversion to a lower category in the case of CAT 11 and III. 
It is normal practice for an ILS to verify the correlation between the 
ground monitor and the airborne measurements. These help to 
optimise the periodicity for periodic flight checks (ICAO, 2004a). 
Microwave The requirements for the MLS are provided in terms of its parameters 
Landing which are the Path Following Error (PFE), Path Following Noise 
System (PFN) and Control Motion Noise (CMN) 
(MLS) i) PFE is the error in the desired course i. e. between the current 
course of the aircraft and the course shown by the MLS beam. 
ii) PFN is the error between the actual centreline and its depiction 
by the MLS beam. 
iii) CMN is the effect of MLS beam errors on aircraft attitude. 
Hence,, these are the portions of the guidance signal that affect a 
desired course (or glide path), mean course (or glide path) and 
attitude angles respectively. In terms of distance the lateral error must 
be within 20 ft, 11.5 ft and 10.5 ft for the PFE, PFN and CMN 
respectively. The probability of radiating false guidance signals is 
I- 10-' for CAT I and I-0.5 x 10-9 for CAT II and CAT III. 
These are monitored by integral (built-in), internal and field monitors. 
52 
Equipment Integrity Monitoring 
Field monitors are generally installed between 30 m and 50 m in front 
of the transmission antennas. Automatic integrity tests are 
implemented for the monitoring system. Manual end-to-end tests are 
implemented when the automatic integrity test does not span the 
landing area fully. For example, current MLS design incorporates an 
automatic integrity check every 614 ms and a manual end-to-end test 
every 6 to 8 months. The radiations are suspended if 
a) the limits above are not followed for more than one second 
b) there is a reduction in radiated power for more than one second 
c) there is an error in the preamble transmission 
d) there is an error in the time division multiplexing 
synchronisation for more than I second (ICAO, 2004a). 
Global There are performance specifications for different phases of flight. For 
Navigation example for CAT I landing, the accuracy limits are 40 m (horizontal) 
Satellite and 15 m (vertical) in position error. This error should not be exceeded 
System with a probability of 10-'for a time period of 6 seconds (ICAO 
(GNSS) SARPS, 2004). As per the accuracy of GPS given in the GPS standard 
(Department of Defence, 2001) aircraft landing is not possible by GPS 
alone. Furthermore, there is no real time monitoring capability for the 
SPS. There are two independent ways to ensure the integrity of the 
transmitted signals, a) external monitoring with the use of special 
augmentation systems, and b) Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) and its variations. This is discussed finther in 
Chapter 5. 
Inertial Integrity monitoring of INS is performed by usage of redundant INS 
Navigation sensors, GPS or by employing checks within the software. The 
System accuracy requirement for a navigation grade INS (of 2 nmilhr 
(INS) specification) is given in the RTCA standard document for 
GpS/WAAS (RTCA, 2001) in the form of a table. For example, the 
coasting accuracy is required to be within 300 m for 10 minutes of 
flight. Guidelines for single string (no redundancy) detection of 
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failure/s in the INS have not been developed by RTCA (RTCA, 2001). 
"Single string" refers to stand alone operation of an INS. However, 
INS integrity can be provided through tight coupling with GPS. This 
topic is addressed in Chapter 5. 
Non- The NDB is not required for precision approach phases of flight. 
Directional Hence coarse monitoring by the use of field monitors is used (CAA, 
Beacon 2000). Field monitoring systems in this case monitor the following 
(NDB) (ICAO SARPS, 2004) 
a) decrease in radiated carrier power of more than 50% below that 
required for the rated coverage 
b) failure to transmit the identification signal 
c) mal-function or failure of self-monitoring. 
Distance The integrity of DME measurements are based on range accuracy. If 
Measuring the transponder delay differs from the assigned value by more than 1 
Equipment micro-sec (equivalent to 150 m range error), an indication is given at 
(DME) the control point. The operating transponder is automatically switched 
off and a standby transponder (if provided) is placed in operation 
automatically (ICAO SARPS, 2004). Among the three types of DMEs 
(Normal, Wide and Precise) the DME/P is the most precise. There are 
two standards; for final approach and initial approach. For example,, 
the accuracy limits defined in terms of the PFE and CMN are ±50ft 
and ±33 ft respectively for the final approach mode. These should not 
be exceeded for 95% of the time. For the purpose of determining 
compliance with the accuracy standard, the PFE and CMN 
components are evaluated over any 10 seconds measurement interval 
(taken within the DME/P coverage limit). For initial approach the 
measurement interval is 40 seconds (RTCA, 1985). 
VHF Omni The monitor system in the radiation field of VOR provides integrity 
directional information. The monitor transmits warnings to a control point or 
Ranging removes the identification (and navigation components) from the 
carrier or causes radiation to cease in case of a fault. This happens if (VOR) 
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any one or a combination of the following deviations from established 
conditions arise: 
a) any change in excess of I degree at the monitor site in the 
bearing information transmitted by the VOR. 
b) a reduction of 15% or more in the modulation components of 
the radio frequency signals or voltage level at the monitor of 
either the sub-carrier or 30 Hz amplitude modulation signals, or 
both. 
c) failure of the monitor itself. This results in the transmission of 
a warning to a control point and either 
i) the removal of the identification and navigation components 
from the carrier or 
ii) the cessation of the radiation of the signal. 
To detect such anomalies, a suitable warning device is required that 
monitors the continuously transmitted standard test signal that 
conforms to the regulations in the RTCA standard (RTCA, 1986). In 
the case of failure of VOR, other backup navigation aids such as Radar 
or INS need to be utilised. 
It can be noted from Table 2-6 that integrity of land based systems can be maintained by 
the use of field monitoring equipment, in general. However, the situation is different in 
the case of satellite based navigation systems. For this purpose, integrity specifications 
are provided with regard to a particular phase of flight. 
In order to make the integrity requirements free from the specification of a typical 
navigation system, ICAO has recommended generic requirements that are to be met by 
all air-worthy navigation equipment regardless of physical location of their source, 
principle or integrity monitoring equipment. These are given in Table 2-7. For each 
designated operation three parameters are defined. The phases of flight were described 
in section 2.2. 
As GNSS is planned to replace the conventional landing instruments such as ILS,, the 
integrity requirements for GNSS signal in space (for landing phase) were selected to be 
consistent with the ILS requirements. The alert limit represents the largest position error 
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that is allowable for a safe operation. The position error cannot exceed this alert limit 
without annunciation within time to alert. These specifications are adopted from those 
of the ground based systems. For example, in the case of ILS the system can degrade so 
that the error is greater than the 95h percentile but within the monitor limit. For 
example, the 95% horizontal accuracy specification for CAT I is 16 m while the 
integrity alert limit is 40 m (ICAO SARPS, 2004). Hence, it is acceptable for an 
approved navigation system to exceed 16 m for 5% of the time but it can exceed 40 M 
(without generating an alert) only with a probability of 1-2 X 10-7 / approach. 
Table 2-7: Integrity Requirements for Aviation (ICAO SARPS 2004) 
Integrity 
Phase of Flight Integrity Alert Limit Time-to-Alert 
En-route 1_10-7 /hr 7.4 km (oceanic) 
3.7 km (continental) 
5 min 
Terminal I_I 0-7/hr 1.85 km 15 sec 
NPA 1_10-7/hr 556 m 10 sec 
A, PV1 1-2 X 10-7 /approach 40 m (Horizontal) 
50 m (Vertical) 
10 sec 
APVII 1-2 X 10-7 /approach 40 m (H) 
20 m (V) 
6 sec 
CAT 1 1-2 X 10-7 /approach 40 m (H) 
10-15 m (V) 
6 sec 
The integrity requirement of the navigation system for a single aircraft to support en- 
route terminal, initial approach, non-precision approach and departure are assumed to be 
1_10-7 /hr. This figure is based on historical accident rates and the characteristics of 
modem turbojet aircrafts. According to these data, less than one 
fatal accident should 
occur in 107 flight hours due to all systems, a number generally agreed upon 
by the 
designers of civil transport (Kayton and Fried, 1997) 
As there is no provision of real time integrity information in the GPS SPS service,, GPS 
use for aviation is currently very IM*Uited. 
There are two methods to monitor the integrity 
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of GPS; the use of special augmentation systems or RAIM and its variations. Special 
augmentation systems are large scale systems that are very expensive. RAIM is a cost 
effective method,, although it is limited to the situation when at least five GPS satellites 
are available. For such cases when RAIM is not available (the occurrence of RAIM 
holes), the INS can provide an external aiding. Due to its complementary nature to GPS, 
this can be a synergistic arrangement for providing integrity. This is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
2.6. Summary 
This chapter has described the evolution of air navigation in terms of the procedures and 
navigation system technologies. Space based navigation systems are the most recent 
navigation systems and in the future are envisaged to replace navigation systems for all 
phases of flight. For the transition of ground based systems to space based systems, the 
ICAO has defined requirement specifications that are independent of the equipment 
utilised. Among these, integrity is most directly related to safety. 
Integrity of the only fully operational space based navigation system to date i. e. GPS, is 
not provided by the system itself. It can be provided by two methods; special 
augmentation systems and RAIM (and its variations) among which RAIM is most cost 
effective. However, it has its limitations and cannot work when less than five satellite 
measurements are available. The INS can be used to provide integrity to GPS in an 
integrated architecture because it is complementary to GPS. This is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
57 
3. Integrated GPS/INS system for Air Navigation 
Introduction 
GNSS is envisaged to become the primary means of air navigation for all phases of 
flight in the future. As discussed in Chapter 2. improved system integrity can be 
provided by using external systems to aid GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) 
and in particular the GPS standard positioning service. This chapter discusses GPS/INS 
integration which is a cost effective alternative to the special augmentation systems; 
SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation System) and GBAS (Ground Based 
Augmentation System). 
In this chapter firstly the principle of operation, architecture and sources of error for 
GPS are discussed. This is followed by a description of the INS including its basic 
principle, architecture and operation. Different coupling architectures are then discussed 
for integration between GPS and INS. These include the loosely coupled, the tightly 
coupled and the ultra-tightly coupled (or deeply integrated). Limitations of the existing 
systems are discussed before summarising the chapter. This chapter hence provides a 
baseline for the discussion of failure models of the individual and the integrated 
systems. 
3.2. Satellite Based Navigation 
The idea of an artificial satellite being placed in space is one of the pioneering 
contributions by the RAND corporation (RAND, 1946). Sputnik was launched in 1957 
by the former USSR. By the 1960s, satellites had become an important means of 
navigation (Kayton and Fried, 1997). The basic principles are the same as those of 
radio-navigation used for ground based transmitters. In the case of ground-based 
transmitters, a 2-dimensional position fix is obtained by a user through receiving signals 
from more than one ground transmitter. In the case of space based transmitters, a 3- 
dimensional position fix can be obtained by use of three signals (assuming time 
synchronisation in tune based systems). 
For a long time, satellite based navigation systems were Primarily military projects 
which is the case for GPS (and to a limited extent GLONASS). 
These systems later 
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provided support for a wide variety of civilian applications. This is now reflected by 
developments in the case of GPS which is now under the control of the US Departments 
of Defence and Transportation. GPS and GLONASS were developed by the USA and 
USSR respectively while a third system is under development by the European Union 
called Galileo which is a civilian system. The predecessor to these systems was the 
United States Navy's Transit System. It was a low-altitude Doppler satellite radio 
navigation system. Its use was discontinued in 1996 after 32 years (Kayton and Fried, 
1997). 
Satellites are equipped with radio transmitters and atomic clocks. A user with a receiver 
can derive his or her three dimensional position, velocity, and time. Although GPS and 
GLONASS were initially developed for the military, due to its Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) status GPS is now very widely used for civilian navigation purposes. 
The receivers are passive in nature and the user only needs to receive range and range 
rate signals. The system then provides all weather, continuous and accurate, worldwide 
navigation capability depending on the operational constraints as the signals may suffer 
from masking by obstacles in the natural and built environment and are vulnerable to 
interference and jamming. For safety critical applications like aviation, augmentations 
or integration with other systems is necessary (Department of Transport, 2001). This is 
due to the reason that the GPS standard positioning service does not provide 
information about signal integrity in real time as given in the GPS standard positioning 
service performance standard (Department of Defence, 2001). One of the most common 
approaches is the integration of GPS with the INS and is described later in this chapter. 
A brief description of the critical elements of GPS is presented first. 
3.3. Architecture of GPS 
The basic GPS position concept is based on the principle of multilateration. 
Multilateration is the process of locating an object (3 dimensional position) by 
accurately computing the Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) signals emitted from the 
three or more transmitters. The system consists of three segments: space, control and 
user. A brief review of each of these is given below. Other topics of interest related to 
GPS; DGPS (Differential GPS) and GPS modernisation are also discussed. Further 
details can be found in many references including Hofmann-Wellenhof et al. (2001), 
Kaplan (2005), and Seeber (2003). 
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3.3.1. Space Segment 
In the space segment, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites are equipped with receivers, 
transmitters, and redundant atomic clocks, along with other instrumentation such as 
transmitters and processors. There are at least 24 operational satellites (nominal 
constellation) in six orbits orbiting around the earth that complete the orbit 
approximately two times during a calendar day. The nearly circular orbits are at an 
altitude of around 20,200 km above the Earth. In the space segment, GPS satellites 
experience many problems. There are many perturbing forces responsible for the 
variation in the Keplerian orbits. 
The irregular shape and cross section of a GPS satellite (as it contains multiple antennas 
and solar panels) makes it difficult to maintain the orientation of the transmitter relative 
to the Earth accurately. A variety of materials are used for the satellites, each has a 
different heat-absorption coefficient which results in additional and complicated 
perturbing forces acting within the satellites. Gas-propellants on the satellites that are 
required to steer the satellites, can leak to create ftu-ther perturbing forces. These forces 
result in orbit errors which affect the accuracy of the navigation solution obtained. As 
the GPS satellites accelerate with respect to the Earth, relativistic corrections must be 
applied. 
D'a Mativistic effects are corrected in satellite orbital models, satellite transmitted signals, 
satellite clocks and the receiver clock. As the gravitational field of the Earth causes 
relativistic Perturbations in the satellite orbits, formulae are used for the orbital 
correction (Ashby, 2003). There are different types of relativistic effects that are 
incorporated in a GPS receiver (GPS receiver standard IRN-20OC-004,2000). These are 
given below 
a) The effect of the Earth's gravity results in frequency shifts in reference atomic 
clocks maintained at Earth based stations. This shift is known as gravitational 
shift. The shift is also due to the Earth's oblate (non-spherical) mass distribution. 
b) Doppler shifts of clocks fixed on the Earth's surface due to the Earth's rotation. 
c) Gravitational frequency shifts of clocks in GPS satellites due to the Earth's 
mass. 
d) Doppler shifts of the clock in GPS satellites due to their motion through an Earth 
Centred Inertial (ECI) frame (coordinate frames are discussed in section 3.4.2). 
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Due to the gravitational field, a space-time curvature of the transmitted signal results 
and hence a propagation correction is applied. An offset in the satellite frequency is 
used so the emitted frequency is 10.22999999543 IýMz instead of 10.23 NIHz. 
Typically a receiver located on the surface of the Earth, and therefore rotating with 
respect to the Earth centre, is equipped with the necessary mathematical model to 
correct for the relative frequency shift discussed above. 
Each satellite emits two carrier frequencies called LI and L2 at 120f,, and 154f,, where 
f,, =1.023 MHz. The Ll signal is modulated by; 
a Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) code at 1.023 MHz repeated every 
millisec referred to as Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code, 
ii) PRN at 10.23 MHz repeated after 7 days called the P-code (precise 
code)and 
iii) a navigation data message at 50 bps (bits per second). 
Similarly, the L2 signal is modulated by a 50 bps navigation data message and the P- 
code. Civilian receivers do not have access to the P-code which allows more precise 
range measurements. This is done by a process called anti-spoofing which is achieved 
either by turning off or encrypting the P-code to allow access only to authorised users. 
Two important aspects of GPS are described below that have particular relevance to this 
thesis. These are Dilution Of Precision (DOP) and atomic clocks. Although DOP is 
traditionally considered a user segment issue, from the perspective of constellation 
design, the source of DOP is the control segment. Similarly atomic clocks are also 
present in the control segment but this thesis is mainly concerned with the satellite 
borne atomic clocks, where typical critical clock failures originate. 
3.3.1.1. Dilution of Precision (DOP) 
The quality of a navigation solution is affected by the geometry of the participating 
satellites relative to the user location. This quality is referred to as the dilution of 
precision (DOP). A high value of DOP points to an inaccurate position solution and vice 
versa. The geometry of the satellites changes with time due to the relative motion of the 
satellites and user. In fact, the DOP is a statistical way of showing the effect of the 
relative geometry of the satellites (chosen to get the position solution) and user on the 
position solution. Geometrically spaced satellites help in maintaining good solutions 
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while satellites concentrated in a narrower region affects the solution negatively. There 
are different types of DOP as defined in Table 3-1. 
DOP is a function of the trace (sum of diagonal elements) of the covariance matrix of 
the solution effor (Kaplan, 2005). In the design of the constellation of a space based 
navigation system, it is a critical factor to provide an acceptable DOP all over the globe 
for all the types of DOP. Empirically the accuracy of the position solution is a function 
of the DOP and the precision of range measurements (Ochieng, 2006). 
Table 3-1: Different type of Dilution of Precision variable for a GPS navigation 
so ution 
GDOP Geometric DOP refers to the geometric precision in 4-d (3-d position and 
time) 
PDOP Position DOP is specifically for the 3-d position. 
TDOP Time DOP is the time dilution of precision. 
HDOP Horizontal DOP is the criterion for horizontal position. 
VDOP Vertical DOP refers to the vertical precision of the position solution. 
3.3.1.2. Atomic clocks 
The atomic clocks fitted to the satellites are very precise. These act as frequency 
standards for the GPS signals. Different clocks on different satellites do not keep the 
same time due to inherent accuracy limitations. Hence the control segment monitors all 
the satellite clocks, in addition to the clocks in the control segment from which it 
derives the GPS time. The GPS time is used as the reference time for a wide range of 
applications such as telecommunications and transport. A Kalman filter is used to create 
a composite clock which, in effect, is the ensemble average (average over time) of all 
the satellite clocks and the clocks installed in the monitor stations. For each clock, a 
two-state or three-state error model (depending on the make) is incorporated in the 
filter. The number of states reflects the complexity of the estimation model. 
In this way, the filter generates error corrections for each satellite. Hence the reference 
time can be obtained by applying the received corrections of any satellite clock to the 
output of that satellite clock (Kenneth, 1991). 
The accuracy of the GPS time is far 
higher than that of the individual clocks and hence the resultant drift is much slower 
(i. e. it has a very high stability). GPS time is referred to as a 
'paper' clock as it is 
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formed by computations and not from the output of a physical clock. This paper clock is 
steered to the Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) kept by the US Naval Observatory 
(USNO). Steering of the clock refers to maintaining it with the UTC by applying 
corrections. Correction parameters required to relate each satellite clock to GPS time are 
transmitted as part of the navigation message broad. cast by the satellite. 
3.3.2. Control Segment 
The control segment comprises the MCS, monitor stations, high quality receivers and 
satellite upload ground antennas. The MCS is located at Falcon Air Force Base, Ohio 
and Onizuka Air Force Base, California in USA. There are six monitor stations spread 
all over the world in Colorado Springs, Cape Canaveral, Kwajalein Island, Diego 
Garcia, Ascension Island and Hawaii. The three upload ground antennas are located at 
Ascension Island, Diego Garcia and Kwajalein. 
The control segment is primarily responsible for the navigation service, time transfer 
service, constellation management, orbital operations and space vehicle 
communications. The satellites are designed and launched to keep their orbits with high 
accuracy. However, due to factors including temperature affected mass anomalies and 
solar pressures, satellites do deviate from their orbits. This deviation affects the 
accuracy of the position solution obtained by the user. To control this phenomenon, the 
following procedure is followed. 
All the monitor stations passively track the signals from the satellites. These observed 
range data (carrier and code) are then transmitted to the MCS along with the telemetry 
data, environmental data and satellite health data. The MCS contains a Kalman filter 
used to estimate satellite ephemeris and clock correction parameters. Ephemeris is a set 
of parameters that can be used to accurately calculate the location of a GPS satellite at a 
particular point in time. The inputs to the MCS Kalman filter are the data from the 
monitor stations. The update of the Kalman filter is performed using these data. Further 
the most recent estimates from the Kalman filter are propagated (numerically processed) 
for the duration of the upload and these are changed into the navigation message fonnat 
(Russell and Schaibly, 2002). 
The uploaded ephemeris and clock correction parameters are stored in the MCS for later 
comparison with the broadcast message. If there are any discrepancies, the operators are 
notified and an additional upload may be required (Hatten and Taylor, 2000). The 
quality of the upload data is dependent on the ability of the MCS to properly predict the 
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future ephemeris and clock corrections. Several factors affect this prediction: quality of 
the current Kalman filter state estimates, quality of the orbit model (reference trajectory) 
and how well the Satellite Vehicle (SV) ephemeris and clock actually behaves in 
accordance with the uploaded predictions (Russell and Schaibly, 2002). Data upload is 
done at least once a day (Hatten and Taylor, 2000). The main product of the control 
segment is the navigation message. 
The navigation message contains satellite ephemeris parameters, clock correction 
parameters, ionospheric model parameters, satellite almanac and health, user range 
accuracy and UTC time parameters. Clock correction parameters refer to the corrections 
between the satellite clock and the GPS time. To assist the single frequency user to 
overcome the ionospheric delay, coefficients are transmitted that are used in the 
compensation model. UTC parameters are provided so that a user can track the 
reference time. The accuracy of the range signal transmitted to the user is based on three 
parameters 
a) the User Range Error (URE) which is the difference between the pseudo range 
measured at a given location and the expected pseudorange (as derived from the 
navigation message and the true user position, neglecting the bias in the receiver 
clock relative to GPS time). A SIS (Signal In Space) URE includes residual 
orbit, satellite clock and group delay errors 
b) the User Range Accuracy (URA), which is a conservative representation (one 
sigma) of each satellite's expected SIS-URE performance based on historical 
data. 
c) the User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) which contains all line of sight error 
sources that include the SIS, single frequency ionosphere model error, 
troposphere model error, multipath and range error (GPS Standard Positioning 
Service Performance Standard, 2001). 
The signal passes through the atmosphere and undergoes changes as described below in 
the section on user segment. 
3.3.3. User segment 
The user segment consists of passive users with the antenna and signal processing 
hardware. The signal is affected by the atmosphere and multipath along with the 
receiver related errors. These are discussed 
in this section. 
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3.3.3-1. Propagation of Signals 
When a GPS signal leaves the satellite, it passes through various atmospheric layers. 
The effect of these layers on the GPS signals is considered below. Figure 3-1 shows the 
transmission of GPS signals. GPS signals pass through the ionosphere and troposphere 
before being received by the receiver antenna. 
The ionospheric layer is considered to extend from 50 km above the surface of the Earth 
to 1600 km. Due to the ultraviolet rays coming from the Sun, air molecules are ionized 
and free electrons are generated. The number of electrons, the Total Electron Count 
(TEC), varies with the solar activity cycle, diurnal variations and magnetic storms. The 
ionosphere is described as a dispersive medium because signals at different frequencies 
exhibit different delays. This is because the refraction index of charged particles varies 
with the signal frequency. This variation induces different impacts on the received 
carrier and code frequency. 
IWIf, 
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Figure 3-1: Global Positioning System Signal Transmission 
In practice, the phase of the carrier signal is advanced with respect to 
the original 
transmitted signal, and the code signal is delayed. This 
is the principal reason behind the 
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transmission of signals at two frequencies instead of one (Hofinann-Wellenhof et al., 
2001). The two signals of different frequencies exhibit different delays. Hence, it is 
possible to form an ionospheric free combination of the two signals. In fact this is not 
absolutely free from ionospheric delay, rather the effect of the ionosphere is 
substantially reduced (Hofmann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). The residual ionospheric delay 
error is typically several centimetres (Sandhoo et al., 2000). In the case of a civilian 
single frequency receiver, signal delay compensation is effected by mathematical 
modelling. 
The atmospheric layer from 9 km above the surface of earth to 16 Ian is known as the 
tropospheric layer. When the GPS electromagnetic signals pass through it, they are 
refracted and bent but not dispersed (as opposed to the ionosphere) as this layer is 
neutral to all frequencies below 30 GHz. The refractivity of this layer depends on the 
compressibility of the dry air and water vapours present in the atmosphere. 
Approximately 90% of the delay is due to dry air with the rest being due to the moisture 
present. The dry air delay can be modelled and compensated for with considerable 
accuracy but the water vapour content is highly variable and is difficult to model. 
Various models used to compensate for the ionospheric and tropospheric delays are 
discussed next. 
Ionospheric Models 
The most popular compensation model used to reduce the effect of the ionosphere is the 
Klobuchar model (Klobuchar, 1987). The design goal of this ionospheric time-delay 
correction algorithm (for the single-frequency GPS user) was to include the key features 
of the complex behaviour of the ionosphere, with an acceptable level of computation 
time. The coefficients of this model are transmitted in the navigation message. 
The Klobuchar model is an approximation of the Bent Model (Llewellyn and Bent, 
1973). The Bent Ionospheric model is a detailed ionospheric model and is 
computationally intensive. It is an empirical model that can be used worldwide. In the 
model the combined influences of geographical and geomagnetic effects, solar activity, 
local time and seasonal variations are taken care of, These were the results of an 
extensive investigation of a vast ionospheric database. This database includes over 
50,000 topside ionosphere soundings, 6000 satellite measurements of electron density 
and over 400,000 bottomside ionosphere soundings (for the period from 1962 to 1969 
covering the minimum to maximum of a solar cycle). The input to the Bent model is the 
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user/station coordinates, satellite coordinates and time information. The output is the 
ionospheric delay. A two step calculation is employed to determine the delay: 
a) the electron density versus height profile is calculated 
b) from the profile, range, range rate and angular refraction, the vertical total 
electron count and the angular total electron count are computed. 
A very important capability of the model is that it can improve its predictions by use of 
ionospheric observations. The prediction accuracy without the update (with recent 
observation data) accounts for approximately 75 to 80% of the ionosphere which can 
improve to 90% with updates. Since it is not possible for a typical GPS receiver to use 
the Bent model for ionsospheric corrections, because of it being computationally 
demanding, an approximate model known as the Klobuchar model is utilised. 
The Klobuchar model quantifies the vertical ionospheric delay of a radio wave in the 
form of a simplified cosine model. The parameters of the cosine curve i. e. phase, 
amplitude, frequency and a constant term are calculated from the broadcast coefficients. 
These terms are fitted in the model to provide the value of vertical delay at the required 
location and time. This delay is then to be corrected for the elevation angle from the 
user to the satellite. Hence a term,, the slant factor, is calculated and multiplied by the 
vertical delay. The Klobuchar model can typically reduce the ionospheric errors by 50% 
(Klobuchar, 1987). Nevertheless, ionospheric behaviour is variable and greatly affects 
the accuracy of GPS. Another model referred to as the Centre for Orbit Determination 
in Europe (CODE) provides a new set of coefficients for the Klobuchar model that 
gives more accurate results (Farah et al., 2005). 
The irregularities in the ionosphere produce both diffraction and refraction. This causes 
fading and disruption of the signals. However, these scintillations are rare, and 
temporary. Extensive ionospheric modelling is required to extract an accurate position 
from a single receiver. Although the Bent ionosphere model is a very extensive model 
based on decades of data, it is too intensive with regard to computations involved, to be 
used in a single GPS receiver. Due to faster communication links and use of internet 
technology, the trend of ionospheric modelling is towards transmission of ionospheric 
corrections almost on a real time basis (Dodd et al., 2006). Examples of these are the 
EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service) ionospheric model in 
Europe and the WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) ionospheric model in North 
America. 
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These consist of a network of constantly observing GPS receivers at precisely known 
locations that send dual frequency carrier phase and pseudorange observations back to 
one or more central processing facilities. There, estimates of the delay imparted by the 
ionosphere along the line of sight from each receiver to each satellite observed are 
calculated. Interpolation of these measurements is performed for a predefmed set of 
nodes called Ionospheric Grid Points (IGPs) at a designated height of 350 Ian. These 
provide a series of ionospheric delay estimates which are transmitted to users equipped 
with WAAS or EGNOS enabled receivers. The WAAS model is based on 5* x 5* 
zenith delay grid maps and is Updated every 5 minutes. 
In a study performed on the accuracy of the EGNOS model, it is concluded that it 
satisfies the 10 m (2 dimensional root mean square) accuracy for shorter baselines but 
exceeds this threshold for longer baselines (Moore et. al., 2002). The performance of 
WAAS model was quantified to have a horizontal accuracy of 8-20 m (95%) while the 
vertical accuracy is higher. However, in the presence of severe ionospheric storms, the 
performance of the WAAS ionospheric model is limited and much larger effors can 
result (Skone et al., 2004). 
Tropospheric Models 
The Saastamoinen model is typically used to model the delay due to dry air 
(Saastamoinen, 1972). This model is based on modelling of the refractivity equation of 
the troposphere based on an empirical relation known as the Smith and Weintrab 
Equation. It has two components, the dry component and the wet component. Using 
derivations from the ideal gas laws, this equation is integrated numerically to calculate 
the zenith or vertical delay. Another model used for modelling the tropospheric delay is 
the Hopfield model (Hofmann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). 
The Hopfield model is also commonly used to characterise the tropospheric delay. This 
was derived empirically by modelling delay as a fpnction of the sea level height. This 
delay is in fact the zenith delay and a mapping function is used to resolve it onto the line 
of sight. A modified Hopfield method is the one in which the integral that appears in the 
calculation of the Hopfield model is solved differently in a manner akin to series 
expansion of the integrand (Hofinann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). There are many type of 
mapping functions in the literature such as presented by Hopfield 
(1969), Herring 
(1992) and Niell (1996). The simplest is the one presented by Hopfield (1969), which is 
an inverse sine function of elevation. The mapping 
function developed by Herring 
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(1992) is based on a continued fraction model (also called Marini model) that depends 
on the latitude, height of the user and temperature. In the mapping function by Neill 
(1996), the continued fraction representation is restricted to a smaller number of 
coefficients. As compared to the dry delay, the wet delay is difficult to model due to 
frequent variation in its pressure and concentration. 
Expensive instruments like Water Vapour Radiometers (WVR) and radiosondes (a 
sensor package used with a weather balloon) are used to quantify the effect of water 
vapour but are very expensive and limited in use. Stochastic models are used instead to 
model the water vapour. For example a model presented by Fleijer (2003) is based on 
modelling wet air by use of Kolmogrov turbulence. Kolmogrove turbulence is a 
description of the nature of the wavefront perturbations introduced by the atmosphere. 
Jin and Wang (2004) provided a tropospheric model based on the first order Gauss 
Markov process. However, to model the troposphere accVrately, measurement of large 
sets of water vapour profile data is currently underway globally to enhance the delay 
modelling accuracy for the GPS signals (Beat et al., 2005). Another empirical model 
called the EGNOS model is discussed below. 
The EGNOS model provides an estimate of the zenith tropospheric delay which is 
dependent on empirical estimates of five meteorological parameters at the receiver 
antenna- pressure, temperature, water vapour pressure,, temperature lapse rate and water 
vapour lapse rate. In a study, Farah et al. (2005) reported that the EGNOS model 
performed best compared to the Saastamoinen, Hopfield, Marini and the Magnet ( an 
empirical model fitted on collected data) models. It was shown by Farah et al. (2005) 
that the EGNOS model agrees well with the CODE estimation with a mean zenith delay 
difference of approximately 2 cm. The CODE is one of the International GPS Service 
(IGS) analysis centres, that offers a product for precise zenith tropospheric delay from 
monitor stations (since 1997). The consistency of the tropospheric estimates is very high 
(order of mm) and is used as a standard (Farah et al., 2005). It is also recommended by 
the SARPS (Standards and Recommended Practices) by International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO SARPS, 2004). Further it is reported to be consistent with the 
tropospheric model for the US WAAS programme (Penna et al., 2001). The WAAS 
model derives the tropospheric delay using the station height above sea 
level, latitude 
and the day of the year. 
The signal received at the receiver is also affected by the multipath error due to 
reflecting surfaces in the receiver antenna environment. 
This is discussed next. 
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Mullipath Error 
A multipath error occurs when the signal to the GPS receiver antenna comes from more 
than one path e. g. after reflection from nearby buildings. The reflected signal is 
superimposed on the original signal and affects the accuracy of the time delay measured 
by correlators in the GPS receiver. To mitigate the multipath effect, receiver hardware is 
modified, for example by increasing the pre-filter (a noise filter before the main 
processor) bandwidth. Hence, the resultant introduction of a high frequency makes it 
easy to distinguish the sharp peak of the direct signal as compared to the reflected ones. 
There are other solutions to the problem ranging from antenna design and siting 
techniques to receiver architecture design and post-processing of observables. With 
regard to antenna design, a choke ring antenna may be used that attenuates the reflected 
signal (Grewal et. al., 2001). Multipath mitigation architecture is based on discriminator 
function shaping and/or correlator function shaping. These are components of a receiver 
used to lock the signal and identify it. In both of these approaches either the correlator 
function is narrowed or the discrimination function is narrowed. This in effect exploits 
the difference between the direct path and indirect path signal to reduce the effect of the 
latter in the composite signal. 
Multipath can also be alleviated through judicious selection of antenna location so that 
reflections from the environment are minimised (Braasch, 2001). Since the multipath 
error is dependent on the surroundings of the antenna, in the context of this thesis, 
airborne systems present a special type of multipath signature. 
Multipath as experienced by an airborne antenna is most complex during the approach 
and landing phases of flight (due to presence of airport building structure) (see section 
7.3.2.3). In the ICAO SARPS (2004), an error curve for multipath is suggested. The 
European Space Agency (ESA) developed an aeronautical channel model to include the 
effect of multipath from an aeroplane and its surroundings. 
The model assumes that the received signal has two components; direct and reflected. 
The reflected part is of two different kinds; fuselage reflected signals and ground echo. 
The second part of the model needs to be comprehensive as each airport has its own 
profile (Macabiau et al., 2006). From the result of a measurement campaign 
(Macabiau 
et al., 2006), it has been shown that the ground echo does not contribute substantially to 
70 
the final error, as it mostly behaves as a high frequency error. It is also concluded that 
an unique single error curve may be proposed for all GNSS signals. It must be 
mentioned here that the proposed new GPS civil frequency L5 signal will be minimally 
affected by multipath error. This is due to the designed higher chip rate (or frequency) 
of the L5 signal as multipath error magnitude is inversely proportional to the chip rate 
of the signal (Grewal et. al., 200 1). Other receiver related errors are discussed below. 
Other receiver Related Errors 
In this section receiver errors other than multipath are discussed such as the use of a 
mask angle, antenna phase centre error and receiver noise. The mask angle is the limit 
on the elevation angle below which the signal coming from the satellite is not used for 
fear of inaccuracies. If the mask angle limit is set higher, reflected signals have less 
access to the receiver antenna. 
In a receiver antenna arrangement,, the antenna geometric centre and the electronic 
centre must be at the same point as the processing of signals is with respect to the 
electronic centre. For static antennas,, these errors can be reduced by careful 
experimentation performed to model them. Similarly in the receivers, inter-channel bias 
results when different satellites are tracked by different channels and thus should be 
carefully calibrated. 
Receiver generated noise is a limiting factor in achieving position accuracy. Similarly 
the receiver clock stability has an effect on the accuracy although the current clock bias 
is estimated in the user solution. 
The tracked signals are then used by the receiver hardware to Produce two observables 
which are time delay from the code signal and phase measurement from the carrier 
signal. These are described below. 
3.3.3.2. User Position Calculation 
The GPS signals are received by the users equipped with GPS antenna and processing 
circuitry. Multi-channel receivers are common which can track twelve satellites at the 
same time. To operate on a received signal, there are two tracking loops in the receiver 
for code and carrier tracking. The code tracking loop essentially determines the satellite 
identity and the signal delay. The navigation message residing on the carrier is also 
stripped out to give the position data of the satellites and other information. The carrier 
signal continuously varies due to the Doppler effect (arising from relative motion of the 
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receiver and the satellite) and propagation effects. The carrier tracking loop locks on the 
carrier signal using a phase locked loop (PLL). The PLL is a closed loop feedback 
control system that maintains a generated signal in a fixed phase relationship to a 
reference signal (Kaplan, 2005). 
As described earlier, the range from each tracked satellite is measured and used to 
calculate the position solution (a minimum of four satellites are needed). However, the 
solution can be improved if there are more than four satellites in view. The equations 
obtained by using the range measurements are non-linear in nature. A linear model is 
derived from these equations and used to provide a position solution. Typical errors 
related to the user segment are noise, multipath, atmospheric delay, user antenna phase 
centre misalignment and errors in computations. 
The observation equation for the code measurement is as follows: 
p'(ri) = R'(T', T, ) - c[(5, r,, (, r, ) - &'(t')] ++ 45, 'P + 45.1p + (5, M 
3-1 
rr 
where the subscript i is for the satellite and r is for the receiver, 
'rr is the receiver time (sec), 
t' is the satellite time (sec) 
p, '(r,, ) is the measured code pseudo-range between the observing site r and the 
satellite i at time t (M), 
R'. (V, Tr) is the geometric distance between the satellite and the observing r 
point, T' and Tr are the signal transmission and reception times in GPS time 
respectively. 
c is the speed of light (m) 
STr is the receiver clock offset for receiver r in the time frame of receiver r i. e. 
STr (rr ) (sec), 
St' is the satellite clock offset for satellite i in the satellite time frame i. e. 
&'. (P. ) (sec), 
S shows the delay due to orbital error (orb), ionospheric error (ion), 
tropospheric error (trp), m1p for multipath and nse for noise. 
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R'(t) is given by r 
R'. V(Xi XrY + (YT) - Yr)" + (ZI Zr)2 3-2 r 
where X'(t),, Y'(0 and Z'(t) are the components of the geocentric position 
vector of the satellite (in the Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) frame) at the 
current epoch (m), 
X,., Y and Z,, are the three unknown ECEF coordinates of the observing site r 
(antenna) (M). A description of the ECEF (Earth Centred Earth Fixed) frame is 
given in section 3.4.2. 
As this equation is non linear, for faster computation, the linearised version is used after 
compensation of errors. The linearised model of four or more pseudoranges is iterated 
until the difference between subsequent position solutions is less than the receiver 
computer numerical accuracy. This is usually achieved within 2-3 iterations (Grewal et. 
al., 2001). 
The mathematical model (observation equation) for the carrier phase measurement is 
given by 
R'. (T'., T, ) Vorb + (5jon +8 
(1), 
Irp 
+ 8mlp +s 
nse (r =. r 3-3 r r) A+ 
Nr -f [(rr ('*r) (ti)] + AC 
where the superscript i is for the satellite and subscript r is for the receiver, 
Tr is the receiver time (sec), 
P. is the satellite time (sec) 
is the measured carrier phase (number of cycles from initial lock) 
A, is the wavelength of the carrier signal (m) 
R'. (T'., T, ) is the geometric distance between the satellite and the observing r 
point, T' and T,, are the signal transmission and reception times in GPS time 
respectively. 
N' is the phase ambiguity that is independent of time and integer in nature r 
is the frequency of the carrier signal (Hz) 
73 
'3. rr is the receiver clock offset for receiver r in the time frarne of receiver r i. e. 
(rr) (sec), 
&' is the satellite clock offset for satellite i in the satellite time frarne i. e. 
(sec). 
The carrier phase observable contains an integer ambiguity. This is the integer number 
of phase cycles contained in the initial range between the receiver antenna and the 
transmitting satellite. Reliable methods for integer ambiguity resolution in real time are 
still under development although methods such as the Least Squares AMBiguity 
Decorrelation Adjustment Model (LAMBDA) claim success in offline processing 
(Teunissen, 1993). The ambiguity can only be resolved if the errors in the GPS 
observables can be reduced to a numerical value comparable to the wavelength of the 
carrier signal. This is made possible by the use of relative positioning or differential 
GPS. The use of DGPS and its benefit for ambiguity resolution is discussed below. 
3.3.4. Differential GPS (DGPS) 
In order to minimise the effect of errors that are common to GPS receivers located in the 
vicinity of one another (< 500 km), the differential GPS technique may be employed. 
This technique is based on the use of two or more receivers, where one receiver is 
stationed at a known point while the position of the rover receiver is to be determined. 
The corrections are calculated for the satellite ranges observed at the station. These 
corrections are then transmitted to the rover receiver via radio link. This is known as the 
navigation mode. Another mode is called surveillance mode in which raw observation 
data from the rover receiver are broadcast to the fixed receiver. The position 
calculations are done at the monitor station. Hence, fewer computations are required at 
the rover receiver. Two correction methods are possible 
a) Calculating the position at the station and the rover using the same satellites and 
applying position corrections to the rover calculations. 
b) Calculating range and range rate corrections to the satellites using the difference 
between the observed and the known positions of the station. These corrections 
are applied to the observed ranges of the rover receiver. 
The second method is more flexible, gives higher accuracy and is the one in general use. 
This concept is used for wide areas or regions and is referred to as the Wide Area 
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Differential GPS (WADGPS) in the case of GPS- It consists of a network of reference 
stations. Among its advantages are coverage of a large area with consistent accuracy, 
coverage of inaccessible areas such as water bodies, and fault tolerance in case of 
failure at one of the reference stations. WAAS, EGNOS and LAAS (Local Area 
Augmentation System) as described in Chapter 2 are examples of WADGPS. In these 
systems the corrections are estimated from ground based monitor stations. These are 
transmitted to the users through geostationary satellites in the case of WAAS and 
EGNOS, and by ground transmitters in the case of LAAS. The use of DGPS 
measurements for code based positioning results in an enhancement in accuracy (see 
Table 3-2). Similarly in the case of carrier based positioning, DGPS (or relative 
positioning) facilitates the resolution of integer ambiguity to provide centimetre level 
accuracy. 
Ambiguity resolution refers to the solution for the variable N/ in Equation 3-3. This is 
an integer number because this is the number of cycles that the carrier signal has passed 
between the satellite and the receiver antenna. If the correct integer value is obtained, 
the precision of the position obtained is below the I cm level. To solve for integer 
ambiguity, differencing technique is employed (although single receiver based methods 
known as precise point positioning are currently the subject of research). 
Differencing of measurements (carrier or code) in the case of DGPS can be of three 
forms; single, double and triple differences: 
a) The traditional single differenced observable is formed from the difference 
between measurements obtained at two receivers from a single satellite (i. e. 
differencing across receivers). A single difference observable can also be 
generated across satellites. 
b) The double differenced observable is formed from the difference of two single 
differences i. e. one single difference is formed from two receivers and a satellite 
A while other single difference is formed from these two receivers and another 
satellite B. The double difference is then obtained by subtracting the two. This is 
referred to as differencing across receivers and satellites. 
c) The triple difference observable is formed from the difference of two double 
differences at two epochs. This is referred to as differencing across receivers, 
satellites and time. 
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For the purpose of ambiguity resolution the double difference method is preferred. This 
is because in the case of single-differences, an additional unknown parameter for the 
receiver clock offset must also be considered (Hofinann-Wellenhof, 200 1). 'The triple 
difference is not used because magnitude of noise increases with further formation of 
differences. Hence, the double difference is a compromise with respect to magnitude of 
noise and provision of measurement redundancy. 
Table 3-2: Error Summary for GPS SPS range measurement (all in metres) 
(Neg stands for Negligible (in cms), UERE (User Equivalent Range Error) is also shown) 
Segment Source of Use Using DGPS DGPS 
Source Error of Ll Civilian Distance Distance 
and Receiver between between 
L2 
I 
(M) receivers receivers 
< 25 kin < 100 kin 
Space Clock Stability 3.0 3.0 Neg Neg 
Orbit 1.0 1.0 Neg Neg 
Perturbations 
Control Ephemeris 4.2 4.2 Neg Neg 
Predictions 
User Ionosphere 2.3 10 Neg lcm/km 
Troposphere 2.0 2.0 Neg Neg 
Receiver Noise 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Multipath 1.2 10 10 10 
Ia UERE 6.37 15.29 10.12 10.12+1 cm/km 
Ambiguity resolution is carried out in three steps 
a) A search space is constructed for potential integer ambiguity combinations. The 
size of the search space affects the number of computations involved. This initial 
search space can be formed by use of a code based position solution. 
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b) The selection of integer ambiguity combinations is done by minminising the Sum 
Squared Residual (SSR) between the candidate ambiguity solution and the 
observed data. This minimisation is carried out in the least square sense. 
c) The third step is the validation of ambiguities. The validation step is dependent 
on the observation equations, quality of the observables and the method used to 
estimate the integer ambiguities. 
LAMBDA is the most popular ambiguity resolution method. It is based on finding the 
integer solution using the least squares method. However, it is always not possible to 
obtain the carrier phase solution in real time. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, 
carrier phase is not used except for the purpose of smoothing to remove effect of 
multipath effor (see section 6.3.2.2). 
Table 3-3: Error Budget for GPS Carrier Phase Position 
((Subiect to Ambicyuitv Resolution) in metre-, Nety qtqnde. for Netylihihip (in cm. 0) 
Segment Source of Military Only DGPS 
the Error Ll and Ll 
L2 phase Phase 
signal signal 
Space Clock 3.0 3.0 Neg 
Stability 
Orbit 1.0 1.0 Neg 
Perturbations 
Control Ephemeris 4.2 4.2 Neg 
Predictions 
User Ionosphere Neg <1 Neg 
Troposphere 2.0 2.0 Neg 
Receiver . 01 . 01 . 01 
Noise 
Multipath . 05 . 05 . 05 
Ia UERE 5.60 5.71 in cm 
77 
An estimation of typical GPS errors is presented in Table 3-2 for code measurements. A 
military receiver can receive LI and L2 signals, hence ionospheric delay can effectively 
be cancelled out. The error budget is also given for a single frequency. Because of lack 
of access to the L2 signal such a receiver must rely on models or external data to 
compensate for the effects of the ionosphere. The accuracy resulting from DGPS can be 
seen to degrade with the distance between the two receivers which is (< 25 km) and (< 
100 km) respectively for the last two columns of Table 3-2. The total error budget in the 
form of the user equivalent range error (I sigma) is also shown. 
Table 3-3 shows the accuracies achieved by use of carrier phase measurements. 
Compared to Table 3-2, the accuracy values are significantly higher. However, this is 
subject to the resolution of integer ambiguity as discussed above. These tables are 
compiled from Seeber (2003), Hofinann-Wellenhof et al. (2001), Kaplan (2005) and 
Sandhoo et al. (2000). With regard to Tables 3-2 and 3-3, it should be noted that range 
error values vary considerably in the literature and according to the specific user- 
satellite geometric configuration. Hence, these are only intended as a rough guide for 
comparing various error sources and the effect of using different techniques such as 
DGPS or multiple frequencies. For example in the simulation developed in this thesis 
variations from these values occur (see Table 7-1). 
In the ongoing developmental phase of Galileo, it is planned that these errors are 
quantified and an integrity message related to them is sent to the user through the 
navigation message. This will enable the users to decide whether the usage of 
corresponding range measurement is appropriate for their application or not (Feng and 
Ochieng, 2006). Modernisation of GPS is currently in progress as described in the next 
section. This will have significant effect on the use of space based navigation systems in 
the aviation sector. 
3.3.5. GPS Modernization 
For civilian use, two new navigation signals will be provided as part of the GPS 
modernisation programme (Hofinann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). The first one will be 
modulated additionally to the present L2 carrier and is called the L2C code. It is 
available in the Block IIR-M satellites, the first of which was launched on September 
25,2005. The third civil signal called L5 will be provided on the GPS Block IIF 
satellites the first of which is scheduled to be launched in 2007. L5 will also be 
available from the Block III SVs (Satellite Vehicles) that will be launched from 2012. 
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At the current replenishment rate, all the civil signals (L I -C/A, L2C and L5) will be 
available for initial operational capability by 2012 and for full operational capability by 
approximately 2015 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006). The benefits of L5 
include the capability to support precision approach navigation worldwide, increased 
availability of precision navigation, enhanced operations in certain areas of the world 
and improved interference mitigation (Hatch et al., 2000). This is because civilian 
access to dual frequency measurements will enable the mitigation of ionosphere error 
using linear frequency combinations. The signal frequency i. e. 1176.45 MHz is also in 
the aeronautics protective band and hence provides immunity against interference and 
jamming. It will also be beneficial in the resolution of integer ambiguity for carrier 
phase solutions - this will enable the users to get centimetre level accuracy (Hatch et al., 
2000). 
A -0, ARer this brief review of GPS, the next section reviews the inertial navigation system 
(INS) that can be used to aid GPS to provide integrity. The INS is a type of Deduced 
Reckoning (DR) system as exPlained below. 
3.4. Dead Reckoning Navigation 
Dead Reckoning systems produce measurements of the path travelled by the host 
vehicle. Dead Reckoning is a misnomer rather it should be referred to as deduced 
reckoning which essentially means deducing the navigation variables by using the 
sensor measurements. These systems update their navigation information by 
incorporating incremental measurements relative to an initial position. There are two 
kinds of DR measurements (Kayton and Fried, 1997): 
a) aircraft acceleration and angular rate measurements by use of 
accelerometers or gyroscopes are used in an INS to update position. 
b) emissions from continuous wave radio stations are used to update the 
position Exes. 
An important characteristic of DR systems is that effors in measurements cause errors in 
the output which grow over time. Hence, there is a need to correct the output data 
periodically, depending on the quality of the sensors. 
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3.4.1. Inertial Navigation System Architecture 
As mentioned above, an INS is a device that operates on the principle of deduced 
reckoning. The operation of an INS can be understood with the help of a block diagrarn 
as shown in Figure 3-2. 
The sensing cluster of an INS consists of gyroscopes and accelerometers. These are 
arranged to enable measurement of accelerations and angular rates along the three axes 
(x, y and z). In simple configurations, there can be three single axis gyroscopes and 
three single axis accelerometers; one for each axis. With a gyroscope that measures the 
angular rate along two axes, there can be an arrangement of two 2DOF (degree of 
freedom) gyroscopes to cover three axes, of which one is redundant. Two types of INS 
are commonly used: gimballed arrangement and the strapdown type. These are 
explained as follows. 
In Figure 3-2, the gimballed arrangement has a feedback loop from the navigation 
processor (shown as the broken line). The function of this feedback loop is to maintain 
the sensing element 'physically' in a known orientation. This is performed by physically 
rotating the platform by electromechanical servo motors that are commanded by the 
navigation processor. The feedback loop is not present in strapdown systems where the 
sensing element is 'strapped down' or fixed to the body of the host vehicle. This is 
because no physical re-orientation of the sensors is required with the change in attitude 
of the host vehicle in a strapdown system. 
Sensor Assembly Signal Display Unit 
Gyroscopes and Processing 
Navigation 
10 
Position 
Processor Velocity Accelerometers 
I 
Circuitry Attitude 
Precision servo Command rates 4 -------------- motors 
Figure 3-2: Inertial Navigation SYstem Block Diagram 
In general, due to this feedback loop, the instrument errors are reduced and therefore a 
gimballed INS is more accurate than a strapdown system (Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
However, this accuracy comes at a price as platform based inertial navigation systems 
(another name for the gimballed configuration) are costly due to the feedback 
arrangement that requires precise pointing hardware such as servo motors. 
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The outputs of the sensing element are velocity increments and attitude increments. Due 
to the digital nature of the measurement circuitrY3, the input to the navigation processor 
is in the form of pulses. These pulses represent the increments in velocity (acceleration 
multiplied by sample time) and attitude (angular rates multiplied by sample time). The 
signal processing circuitry perfonns the conversion. The navigation processor uses 
integration routines and gravity models to calculate the navigation variables. Usually 
navigation variables include position, velocity and attitude of the host vehicle. This 
infonnation is fed to the display unit in the aircraft cockpit. Depending on the nature of 
the system, different combinations of output variables may be required. 
In the case of the integrated system, variables from different levels of INS components 
are passed to the overall navigation system to be integrated with other sensor data. For 
example, position and velocity are fed to the integration computer in the case of loosely 
coupled systems while raw measurements are required for other integration 
architectures. 
Table 3-4: Comparison of the Platform and Strapdown systems 
Platform Systems Strapdown Systems 
Less accurate sensors may be utilised Highly accurate sensors with a wide input 
with a small input range of range are required for precise navigation. 
measurement. 
For a typical tangent plane A gravity model needs to be updated at each 
configuration in aircraft navigation, a epoch according to the current position. 
gravity model is not required except for 
calibration purposes. 
Coordinate transformation is not Intensive computing effort is required to 
required as accelerometers directly give maintain coordinate frames in the computer. 
output in the required navigation frarne. 
Expensive accurate hardware (not Hardware other than the sensors and the 
including the sensors) is required such navigation processor is not required. The 
as servo motors and precision gimbals. mechanical platform is replaced by an 
analytical frame representation within the 
computer. J 
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In the case of a strapdown system, there is no feedback loop. Hence, the sensing 
element is in the 'body frame'. The navigation calculations are relatively complex in 
this case. As the measurements from the accelerometers are in the body axes, these are 
transformed to the navigation axes (for example, the North, East, Down (NED) 
coordinate frame) by coordinate transformation. These transformations are carried out 
using outputs of body mounted gyroscopes. 
Further, the gravity sensed by the body mounted accelerometers must be corrected 
because an accelerometer cannot differentiate between the applied acceleration and the 
acceleration due to gravity. This also requires a coordinate transformation and hence 
also affects the accuracy. In summary, platform systems are complex in construction but 
more accurate than the strapdown systems. A comparison between the two 
configurations is given in Table 3-4. 
The errors in the INS grow with time as opposed to the bounded error behaviour of the 
GPS. The typical errors associated with the INS are bias, scale factor, input axis 
misalignments, non-linearity, asymmetry, dead zone and quantization. Some of these 
errors are compensated by adjustment in the sensor electronics, mechanical arrangement 
or calibration using precise physical references. Still, there remain residual errors which 
are initial condition errors, mechanical misalignment errors and gravity model errors. 
These errors are subsequently integrated with the corresponding measurements in the 
processor, hence the errors in the INS grow over time. 
In this research an aviation grade INS is used that consists of mechanical accelerometers 
and a fibre optic gyroscope (see section 9.2). The basic principles of operation and 
construction for these sensors are reviewed briefly below. 
The Accelerometer 
An accelerometer generally consists of a suspended mass (known as proof mass). This 
mass is hinged at one axis and its displacement is an indication of the applied 
acceleration. The displacement is sensed typically through a capacitive pickoff 
arrangement, although other variants are also used. Figure 3-3 shows a simplified 
construction of a simple accelerometer. The mathematical model of the accelerometer is 
given by Newton's second law. It is shown in the transfer function form as below (in the 
Laplace or frequency Domain) 
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H(s) = 
x(s) 
=1 3-4 
a(s) s2 +D S+ 
K 
mm 
where 
a is the external acceleration (n. LIS2), 
x is the proof mass displacement (m), 
IS2) K is the spring constant (kg, P 
D is the damping constant (kg1s), 
M is the mass of the suspended beam (kg). 
It can be seen from the transfer function in Equation 3-8 the dynamics of an 
accelerometer are like a spring from which a mass is suspended. The displacement of 
the spring is determined by the acceleration applied to the mass. This displacement is 
proportional. to the acceleration and is measured using typically a capacitive sensor. The 
geometric design of the proof mass beam ensures that it is sensitive in one axis and has 
low off-axis sensitivity. 
Capacitive Sensors 
Proof Mass 
Pivot 
Figure 3-3: Schematic of a typical Accelerometer 
The accelerometers are typically specified by their sensitivity, maximum operating 
range, frequency response, resolution, full-scale nonlinearity, offset, off-axis sensitivity 
and shock survival. 
3.4.1.2. The gyroscope 
A fibre optic gyroscope is based on the Sagnac Effect, a relativistic phenomenon that 
permits the observation of rotation relative to the inertial space (Kayton and Fried, 
1997). According to the Sagnac Effect, when a light beam is circulated in a closed path 
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that is rotating in inertial space, the optical length seen by the co-rotating beam appears 
longer than that seen by the counter-rotating beams. 
The working of an Interferometric Fibre optic Gyroscope (IFOG) is shown in Figure 
3-4. When the fibre coil is stationary, the clockwise beam and the counterclockwise 
beam 'see' the same distance as per the Sagnac Effect. But in the case when the fibre 
optic coil (and the detector) is rotated, the distance traversed by the two beams become 
different, and the two light beams interfere with each other at the detector. The phase 
difference is zero in the case when both waves travel equal distance. However, when the 
distance travelled is different (in the case of applied angular rate) the phase difference is 
proportional to the applied angular rate. 
Fibre Optic Gyroscopes (FOG) also suffers from the traditional errors such as bias, 
random drift, scale factor, non-orthogonality and deadband (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
However, the most significant error source is white noise and is listed typically in the 
specification sheet of a gyroscope (see section 9.2). White noise is due to spontaneous 
emission of photons and backscatter, typically present in light sources. The white noise 
density for an FOG measured in deglhr-(Hz)112 is an important parameter in the 
selection of a sensor. In the case of the navigation grade IMU used in this thesis the 
value of white noise is 0.0025 deg1hr-(Hzf2. 
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Figure 3-4: Schematic of a Fibre Optic Gyroscope 
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3.4.2. Operation of an INS 
In a typical strapdown INS, three single axis gyroscopes and three single axis 
accelerometers are clustered together. These are typically arranged to measure the 
angular rate and linear acceleration along each Cartesian axis. The output of the 
gyroscope (i. e. angular increments) and that of the accelerometer (i. e. velocity 
increments) are represented by A0 and Av obtained along each axis. 
In the navigation processor, the navigation differential equations are numerically 
integrated to get the attitude, velocity and position. Before presenting the equations the 
definitions of the reference coordinate frames are provided. Figure 3-5 shows the 
orientation of the frames. This figure is discussed after the definitions of the coordinate 
frames below. 
0- 
Eurth Frame (e): This is known as the Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) frame. It is a 
three dimensional coordinate frame that is assumed coincident to the centre of the Earth. 
The X and Y axes (perpendicular to each other) are in the equatorial plane (plane that 
contains the equatorial circle) with the X-axis from the centre of the Earth to zero 
degrees of Longitude. The Z-axis is along the rotation vector of the Earth. 
North 
xi 
Centre of 
gravity of 
the aircraft 
East 
Figure 3-5: The Earth and an aircraft (not to scale) are shown to clarify 
orientation of the coordinate frames discussed in this thesis 
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Body Frame (b): This is a three dimensional coordinate frame that is assumed to 
coincide with the centre of gravity of the aircraft. Traditionally, the X-axis is along the 
port (opposite to starboard or the right side), the Y-axis along the fuselage and the Z- 
axis is downward. 
Navigation Frame (n): This is a three dimensional coordinate frame in which navigation 
equations are integrated. There are different choices of navigation frames utilised 
according to specific applications. The choice of a specific navigation frame can result 
in savings in terms of hardware or computations. For example the use of North, East, 
Down frame in an aircraft requires only two accelerometers instead of three required for 
an INS. This is because horizontal navigation is possible by the use of two horizontally 
mounted accelerometers (in a platform configuration). Since an INS is not stable in 
vertical domain, a third accelerometer needs not to be utilised. This enables direct 
transformation of two horizontal accelerations to their North and East fi-ame 
counterparts. 
Inertial Frame (i): This is a three dimensional coordinate frame with the origin that 
coincides with the centre of the Earth and its axes are assumed to be non-rotating with 
respect to the fixed stars. Its Z axis is defined along the spin axis of the Earth. 
The orientations of these frames can be seen in Figure 3-5. The navigation frame axes 
are shown with coordinates with hollow arrowheads while body frame axes are shown 
with opaque arrowheads. The centre for these two frames is co-incident with the centre 
of gravity of the aircraft. Furthermore, the inertial frame and the Earth frame have their 
centres co-incident with the mass centre of the Earth. The conversion between the two 
frames is obtained by using a transformation matrix that uses the angle traversed by the 
Earth due to its spin (with an angular rate Q) in time t. 
The choice of a navigation frame coincident with the alignment of the mechanical 
platform results in savings of computation as numerical integration of the outputs of 
sensors can be done in the same frame. Hence, the primary reference navigation frame 
in this thesis has the components along local North, local East and along the local 
vertical (towards the mass centre of the Earth) at the centre of gravity of the aircraft. 
The navigation differential equations are of three types. The attitude of the aircraft is 
obtained by solving the time propagation of the coordinate transform matrix between 
the navigation and the body frame. The input to this set of equations (Equation 3-5) is 
the angular rate increments from the body mounted gyroscopes. These are only required 
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in the strapdown systems. As explained in section 3.4.1, these equations are not needed 
in a platform (or gimballed) system. 
The other two sets of equations are used for calculating the velocity and position vector 
of the aircraft (Equation 3-6 and 3-7). The input to these equations is the specific force 
from the set of accelerometers (Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
en 
= Cnnb _on t"n bb ib inb 3-5 
n =fn - [2w" + a)n ] XVn +gn 3-6 ie en 
n =Vn 3-7 
where Cb" is the transformation matrix (of dimensions 3x3) from the body 
frame (b) to the navigation frame (n) 
v" is the velocity vector (of dimension 3) of the body with respect to the Earth 
expressed in the navigation frame 
is the output vector (of dimension 3) of accelerometer known as specific 
force 
w is the angular rate vector (of dimension 3) 
g' is the gravity vector (of dimension 3) at the current position expressed in the 
navigation frame 
p" is the position vector (of dimension 3) expressed in the navigation frame 
Qih is the angular rate skew symmetric matrix (of dimensions 3x 3) from the 
body frame to the inertial frame and expressed in the body frame. It is formed 
from the vectorWib (of dimension 3) 
,,, 
is the angular rate skew symmetric matrix (of dimensions 3x 3) from the C2, " 
navigation frame to the inertial frame and expressed in the navigation frame. it is 
formed from the vector )n (of dimension 3) in 
A matrix is skew-symmetric if its transpose is the same as its negative. This is used to 
facilitate the cross product calculation of two vectors. For example, if x and y vectors 
are to be multiplied (mi that order), x is written in the form of a skew symmetric matrix 
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(call it X). Then X and y are multiplied using matrix multiplication rules, to obtain the 
cross product of x and y (Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
For a typical set of Euler angles, C" is defined as b 
cosy -sinV/ 0' cosO 0 sinO' l 0 0 
Cn 
b sin y/ Cos V/ 0 0 1 0 0 cos 0 - sin 0 3-8 
0 0 sin 0 0 cosO \, O sino coso 
where qf, 0 and 0 are the Euler angles in the rotation order. The Euler Angles 
are three angles used to specify a rotation in three dimensional space. 
The attitude transformation matrix is updated, which at each sample time provides the 
values of Euler angles. The following comments clarify further the velocity and position 
sets of navigation equations. 
As the accelerometer cannot differentiate between the applied acceleration and gravity, 
its output (known as the specific force) must be corrected by the value of gravity at the 
position of the body. The vector g" is then obtained from a gravity model that uses the 
current position of the body as its input. Similarly, w" and w, " , 
in Equation 3-6 are the en 
angular rate vectors for which analytical expressions can be derived depending on the 
navigation mechanization (Titterton and Weston, 2004). The velocity obtained by this 
integration is further integrated to get the position value. 
INSs are manufactured by using a wide variety of sensor technologies. These include 
laser, fibre optic, atomic interferometry, nuclear magnetic resonance, electrostatics, 
fluidic, ring resonator and MEMS (MicroElectoMechanical Systems) (Titterton and 
Weston, 2004). In addition to the expensive Inertial Reference Systems (IRS) that 
consists of high quality ring laser gyros (or dynamically tuned gyros) and precise 
pendulous accelerometers, there is an increasing use of micro-machined inertial sensors 
known as MEMS based INS (Yazdi et al., 1998). Such inertial sensors have seen a 
steady growth in use over the previous decade. At present, micro-accelerometers can 
measure acceleration in the micro-g range and micro-gyroscopes can measure angular 
rate in the deg1hr range. The technology behind MEMS fabrication is the same as 
silicon integrated circuit fabrication. For aviation applications, MEMS based INS is still 
in the prototyping phase (White and Rios, 2002). 
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The preceding sections have presented the basic architecture and principles of operation 
of GPS and INS. This information is used in the next section to underpin the discussion 
of the integration of GPS and INS in order to provide enhanced navigation performance. 
3.5. Integrated GPS/lNS System Architecture 
Traditionally GPS and INS are coupled through a Kalman filter for the processing of 
raw measurements to obtain position, velocity and time (Grewal et. al., 2001). Initially, 
two broad classes of integration were developed; loosely coupled and tightly coupled. 
However, in recent years, a third class has emerged, referred to as deep integration or 
ultra-tight integration (Gautier, 2003). 
Figure 3-6 shows the three high level configurations of GPS/INS integration. In this 
figure, the Radio Frequency (RF) front end refers to the electronic circuitry in the GPS 
receiver that is used to down-convert the GPS signal carrier frequency to a lower 
frequency called the Intermediate Frequency (IF). This is done in order to avoid the use 
of expensive receivers that may be required to process signals in the GPS carrier 
frequency range. The acquisition and demodulator block track the input signal by 
monitoring the error between the received signal and the replica signal generated 
internally by the receiver. 
The received signal is also multiplied (demodulated) by the replica signal. The integrate 
and dump (I & D) filter averages the signal obtained from the demodulator to produce 
the average in-phase (1) and quadrature-phase (Q) components of the demodulated 
signal. This is required to execute the discriminator algorithm that can now decode the 
time delay between the internally generated code signal and the code signal obtained 
from the received signal. 
The pseudorange (PR) and delta pseudorange (DPR) measurements obtained from the 
discriminator are then used by the navigation filter to produce position (P), velocity (V) 
and time (T) of the host vehicle. In parallel, velocity and attitude increments are 
obtained from the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) to be used in the navigation 
differential equations to generate attitude, velocity and position (see section 3.4.2). Also 
in the navigation processor, error compensation equations are used to refine IMU 
measurements. The integration filter is used to combine the measurements from GPS 
and INS. 
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Interconnections for different couplings are labelled in Figure 3-6 to clarify the depth of 
integration (connections for ultra-tightlY coupled, tightly coupled and loosely coupled 
systems are shown in red, magenta and brown colours respectively). In the case of 
loosely coupled systems, position, velocity and time from the GPS receiver are 
combined with position, velocity and attitude from the INS by the use of a truth model. 
The truth model is a mathematical depiction of the error characteristics of the systems 
that are to be combined by a Kalman filter. 
For the tightly coupled system, position, velocity and time from the INS are combined 
with the GPS pseudorange measurements by using a Kalman filter. In ultra-tight 
coupling, the measurements from the GPS receiver used are the in-phase (1) and 
quadrature phase (Q) signals (as described above). Further, there are feedback loops 
between the integration filter and the tracking loop as shown (such as Doppler 
frequency feedback). There are variants of ultra-tight or deep integration. The salient 
difference between these couplings is the method of combining INS and GPS 
observables. For instance, Gustafson and Dowdle (2003) used a minimum variance non- 
linear filter while Kim et al. (2003) and Gold and Brown (2004) employed an extended 
Kalman filter and cascaded Kalman filter stages respectively. The three classes of the 
integrated system are described in detail below. 
Loosely coupled system 
In this configuration, the outputs of the two systems are combined in a navigation 
processor which is a Kalman filter. It is a recursive filter that estimates states of a 
dynamic system in the presence of noisy measurements. It reduces the effects of noise 
and provides optimal estimates of the states (in a weighted least squares sense). The 
dynamics of the system (i. e. aircraft) are defined and are estimated using a Kalman 
filter. The inputs to the Kalman filter are the measurements from the GPS and INS. An 
implementation of a typical Kalman filter system requires a dynamic matrix, a 
measurement matrix, a system noise covariance matrix, a measurement noise matrix 
along with the initial values for the state vector and the state estimate covariance matrix. 
In the case of the loosely coupled system, typically the measurement is the position 
vector obtained from the INS and GPS. The Kalman filter is typically implemented as 
follows: 
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The measurements from GPS and INS are subtracted to generate the measurement error 
vector that is the input to the filter (typicallY latitude and longitude obtained from both 
systems). 
Zk -"z Yk, INS - Yk, GPS 
where 
Zk is the error measurement vector at epoch k 
YkJNS is the INS measurement vector at epoch k. 
Yk, GPS is the GPS measurement vector at epoch k 
3-9 
The Kalman filter is solved using a computer. Hence, the equations are not written in 
the time domain but in the discrete domain. Therefore, each epoch is represented by k. 
This is essentially a time increment after which the Kalman filter is processed the next 
time. 
Based on the system model, the system state vector is propagated as follows 
-X= (D 
A 
k+l ,k Xk 3-10 
where 
(Dk is the dynamic matrix that contains the error model of the INS 
X-i the system state vector at epoch k k 'S 
A 
is the estimated system state vector at epoch k. Xk 
The system model is assumed in this equation to be 
Xk+l -": (Dk Xk + 
rk ok 3-11 
where Fk is the process noise matrix at epoch k 
O)kis the process noise vector at epoch k. 
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While the measurement model is 
AA 
Zk+l -,, z 
Hk+lXk+l + Vk+l 
where 
3-12 
A 
is the estimate of the measurement produced by the states estimated by the Zk+l 
Kalman filter 
Vk is the measurement noise vector at epoch k 
Hkis the measurement matrix at epoch k. 
In the Kalman filter formulation, the following assumptions and definitions are used: 
E[o)i O)T] =0V i#j i 
E[wi WT] = Qk V i=j=k i 
E[v, VT] =0V i# j 3-13 i 
E[v, VT] =RV i=j=k ik 
E[(xo - x^o)(xo - x^o) Po 
where E[x] is the expectation of x 
Qkis the covariance matrix for process noise 
Rkis the covariance matrix for measurement noise 
P is the initial condition for the covariance matrix for the state estimate. 0 
The covariance of the state is also propagated through time: 
TT 3-14 Pk+l ':: (Dk+lpk (Dk+l +TkQkrý 
where. ýk is a priori covariance matrix for the state estimate, 
A 
P is the a posteriori state estimate covariance estimate obtained at the last k 
epoch. 
The new estimate is based on the Kalman gain calculation. The Kalman gain 
Kk., is 
given by 
TT -1 Kk+l 
=Pk+, HK+J(HK+ITk+, HK+l + RK+l ) 3-15 
This is further used to update the state and covariance as follows: 
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A 
+K -Hk+lXk+l 3-16 Xk+l --'z Xk+l k+l [Zk+l 
A 
P =[I-K H 3-17 k+l K+l K+l 
IPK+l 
whereXk+, denotes a posteriori estimate of the state at epoch k+ I 
A 
Pk+l is a posteriori covariance for the state estimate at epoch k+ 1. 
The measurement equation as shown in Equation 3-12 depends upon the mechanization 
of the navigation equation of the INS and the lever arm arrangement between the INS 
and GPS. Mechanization is a term used to refer to the implementation of navigation 
differential equations in a processor (numerical or mechanical) to generate position, 
velocity and attitude of the host vehicle. The measurement matrix, Hk, depends on the 
interrelation of the INS and GPS measurements. 
The truth model utilised to propagate the states and covariance matrices represents the 
errors of the systems to be integrated in the fonn of differential equations. These are 
obtained from a perturbation model of the original navigation equations, including 
models of clock biases in the case of GPS (Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
A key disadvantage of the loosely coupled system is that the Kalman filter depends 
upon the GPS solution. Hence, if the GPS solution is not available (e. g less than four 
satellites available) the integrated solution is no longer possible. However, in the case of 
the tightly coupled system, raw measurements of GPS are processed by the blending 
filter. Hence, in this case, a useful navigation output is possible even for the situation 
when less than four satellites are available. 
Traditionally two types of Kalman filter are used; the Linearised Kalman filter (LKF) 
and Extended Kalman filter (EKF) (Grewal et. al., 2001). The LKF works on the 
linearised model of the process. This linearisation is realized by a first order 
approximation of a Taylor series expansion. The same dynamic and measurement 
matrices are used throughout the operation of the LKF. In the case of the EKF, the 
dynamic and measurement matrices contain nonlinear terms and are evaluated at each 
epoch. Hence, the EKF is more accurate than the LKF but requires more computational 
effort. 
Another kind of Kalman filter used in the loosely coupled GPS/INS integration is called 
an Unscented Kalman filter (UKF) (Nassar et al., 2006). In the case of the UKF, 
detailed modelling of the behaviour of the dynamic process and noise is carried out to 
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achieve better accuracy. Nassar et al. (2006) have shown that better accuracy can be 
achieved by using the UKF instead of the EKF. However, there is no benefit from using 
the UKF with respect to the provision of integrity. This is because there is no addition to 
redundancy as compared to the EKF and in general, a more complex formulation is 
more prone to failures (such as those resulting from feedback loops). 
3.5.1.2. Tightly Coupled System 
In the loosely coupled system, typically the processor of the GPS measurements 
contains a Kalman filter for processing raw measurements to derive position, velocity 
and time. Hence, there is a formation of cascaded filters when the system is integrated. 
There can be problems in a cascaded implementation of filters in terms of noise 
modelling. This arises because the signals that are input to the later stages of the filter 
are filtered by the previous stages. 
In general, filtered outputs lose their Gaussian characteristics. Hence, a typical 
assumption required for using a Kalman filter is violated. This configuration is avoided 
at the cost of complexity in the tightly coupled systems. The raw measurements of the 
GPS i. e. the pseudoranges are provided from the GPS to the Kalman filter directly. The 
error states for the receiver clock bias and drift are also included in the Kalman filter. 
The Kalman filter processes the pseudorange measurements from the GPS receiver and 
the predicted values of these parameters obtained from INS measurements. As the INS 
provides the current location of the host vehicle, it is possible to use these predicted 
parameters for the participating satellites. The expression of the prediction of 
pseudoranges is given by 
A ev 
-R 
e 
_LAe jo = 1IRS INS 
11 
where the subscript e represents the ECEF frarne, 
Re sv is the position vector 
from vehicle to the satellite, 
R INS is the position vector 
from the INS to the vehicle centre of gravity 
3-18 
and LA' is the lever ann correction. This is the distance between the centre of 
gravity of the INS and GPS receiver antenna phase centre. 
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Equation 3-18 is written in the Earth frame. The measurement equation is formed usmg 
the two sets of pseudoranges with the predicted set from the INS and the other set 
containing those measured from the visible satellites (Nikiforov, 2002). 
A 
PI, INS - PI, GPS 
Zk 3-19 
A 
_Pn, 
INS - Pn, GPS 
where, b, is the predicted pseudorange of the A satellite by using the INS Oi INS 
position 
p,, Gps is the pseudorange of the ith satellite obtained from the GPS receiver 
k is the epoch number. 
The tightly coupled system provides benefits over the loosely coupled system 
particularly when satellite availability is less than four or in the case of poor user- 
satellite geometry (even if the satellites are more than four). In such cases a loosely 
coupled system cannot work because the GPS position solution is either not available or 
is very poor. As in the tightly coupled system, satellite measurements are directly 
incorporated in the Kalman filter, hence the use of the GPS measurements is still 
possible even if there are less than four satellites available. However, the quality of the 
solution in such a case is dependent on the quality of the INS used. 
However, tightly coupled systems have longer transient times and settle to a steady state 
slower than loosely coupled systems. This becomes critical in the case when one 
satellite measurement is replaced by another. In such a case, tightly coupled systems are 
more sensitive to the 'switching' phenomenon compared to the loosely coupled system. 
This effect is important with regard to the integrity as integrity computations are 
typically done in steady state and can be a limiting factor when the time of flight is short 
(Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). This can also manifest itself as an occurrence of a failure. 
Similarly, tightly coupled systems respond slowly to the INS errors compared to loosely 
coupled systems (Gautier, 2003). A more complex coupling referred to as deeply 
integrated (or ultra tightly coupled) is discussed in the next section. 
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3.5-1.3. Deeply Integrated System 
Deeply integrated systems use the INS to aid the GPS receiver tracking loop. However, 
the terminology on the classification of integration architecture is not consistent. A good 
discussion on the use of this terminology is presented in Gautier (2003). There are a 
number of approaches which are referred to as deeply integrated or ultra-tight coupling 
in the literature (Gold and Brown, 2004; Kim et al., 2003; Gustafson and Dowdle, 
2003). 
A typical ultra-tight configuration is shown in Figure 3-7. The GPS receiver functions 
are replaced by software filters. The software tracking loop is aided by the output of an 
INS. The received signal is used by the coffelators to form the error signal between the 
receiver generated replica signal and the incoming signal. This is smoothed by the 
smoothing filter (to remove the noise) to form the range and range rate measurements. 
These are fed to the navigation processor which also accepts inputs from the Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU). The navigation processors can take many forms as described 
below. The estimated values for range and range rates from the navigation processor are 
then used by the replica code generator to generate replica signals. These signals are 
used by the coffelators and the process is repeated again. 
The variants of deep integration are essentially the same except for variation in error 
models, filter selection and incorporation of signals from the IMU. There are differences 
in the implementation of the filter used for the fusion of the measurements. For 
example, in Gustafson and Dowdle, (2004) a minimum variance adaptive non linear 
filter used (navigation processor in Figure 3-7), while in Kim et al. (2003) a Kahnan 
filter is used. Apart from the filter variations, the INS aiding of GPS can take different 
fon-ns, for example, aiding by providing velocity infonnation from the INS, and aiding 
the tracking loop by the location of the satellites as calculated using the data from the 
INS. The ultra tightly coupled approaches are presented briefly below. 
Ultra- Tight Integration by Kim et al. (2003) 
Instead of using pseudorange measurements, raw measurements from the GPS tracking 
loop are used that are known as I and Q. In this way, improvement in signal tracking is 
achieved, especially in the presence of noise or in the case of low power. The structure 
of this type of integration is based on the concept of Vector Delay Locked Loop 
(VDLL) as presented by Parkinson and Spilker (1996). 
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Figure 3-7: Typical Ultra tight coupling configuration 
In the VDLL configuration, all the available signals are processed with a single filter 
rather than the use of individual delay locked loops. This results in a reduction in noise 
and hence the tracking channels are less likely to enter the non-linear region. Another 
benefit is that this approach also works in the case when an individual tracking loop 
fails completely. Further, it is suggested that instead of a single filter, a federated filter 
approach may be used. 
The two stages of the filters are the local filters and the master filter. Each measurement 
is assigned a local filter which is in fact a single state, single measurement Kalman 
filter. This estimates the value of the measurements and in doing so reduces the noise 
content. The estimated values of pseudorange measurements are then passed on to the 
master filter. There are two benefits of using this approach 
1. The calculation load is divided between the two filters, working at different 
rates. This is because the local filters are operated at a higher data rate while 
the main Kalman filter works at a lower rate. 
2. This configuration is better at fault detection as detection of the individual 
faulty sensor can be carried out with a higher probability. The local filter stage 
can be used to monitor individual satellite health leading to exclusion in the 
case of a faulty measurement. 
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The master filter is constructed in a similar manner to a VDLL. The VDLL 
configuration is given by 
v(t) = 
Ak Pd I 
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where 
Ak is the vector of the maximum amplitude of individual measurements 
Pdis the power in the differentiated signal 
T'. is the code delay in the signal received from the ith satellite 
x, y., and z,. are the Cartesian coordinates of the nominal receiver position 
while 
A denotes the estimate 
br is the estimated receiver clock bias 
v(t) is the vector of pseudorange measurements as a function of time. 
The measurement matrix is formed from the Jacobian matrix of the time delays with 
respect to the receiver position. In the filter, the position is estimated with the time delay 
for each channel. This is then fed to the code generator. This code generator works in 
the same way as that of a conventional receiver tracking loop and generates replica code 
to compare with the received code. 
The master filter accepts velocity information from the INS to help in positioning. 
There is also feedback to the INS for the calibration of its effors. The measurement 
covariance matrix of the master filter is a combination of the error covariances of local 
filters. The results reported by Kim et al. (2003) suggest that such integration helps in 
reducing the problem of tracking those signals that are weak or immersed in noise. 
However, with regard to this thesis, there is limited gain in the case of detection of 
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slowly growing errors by employing this kind of configuration. This is explained further 
in section 5.5. 
The algorithm by Kim et al. (2003) is the simplest in the category of ultra-tightly 
coupled systems discussed in this section. It can also present benefits if a variant of it is 
used to assess the integrity of the GPS pseudoranges. This can be done by monitoring 
the local filter stage of the scheme where each individual measurement can be accessed. 
However, no such scheme is employed to this effect. A failure can disrupt the whole 
filter as there is no scheme to isolate the failed measurement. In comparison to a typical 
GPS receiver with parallel tracking channels, this type of configuration is more 
vulnerable to the occurrence of a failure in one of the measurements because of the 
resultant corruption of the main Kalman filter. The noise handling of the scheme in the 
case of interference is dependent on the modelling of the noise parameters in the 
Kalman filter formulation and needs to be tuned according to the situation at hand. 
Deep Integration by Gustafson and Dowdle (2003) 
In Gustafson and Dowdle (2003), the correlation delay is estimated by using the 
measurement from the available satellites and the INS for each channel of the GPS 
receiver. Measurements from all available satellites are processed sequentially and 
independently. A non-linear minimum variance estimate is arrived at by the use of a 
detailed algorithm. In contrast to a typical Kalman filter,, the treatment of the filter is 
non-linear and filter gains vary adaptively with the noise in the signals. In this way, the 
efficiency of the tracking loop is enhanced. It can also be said that the INS is in effect in 
the feedback loop. However, in this way the integration has more dependency on the 
INS error behaviour. 
This filter is particularly effective in the case when GPS signals are exposed to 
jamming. Due to the use of an extended correlator algorithm for the GPS signals, 
maximum amount of information can be extracted from the corrupted signals. The 
extended coffelator algorithms refers to the GPS receiver correlation algorithm in which 
the correlation of the in-coming and replica signal is performed over a very wide part of 
the signals as compared to a conventional coffelator. This essentially reduces the effect 
of signal noise on the coffelator output. 
It is envisaged that this filter may be limited in use due to its non-conventional nature 
and computational complexity. The benefit of this scheme over the traditional Kalman 
filter has also not been shown. Note that the traditional Kalman filter is also an optimal 
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filter and can provide further benefits when implemented in its extended fonn or its 
unscented variant. Hence, there is no further advantage of detailed mathematical 
modelling over the EKF modelling as utilised in the scheme by Kim et al. (2003). 
Ultra- Tight Integration by Gold and Brown (2004) 
In another approach, a cascaded filter implementation is suggested (Gold and Brown, 
2004). This is called the GPS-Inertial Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (GI- 
RAIM) method. In this case, an optimal estimation technique is used to coherently 
combine the GPS signal from the civilian and military codes. The technique essentially 
consists of the estimation and minimisation of residual errors between position solutions 
from the GPS and a good quality INS (navigation grade of gyroscope drift < 0.01 deg1hr 
and accelerometer bias < 10 micro g). This technique uses carrier phase data and signals 
that are available only to military users. 
Discussion on Deeply Integrated Systems 
The approach of Gustafson and Dowdle (2003) is the most complex of all the 
integration techniques. The use of a non-linear adaptive filter makes it very 
computationally intensive. The scheme by Kim et al. (2003) is the simplest since the 
EKF implementation employs a simplified first stage. 
Due to complex coupling structures, integrity is hard to maintain for the deeply coupled 
systems. In the case of the ultra-tight coupled system proposed by Gustafson and 
Dowdle (2003), filter integrity management is carried out through provision of an 
algorithm to check divergence of the filter. However, there is no general integrity 
algorithm, examples of which are given in Chapter 5. In the case of the Ultra-tightly 
coupled system presented by Kim et al. (2003), the paper states that the filter used is 
good for integrity management because of its simplified first stage that consists of 
individual filters for individual measurements. However, no specific integrity 
monitoring scheme is proposed. The GI-RAIM configuration is designed with integrity 
in mind and a high quality INS is used for this purpose. This is discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
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3.6. Limitations of the Existing Systems 
The integrated system has three major benefits over the individual systems: 
" the accuracy of the integrated output is better than the individual systems 
" even during GPS outages the navigation solution is available over a period of 
time depending on the quality of the INS. 
the integrated system copes best with noise and interference. 
The accuracy of satellite based navigation systems is expected to continue to improve 
enabling a bound on the errors of the integrated system. In the case of GPS, the 
modernisation program involves new satellites, improved satellite clocks and additional 
signals. Hence, with regard to accuracy, GPS should be suitable for most phases of 
flight in the near future. However, the use of satellite based systems such as GPS for 
aircraft navigation is constrained by the stringent requirements for integrity. Note 
however, that Galileo is designed to provide integrity in real time and accuracy suitable 
for most phases of flight (see Table 2-5), hence addressing to some extent the weakness 
of GPS with respect to integrity monitoring. 
Integrity is essentially needed to assure safety of flight. The essential element that needs 
to be fulfilled is the detection and exclusion of the faulty sensor. In the case of loosely 
coupled systems this is not possible because access to individual measurements is not 
provided. For tightly coupled systems, integrity algorithms are provided in the literature 
and are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, in general there are no integrity 
methods available for monitoring the performance of a deeply integrated system. This is 
due to their complex and non-standard nature. An exception to this is the GI-RAIM 
(GPS-Inertial RAIM) method that is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Another issue that arises due to the coupling architecture is its effect of coupling on the 
integrity performance. For example, it is conceivable that a complex architecture 
generates more failures due to its construction. Therefore, a detailed study of the failure 
modes of the respective systems and the coupling architectures is required. This is the 
subject of chapter 4. 
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3.7. Summary 
In this chapter, an overview of the integrated system architecture has been presented 
along with the characteristics of the individual systems. Different segments of the GPS 
including the sources of measurement errors have been discussed. Inertial Navigation 
systems have been introduced along with their construction and mechanization. 
Mechanisms for the integration of the two systems have also been described. The three 
levels of integrating GPS and INS; loose, tight and ultra-tight have been described in 
detail, using representative configurations. In this way, key features of these schemes 
have been identified. The next chapter builds on these features to carry out a detailed 
analysis of the potential failure modes and specify corresponding representative 
mathematical models. 
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4. Integrated System Failure Modes 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented the main features of GPS, INS and their integration. This chapter 
builds on this to identify the potential failure modes for the three groups associated with 
GPS, INS and the integration process. The first group; potential failure modes of GPS 
identifies failure modes for each of the three segments. The second group; potential 
failure modes of the INS, is divided into three classes; a) operational failure modes b) 
hardware failure modes and c) MEMS (MicroElectromechanical Systems) based 
material failure modes. The third group presents the potential failure modes that arise 
due to the integration process. 
In order to allow a detailed assessment of the capabilities of existing integrity 
algorithms, the failure modes are classified and mathematical (failure) models assigned 
to each class. The strength and weaknesses of these representative models are discussed. 
The representative models are used in Chapter 7 to quantify the performance of existing 
integrity algorithms and in Chapters 8 and 9 to develop a new approach to sensor level 
integrity monitoring. 
4.2. GPS Error Behaviour and Failure Modes 
GPS is a complex system consisting of the space, control and user segments. Failures 
could occur at different levels from the control segment, through signal generation, 
transmission and processing within the receiver. As some of the operational GPS 
satellites were launched many years before the achievement of Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) in 1995, their payloads have aged with time, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of age-related failures. The design life of a GPS satellite is around 7 years. 
The earlier Block II/IIA satellites are out of service. The current operational satellites 
are those of the Block IIR category (Lavrakas, 2007). As shown in Olynik et al. (2002) 
the rms clock error is largest for Block 11 satellites and lowest for Block IIR satellites 
with Block IIA satellites exhibiting intermediate values. Although the improvement in 
Block IIR satellites may be due to better quality clocks (Rubidium as compared to 
Cesium based clocks) the expectation is that in general, there is a correlation between 
the age of the satellite clock error (i. e. the older the satellite, the larger the error). Table 
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4-1 provides a summary of GPS failure modes as captured from existing literature 
(Ochieng et al., 2003), augmented with new ones identified during the course of this 
research. Each failure mode is assigned a unique identification (ID), with a 
corresponding summary including an estimate of its impact on the relevant 
measurements. 
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Another category of errors common to all the electronic equipment is also applicable to 
GPS receiver electronics as discussed in entry 1018 in Table 4-2. An important 
conclusion that can be drawn from the above table is that the nominal errors of GPS are 
bounded. There are other failure modes that are catastrophic in nature such as jamming 
of the signals, but the effect of these is not permanent. Once the jamming source is 
removed a receiver can resume its operation by getting a new fix. However, the other 
system under discussion in this thesis does not share this problem. INS is a standalone 
system and suffers from different types of errors. These are presented in the next 
section. 
4.3. Inertial Navigation System Error Behaviour 
and Failure Modes 
An inertial navigation system consists of a sensor arrangement (gyroscopes and 
accelerometers) and a navigation processor. The measurements obtained from the 
gyroscopes and accelerometers i. e. angular rates and accelerations are numerically 
integrated in a navigation processor to obtain the position solution. Any hardware errors 
or effors in initial conditions act as forcing functions to the navigation mechanization 
equations and hence grow with time. Hence, over time, these nominal errors convert 
into failures depending on the requirements set for a particular application. In aviation, 
for example, nominal INS errors become failures when the alert limits set by 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) are exceeded (see Table 2-6). This 
section describes three types of INS failure modes: those arising from operational 
hardware, operational software and those specific to Micro-Electromechanical Systems 
(MEMS) technology. 
4.3.1. INS Operational Hardware Failure modes 
INS operational hardware failure modes are in fact nominal hardware errors that are 
well known in the navigation community. Table 4-2 presents these failures. They have 
been compiled from the existing research literature (Farrell, 1976, Farrell and Barth, 
1998; Grewal et. al., 2001; Madni and Costlow, 2001; White and Rios, 2002 and 
Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
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Table 4-2 covers the hardware failure modes which are typically present in INS which 
are manufactured using different technologies such as mechanical, ring laser and fibre 
optic. Except for the rare case of random walk which is not applicable to mechanical 
gyroscopes, these errors are shared by all types of INS. Although these failure modes 
are also present in MEMS, there is a class of failure modes that is present exclusively in 
MEMS based INS. These are discussed in section 4.3.3. 
The output of INS sensors is fed to the navigation processor to obtain the position, 
velocity and attitude of the host vehicle. The processing also results in errors which are 
discussed in the next section. 
4.3.2. INS operational Software Failure modes 
INS software failure modes are associated with the navigation software mechanization. 
Mechanization is a term used to refer to implementation of navigation differential 
equations in a processor (numerical or mechanical) to generate position, velocity and 
attitude of the host vehicle. The navigation equations are driven by the initial conditions 
and the outputs from the sensors. Hence, errors in the initial conditions and outputs of 
the sensors are numerically integrated in the navigation software. This results in growth 
of error magnitudes, with the passage of time. To study this growth, error models with 
temporal growth characteristics are typically used. However, it is not possible to use 
these models for on-line compensation. This is because of the random nature of the 
initial conditions and sensor imperfections. For example, although it is known that the 
Schuler oscillation has a time period of around 84 minutes and its behaviour is 
sinusoidal, its sign and the magnitude varies with the quality of the initial conditions 
and the sensors used. Similarly the random bias of a typical accelerometer or gyroscope 
varies from turn-on to turn-on and the offline calibrated values cannot be used to 
compensate these (Farrell, 1976; Titterton and Weston, 2004). 
124 
vý 
Z 
plo 
00 
F-4 
M ý 
w 
r- rA - Q;. ) 
g 1 vi 2 u ä 
. 1. - -5 +A ýý- 4 0 ý ;j +. j P. 4 l= r ci ýc l cu ý4 t) A g .4 . -4 a ý 
2 (L) "Ci 5 (A g) 
P 
ýg 0, % P-4 lu 0 ci u 
M t 
t: 
z5 - 5 ý ; ; ý5 r o 9 m s--, --ci 0 R 
ei 
4- 
, +. 4 0 
to (L) t 2ýý 0 . u2 ". 4 g 
A 
a b . 
P. 4 
l 16--b 0 C> 9-4 ej s 
00 
j 
4 0 .4 0 
A 
.0 qj 
+-f 
0 . -4 .Z U rA U (L) ý 
.5 
-' -0 CU Gn 0 r g . . 
14 91 ce cu 
> . t, 9 x -0 '! A (A 
c) 
= 
A 
cn 0 g 0 '«, 
. P-9 . -4 . 
ei "0 K " 2 0 2 5 44 g A c A -t 0 E tz Q 2 >na( (L) 1-4 -4 e S. cli r. Gn 
P 
(2 
4 Gn 
qe 
2 5 
+cg A-i 
" 2; 1 A 2 1-ý, 
0 
r-' . -4 
4 ,0 Iz -4 cid X 
9) 0 0 $-4 0 C) U, 5 ý 
-4 
ýg 
.,. 4 
'19 
4) 
u 
0 
4 lý 
Z! 
.5 
e. ) = 
ý 
ýo C) ý4 . Gn P. 4 . -4 Itý +-& > 0 
4-4 
"0 Q) 0 GA 
Z 0 u f- 
C, 3 
- 0 0 ei = ä .. b ei 6.. P-4 
CO, 2 
ui (2 
12 . k4 
W') 
CN 
ý4 
-xi (L) Gn A it' . P»4 
> 
u 91.1 
0 +cý 0 0 C) (n "0 ci 
9 PC 
-zý 19 6E5 g 2 t rA u e "Ci zi 
0 172, P-4 
l= = 
Q 
2 , , 
4.. 4 -P-4 m 
cn --4 W 
0 
1--4 u . ". 
d Q p 
kw +! A ci "CJ £- U 8, c; 0 (A u ýe u 
ri %D4 
c02 5 bý 
0 
iv-. f. ý-4 0 
4 
2 -ze 
ý 
4--4 
-, 6z1 
0 
1 
w-4 --4 w--4 WO x 
,0 
9 
A 
9) 
1.4 
tr) 
., 0 
ooý 
V') (2 v2 1-4 . P. 4 
+-1 
. -4 
(A 
0 
(0 
Gn u 
u 
4.4 
0 
U 
a 
J: 1 
-5 ci r4 
u 
ýJ, 
2 
s C> 
r-ý 
g 4.. 4 
0 
0 
5 A -: s 
c02 
ý 
= 
9) 
- 
-10 
olý 
1-9 
%DW x 
. -4 u 
t 
9) "0 .,. 
0 (L) 
Z 
X '5 0 
ý tDi) lý ic e 0 2L4 _I, ' . ". d Il> c02 < 
$24 
0 1 .> 
u .4 
-4 
Zu g 0 
ci 
$ 
= "0 
9 
u 
-ci > "':: ý 
= 
0 -i-, J - ö 
2 e CD c) 9 (4. -4 0 
Int 
C) w . Gn 
, iý, > - u 
= (4-4 0 g; f--4 ýo g +'toý 9.4 C 424 
zi e e zý 
t2 
5 
w 
c ,2 
c ý) jCI) lý u .2 f2 > E 
e 
(L) 
ýz 
Gn 
< Ei *0 2 lý* 
A 
ýn 
Gn u 
. 
cii 
(A 
0 
P. 4 
4-4 
0 
c02 
.5 
:. 
g; V--4 
JD 
0 
u 
Q ý% 
rA 
r-4 
0 
lý 
1; 2 
Ll. -0 0 
M 
- 
r. 0 
+-) 
"G 
0 
(L) 
tr 
Gn 
2ý *W 
rA .c . -4 u r 9. ) 
0 
* 1-4 
4 
W --4 v-4 (L) 14-4 
Q 
lw ei 
(X 
9 
J,. U 
-4 .. -4 
U JD 
"ö ce 
0 
r-L4 
WP- 
4--4 
Gn 
0 
P-4 
( 
L) 
3.1 ce 0 e Gn ;i 
u 
ä 
9 -! cn -4. - u 
Gn .. -4 
44 
2 "% -ýe 
1 
C A 
,4 5 P--4 u . ;. 4 2 i'>, - -4 > rý e 4 w . --4 eb 4-4 
g 
"0 
2 
ci lý öj) 
. -4 
> 
"0 0 
E5 
+ 
U 
e 
W 
ýI .2 
. -4 $. 4 -5 0 
0 9 ýe -ze 
ci 
C, 3 
ci 0 
bo 
CU 0 0 ei 
(5 > L) Gn 
(1q 
Gn 
C 
cn 
Gn 
le 
Gn 
ýo 
C14 
v-4 
f 
kn 4 
C) 
u 
-4-0 I, t2 l .4 2 Z .4 (Z c> -: ý -ZJ 
0 "0 
L 
<+. 4 r- 
(L) 
0 
4 c21 
0 
44 2 
u 9) .4 ;2 Gn 
+. j -4 
W 
Gn 
. v-b 
4-1 
0 
-4 "0 
;2 0 
w 92 0 
2 
r u vý :ý -ýý = ce 
ý 
u 
924 (U ý 5 ä - z 
Z) 0 
ko 
ce 0 -U 9 Ce 
E 2;, 
u 
mi » 0 
9 
V--4 0 90 
cn $. 4 ;j 
ci 
P--4 
(1) 
M Gn 
.,. 0 
ei 
ci 
cn ;.. 0 "8 0 Ei 9 
> Q 
'+ý4 r, 
4-4 
0 
c . ', 
ä 1 4- 4 5 9 R> e ý 9) 
ix 
Gn 5 ý fi -9 zi 
4-) 
Ei c, (Z (Z 
P--4 
" . -I 
0 
ýlü 
-lc$ 
0 
vý n 
m ýi 4) * -4 tý -a *5 (X 0 +.. b 4 Gn 0 ' -e c) 0 ... -4 -4 10 
cn u Gn -ý8 -4- Gn ý4 0 9) 
5 9 
4-4 
;2 . _, (a (L) ce 
0 ce 
(4-4 0 
. 
2 Gn 
cn 
9 
«$ 0 
-0 
9) -zý -5 
Gn 
-zi = 
öü U) Q 
4 2 2 u ch 9) v--4 . ý4 1-1 
19 *rý 9) 0, -ZJ 2 
--4 
0 
. -4 $-4 0 
'-. ' %D,. 4 -a 
9 0 
A -, cn r. Q 1-4 (L) 5 
Cid (L) -; A >, 0 rA u wo cu 9) 
.2 ri "0 "= 
(4-4 9. - rý 15 ý n... Gn 2 1 0 U 0 -4 (L) . Gn 
0 
Q r»q 0 Q Gn 
w 
*ýe 
ýe . w»d 
P-4 
Ad 
; tz vi Gn 
:Z -, E., 
9 a +- ) le ci U 
ce eL) r. gl w - 0 
- 9 
.,. 4 
ýI 
4.4 
0 rA rl 
-, c 
-5 - -ýA 
41 
-+-i u rl .,. 
4 
"Ci 5 
r L. 
. 
--4 
0 cm 2 , '5 -4--0 
.. 4 
2 
0 
t8 
MIO 
CD C CD 
I- 
CN 
V-4 
4-4 cu w r u t- 1) o 
- 
, ., 
(D ýý > tz :. 0 
c; 
14 U -4 5 u2 u 
. -4 u g) vý (A e 
--4 ,' ýCJ i , (L) 
9 0 
>--( 
21 Cwo *g 
Gn 
;2 ý e , v2 i ý, 
2 
. P-4 kg u (n a ý 2 - iz 0 le > . 
G 
A 
+, -ý 
en 
5 - u CZ 0 e 5 .2 ".. ý 5 " . + c4 ; -4 .. 0 0 Ci 4-, -zi c4 e 
X 
ZJ 
0 s > 0 « 
Q 
0 
Gn 
CU tu A - 0 32 . C14 
ce 42 P-4 
(C i 
2 --4 
+_o 
(L) 
2 
rA (L) e rA 
14.0 u -C 9) :. .. 
cu 
0 lý Gn 
ý ýo po 
all 
Gn 
00 
cq 
V--f 
Hardware failure modes and software based failure modes of INS were discussed in the 
last two sections. However, there is another class of hardware failure modes specific to 
MEMS sensors. This arises due to the nature of the material and manufacturing process 
of the MEMS sensors. These are discussed below. 
4.3.3. MEMS based INS Failure modes 
MEMS based sensors are etched from Silicon wafers using the Integrated Circuit (IC) 
fabrication technology (Maluf, 2000). In contrast to typical IC electronic circuits, a 
MEMS based INS contains moving elements. Hence, there are frictional errors 
associated with the relative movement of surfaces. It should be noted that the study of 
MEMS based failures in the literature is mostly limited to cases of assurance of their 
reliability in harsh environments. The field seems to be premature compared to the 
study of gradual (navigation) performance degradation which is more relevant to the 
understanding of MEMS sensor behaviour when used in the construction of an INS. The 
potential MEMS based INS material failure modes are presented in Table 44 as 
gathered from the existing literature. The impact of these failure modes is generally not 
available in quantitative terms. This requires detailed simulations or experimentation of 
MEMS based INS. However, the nature of potential failure is mentioned i. e. is it a slow 
degradation of the performance or an abrupt failure. The dynamics of the failures are 
important in this thesis because these aid in the design of integrity algorithms. 
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In section 4.2 and 4.3, failure modes of GPS and INS are summarized. These failure 
modes arise when these systems are operated as individual systems. However, when the 
two systems are integrated a class of failure modes arise from the integration process. 
These are summarized in the next section. 
4.4. Integrated System failure modes 
When GPS and INS systems are integrated, failure modes can result from the 
integration process. The failures (listed in Table 4-5) arise from the formulation of the 
integration filter and the interaction of two systems. It should be noted here that due to 
the complex nature of the coupling between two systems, it is not always possible to 
estimate the impact of these failure modes quantitatively, without detailed 
experimentation. 
134 
COD 
&W 
P6o 
F--( 
2 ce :' "0 r. 4 
(+-d g ro Gn Q :. -CJ (A CU 
E5 -zi ' Z ý " g u tDz e u '. - 0 v2 . .. d 0 u Ei c) P--4 ýc3 t) +. 0 0 
> 
A 9) 'le-, Q - --4 ;8 2ý $Z U u>ý 9 A --4 8 ýc g . jý 0 u ý :1 zw c4 ýc (L) w (L) 1 1 > ci ; 0 4 1 -5 1 (L) c4 i-a «g -, +. -4 
" 'ýý c02 ZJ 4 
s- 
ý4 0 14-4 
j 
,e . .. g 0 t= 
*i 
-5 
1 
2 
. -4 4 +.. b ci 
0 
ci rz 0 4 Q u e . 2 93 u ci '5 = >, 
9 >, 9) 0 .4 5 (L) 5 
--4 
(L) 
1.0 4 u 4 , u 
9 
> . u2 fi 
n 
t 2 't ý klý b 
9 
c4 ä 
G 
. 
M 
* $Z ýý g 2 5 -.. d s 
+- 
rA 
. 
>wog 4 40 
0 ' 15 5 
4) 
o . ý4 e (6-4 5 0 0 ý w . - 2 
>ý, 
C) - -4 
2 Ei g <Z u 0 : -. r 0 u t u g 0 
CD 9) u l= u -6.1 
0 
Gn 
4 r-1 +. i ýL4 
1 1 - 2 
ý 
(L) = 0 1 . 
( g le 
(L) 
:s 4-4 1 ' ' 0 10 C, 2 9 - = Q 
o 2 Gn Ir . 0 ) -4 
" 
u . mw .A rA u 
0 
15 lw cn 
2 
to u 
-4 i ý 
-0 r :5 -4 = 
u tD» + e 5 
'5 1 0 
0 m 
. u e -rz 
0 4 
2 ý--4 (DI b--4 10 --4 F 
10 
vl 
rn 
"-d 
GO2 Gn 1-4 
> 
5 -0 U . -, ýl- 
2. 
-4 > Q 2 g 0 1 1 2 2 V) 
1--4 
u 
-CJ u2 C> po cn (, q U 
U u 0 42 +-& u «$ c14 9) Gn 
Gn C4 4) 
(A 
e 
9) 9 75 
M 
-ý -g ýd 
+. j ý5 ý8 
-0 ;5 1.1 u . 
5 
ýc *ý Z cn +CA rA --4 5 
_ci 
9 
$ --4 V cn Cl, 4--a -t (L) --4 "0 ; -, 0 r, .5 ýc "Ci (L) = 0 cn 
0 JE 
4-4 
ce 2 
'62 
2 - >, . ce ch " ;5 ob , ci 
. -4 
-2e 3p cd 5 Ei w 
0 (L) c E c2. "0 9 14-1 *5 5 Pzi CJ 0 
ZJ 
0 
clý -+-i 
- 
"-*, 
o 
+.. ) ýi-i 
-i, < - cq 02 :1 0 u 0 5 ý clý ýj e u --4 e 4) A 
P-4 
. ý - :, '11 - cn IQ) r cn c*N u ýo . ;e 4 Id 
-22 2G 0- 
. -4 (2 12 P-4 
ý 
m e 
16-1 kg ti P. = 12 Z . 
4) 
Qi c02 
+. 0 --4 
Gn m ýo *1 0 ce 9 9) ý> (L) 0 
9.4 
+M 
ýi u e u rn <j = , cd ýý fi tý 0 :2 0 u 2 CD W -- tý ;j CJ 2 Q 0 rq 5 
e 
- e ci 9 ci 'jý . 
1 
C, ) 2 4-4 L 
: - -. ý u " w 
0 0, .. . , , bi) 0 (L) t2 
KA 
to 0 .A 8 5 e ca . "., ;j 
ý, ýc 1, 9 0 
1-0 c 0 Q Q 0 
C) 
g -. C) -; A ie 0 C, 4 0 (Z) 
A% 0 
1; 4 Z., cu Gn 0 v (A 2ý 
140 
9) 5 Gn u p--d u +- 4-. 8 2 -bd Gn "ZJ cý 0 4. a !ý 0 tu 0 - .,. 4 
0 W. 4 
1 A zi X rA 2 
* 3 -zý 4 ce l5 5 2 r. Q C, ta ) cn te >, Z: 0 2 0 4-- --4 EA "0 5 w Z (L) . p»d 2 rA :, 0 - 5 >-. rA A, 4. --b (L) 0 4) - s p--4 
CD le 
9 X . ,5 
9 "COL) 9 -; 3 -ci 0 Gn 
K a : V) ý g 
5 4 e kg c ý, 2 0 zý 
9 0 (L) 4) Q CL) ýI 4.4 "0 
u ý 
eg e GO -0 0 4) rA 
rA J +. j 0 0 
u 
g) --4 cn A 
.5 3ý Gn --0 "0 , W-d 2 2 - 
- 
9: 4 Ei Gn . , cu . cd 
gý 9 r "A 
i 
ý (L) ý2 ý . 4 2 tý , cn 1 Q) C) 
"0 Z 
GO2 
11 . --4 r --4 .5 1.4 -0 , 
< u - , C. 4 u öß 9: 4 . C) CU u 0 Z c, 
rn (L) u c 
2 "ü Po " p U 5. ý -2 + - - .5 --0 N. 4 
a u 
9) . 
--. 4 
-4 
cj 
E5 U 9 
E 
x g S X) 
m 
4) . e 
r 
n CD g) c i CD 14 0 Gn z d C> - 4 4. -4 Gn C gl --4 --4 rA 
--4 zý u 
9 
2 *i cri 
u 
(L) 
.. j-. Q 2 
Gn m ä 
.4 
+-. ) 
--CJ 4) 
0 -+-1 
2 
+-& 4-4 Cý C) cn 9: 2 
GA = -0 . -ý 1-4 u 
0 - 
;5 "14 12 c) ci 9 0 > Q - 2 > 92.4 
( ) t ei L ä u 9) rn (L) 4 
ci -.. 1 e (Z ý 9 .5 S r. 2, u :2 W (X rq .. -4 
ä .. -4 ; - Ei (L) ei .u 
u 
P., ci 4) Gn = e 9 r. le C D u 9 9) c7, (U lu r L -- CD . Q -4 Goý 
c2 >-. 
_ , 
x cii 1; 5 
A 
9) > 0 
-+-& rA Q 
vý +-; ýo r--4 
gi 
4-4 
0 
9 e ýg 
-4--0 U Gn rl 
u 
Gn 
2 
u 0 0 (L) --4 
ý-9 l> L) 
li (L) -0 F 
(V IND 
r- 
rn 
". -4 
"C --Z, :. . 
r. +-, u 0 e A 
c02 
-4-1 
1 
u 
9) 
- 
4 
u C) 0 d (A rn +-. ) 12 4 -4 ( 2 > 
$-4 
cl 
Q 
0 75 u U --4 
cý Q 
ýA * r. 'Icý 9 Gn vý -.. 1 . -5 
4 
9) c 1 
0 rA 
4 u 
1.9 t2.4 (L) rA 
in Z. 
' w wo +-0 $-4 5 - -4 0 l 0 0 41 
ci öi) "; 5 r u " 4 (L) cu 
lzw 9 e 
t 
* 
cn 
0 
-, 
.0 - 
e Gn 
u 
9 
ý 
1 u e > u 75 s. - u 
u2 
m 
E J. -1 ci 
--4 
cu e m 0 ý 
: 11:: Gn 0 -0 » "8 z3 . -, , ýo Z .5 ei S-Nd S- 0 2 
"0 u 0 
2 
4--a u 
= U rA -, 2 ri >, -. , ,u 
0 -cj u u (L) Gn 14-1 2 (A --4 
P-4 P. 4 
c02 
$Z 
0 
... d r 1 @ u t, - Q +. -% . 4 0 
(A ;5 -9 
c14 Q ltx Z rq 
., 
2 
(L) cýI Gn 
ý-4 
Gn 
Gn +_A P-4 
GO2 
2 
rA 
Z, 
0 
+-b u . P. 4 . fflg --4 P. 4 
#, ce :e 
e *i 
rA Gn 
; -i U2 Ul 
0 z 
. Gn ý Gn 
Gn 
rJ2 Gn 
8--4 
2 
Gn 
U 
o 
fi 
ci 
(L) 
--4 -0 
r4 
. -4 
'ý 
0 
2 
U 
(4. -4 - zý =. 2 
+i CL) ei -tý -0 
5 
e 
C, 2 . ', , g 
CI., Q$ 
:i 
> 
0 
A (L) 4) 
> Co 
Q) * üý 
( 
A 
9) > L) 44 
ce 
,u iv ; tý N4 v 2 > 0 
Q) 
+. 0 
fi 
lu F--., ý-4 
00 
Clf) 
T-4 
LW 
pý 
9) 
ý 
u 
cn 
4-4 
0 
ýc 
rA >-. 
ý: 
0 
CVJ 
cn 
:. EI 
"ci 
u u 
ýCJ 
0 
X) 
. 14 N. 4 
= 
cli 
c02 
rA 
9) 
ci 
Z 
A 
4 
0 
Gn 
ei 
CD (Z 
; i3 
ei Gn 
.2 5 
Gn 
Q 
ro 
ce 
u 
_C: 3 4--b 
-+-. ) 
zi C 
>w 
IQ) 
-4-1 
r. . -4 
2 u 
gj 
2 u 
Q 9) 
44 
2 (L) 
2 
e 
>e 
t10 
-zi (L) 
to, 2 
zi 
9) --4 
Q 
P--4 * -' %Z 
n4 
tu 
+-i 
-0 r., 
u 
CKJ 
3 
Gn 
. -4 (L) 
.0 cu 
in 1--4 "Ci 
(L) 
c2 
(L) 
Gn 
+ ý r ---4 tz u Ei 
0 1-4 
0ý1 
Clf) 
r-4 
4.4.1. Discussion 
Following the categorisation of failure modes of the integrated GPS/INS system some 
observations are presented in this section. With regard to the failure modes of GPS and 
INS, two important observations are: 
This analysis has confirmed that GPS errors are bounded while there are a large 
number of INS errors that grow with time (see Table 4-1 and Table 4-3). Even in 
the case of storms or scintillations in the ionosphere, GPS signals might be 
disrupted but these do not result in the divergence of the solution as this will be 
corrected as soon as the disturbance is over. But in the case of INS, especially 
due to gyroscope errors, the danger of divergence of the solution is always 
present. 
Although the modernisation of GPS improves clock accuracies and provides 
multiple frequencies for precise determination of position, new problems are 
introduced such as inter-channel biases for different antennas (see Table 4-1, 
entry G 11). These should also be considered and accounted for. 
With regard to the INS, MEMS based technology is promising. The following 
comments should be noted about MEMS: 
When it is argued that MEMS can be used and at a very low cost, the cost of 
calibration equipment is usually ignored. However, it should be noted that 
calibration is an essential part of the operation of an INS (see Table 4-2, entry 
101). Due to its mechanical precision and alignment, such equipment is very 
costly and will be needed for an accurate MEMS based INS to perform on a par 
with a conventional INS. 
MEMS navigation performance failure modes are similar to conventional INS 
and are generally greater in magnitude. The current literature on integrity/failure 
modes of MEMS does not address the navigation performance in harsh 
environments but discusses their reliability i. e. whether these will turn off or 
degrade very badly if a certain situation arises. 
With regard to integration mechanisms the following points are to be noted; 
Current GPS/INS integrity algorithins are designed for expensive INS which are 
very accurate and so can act as a reference (see sections 7.4.2 and 8.3). 
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However, in order to treat the integration of GPS with MEMS based INS, a 
radically different method may have to be used. One approach is to treat a 
MEMS based position solution as equivalent to one satellite measurement. This 
is explored further in Chapter 8. 
There is no doubt that the accuracy performance of an ultra tightly coupled 
system will be the best most of the time. This is especially true in harsh 
environments. However, it must be recognised that integrity is the major 
consideration for safety. As the performance of GNSS is improving over time, in 
the near future, the accuracy requirement may not be a significant problem. 
However, integrity needs to be improved for approach phases of flight (Hwang 
and Brown, 2005c). The reliance of an ultra tightly coupled system on an INS is 
one of its dominant features (see section 3.5.1.3 and Table 4-5). Although it has 
benefits in term of performance in the presence of jamming of GPS signals, the 
INS increases the likelihood of failure of the integrated system. From the failure 
mode analysis of the integrated system it can be concluded that whenever 
integrity performance is considered, ultra-tightly coupled systems cannot a priori 
be regarded as a better option than tightly coupled systems. This is discussed 
further in section 5.5. 
The failure models discussed in Tables 4-1,4-2,4-3,44 and 4-5 are classified and 
modelled in the next section. 
4.5. Classification and Modelling of Errors 
Before assessing the capability of integrity algorithms to protect against the potential 
failure modes in the previous sections, mathematical models for the failures are 
required. Such models enable integrity performance to be studied by simulation. The 
first step in the failure modelling process is to group failure modes into classes which 
enable mathematical functions (representing each class) to be developed (Table 4-6). 
The mathematical functions are based on concepts used in control systems (e. g Dorf , 
1988),, and inertial error modelling (Rogers, 2000). 
141 
"0 
sw 
00 
E-4 
u 
(L) e 
4) 
§ .' jz u2 ( ) >-,. " t -2 5 
CA 
.5 L 
Q 
9 
2 . ". 4 1-111 le .0 . "-i U 4) 
ý 0 p w u 9 Gn 5 " 
V) ýo = --4 a ICJ 4., Gn 
B -5 
ci ue L) E -0 ,E5 >-. u 5 u t. 
Jo ä 
. 
gp 
Gn 
9 o e «4., 2 u Gn u t6. -4 - C i ý 
P. 4 tu 
= -5 
= 
A 4-1 C) .2 -0 > rA = u 4 tý rA E3 0 *(L) Im u 0 c ýs ý > - 0 ei e "Ci ý . P. 4 0 5 5 < Ob 
(L) e = 
C) 2 "Ci g M' 0 >-. --d 0 ! 
rn U ýj c: 
ci 
rA 124 't eu 
Q 
8. -4 124 5 
+. 0 
ýý (L) 
0 0 ;Z 
g) . v-i 4.6 
Q -, r, i "0 9 1 
+-& 4) 
ýi- 
e "0 c4 00 
rA z 00 >.. q GA Al-% "0 :, V--4 ý ý 
N. -4 
P 1 
1: 4 
C 0 ". -4 S-4 A . -% cn 1 l 
Qm 
C14 
qT 
T--4 
u 
-ý4 -rý 0 Cd 
CA tr: 
4-4 
0 
0 5 .5 0 
rA [- ; t4 vi *1 : 4 ý . 
to 4-4 
4 5 
ýý 0 4., 0 
0 . zcd cl: s 4) 0 t4, 
.,. o > 
. +-? 4) 
" 
+-a W 0 -4 ..:, 
- .ý 
o 
0 ) *0 C i . 4) cd 0 
tw 
+. j 0 4. ) Q O-j W Q 
, 
w ý J- ý, rA 0 -cl I 0 0 -0 . u 0 Q > tw 0 ý 
+ Q ) 4 Cý ý 0 'A 0 04 ýs U >1 W 0 
0 
4 C, . 
8 -0 4) 
g 
po 4.4 1 *. b 0 " v 
Al 0 -Zý 0 0 
Q 
1 
I= 
-Zýl 
* r. 
0 9 
-4-A 
. 
.0 
9 
5 1 
V. -O tr) T--4 00 kn 00 qzt 00 C, 4 t- 1.0 ý, o 4ý ý-4 ( D, r-4 v-4 0 0 r-4 V-4 
0 
0 0 
rA ý--4 
4 
110 1-ý 0-4 
rA 
43. ) 
4! loý% W) ý-4 (1) C-q t-ý -4 ý, o I", 
po 4 41 r--4 r-4 
0 
C) 
1 l Q V) (0'*, ýý el r-. 4 1.0 
C s tr) r-. 4 V-4 "-4 
01 
; 0-. 
ýo Ei 
1.0 0 
L- I I I 
Cf) 
Ict 
r-4 
1 
-e ZA 
d 
. d 
w 4-4 0 "0 
u 
" 
ci 0 
lýý 9) 
ýc 
e ý8 
2 -8 2 0 0, 
1-4 
+. 0 rA 
kw 
(X 
9 (> (n E5 ýd-i ci 
5 fe 
. 
Gn 
0 4) u2 e E Q m rl e Co * 
. -4 
2 -- 0 (L) 1 . .4 . 0 ) ,v (D 0 . P-1 Gn 
0 
> Je Gn 4 ý e 23 , (L) 
CO2 CA 
.,.. d v-4 
Gog 
9 
C) 
GO2 
GO2 
1 ýd > 
A 
qj 
po 4-« 
3m -. -d 2 
P.. W 
ci 9 -IC'-UI "0 Q u2 
C-6-4 
_I 
tý; 4=, 
e 
j 
(L) 44 
? N 
N , 
riw (9 4 
t ll 
11 
> 
e= 
-i- 
- Cl 
w 
i 5 r 
u2 
"0 
5 e, -I e4, C) (A 
C) 
-i-i Gn c < 2 ý 
< -zi 0 
C> 
A 
Glý 
fl e 
> 02 alý N-4 N-4 00 >. »d GA Q 
.2 in ý--4 
Gn fl 4 C ( ) 
(2 
ei 
t-ý P. -1 rn Gn Gn UD el v--1 P-4 
02 > > (2 C (Z 
1.0, 
5. ýg 9.0 
0 9. d "0 . V-4 Q 2 im rA 
Z 
tü " 
4-4 lý 
;j 
(L) = öz 4--4 '14 --4 4 < 0 A 
IQ) "LZ C) - --4 1 
41 «s cu -0 0 4. -4 tDz 
LO e 0 = AD 
0 9 in 
E 
. ". d 
k4 
ý= 
cn, -, 1 *r3 3 ea 5 u ý4-i 0 . qj +. 0 ý g 0 (L) _ci 0 j +. - ci EI ý+- 
u 0 4-4 
- 
1 
gL -0 ý: ze U . -4 0 0 
9 
<j 
c02 e 
;ý ý A ;j "0 t e cj 
"0 p. 
u * +, !, . 
2 
ý 
i 
C, 2 0 c 
4.4 
l= 4-9 Jý 
im ei 
0 x e A 
c> 
Q ý, cn cu r A ýG 3 
Q 
NW 
1w 1 
- 
1 
tt') 
IRT 
T--4 
With respect to the characterisation in Table 4-6, two points should be noted: 
* The models do not reflect the properties of the failure modes exactly. Rather, 
they are assigned on the basis of their approximate growth and magnitude 
characteristics, as these have the most relevance for integrity algorithms. 
* There are codes which are present in more than one classification, the reason 
being that some errors like IOS7 (i. e. initialisation errors) although oscillatory in 
nature, their magnitude also drifts with time (see Table 4-3). 
4.5.1. The Significance of Slowly Growing Errors 
Among the classes of potential failure modes in Table 4-6, Slowly Growing Errors 
(SGEs) or ramp errors receive most attention in the integrity research for the following 
reasons: 
Step faults can be easily detected within the Time-To-Alert (TTA) by simpler 
snapshot fault detection algorithms. 
* Errors growing at a high rate trigger an alert early, and can thus also be detected 
by step detector algorithms. 
9 SGEs are typical of the GPS clocks and similar errors are present in INS (a well 
known fact in the navigation community). A snapshot algorithm would take a 
long time to detect these types of faults as they take time to reach the fault 
threshold (Busca et al., 2003). 
This class of error is the basis for the integrity research presented in the rest of this 
thesis. 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter has presented an investigation of failure modes of the individual and 
integrated GPS/INS systems. For INS, the failure modes were divided into operational 
and hardware failure modes. As the latest sensors available for INS are MEMS based, a 
table for material specific failures has been developed separately. Similarly for the 
integrated system, failure modes were listed that arise due to the coupling mechanisms 
of the two systems. The final contribution of this chapter was to group these failure 
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modes in classes and assign failure models to each class. Furthermore, the worst case 
failure mode was identified, which is the slowly growing error (SGE). 
Integrity algorithms to protect against these failure modes in individual and integrated 
systems are subject of Chapter 5. Chapter 5 addresses integrity algorithms (for 
integrated GPS/1NS systems) against general failure modes as well as those designed 
for tackling SGEs. 
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5. Integrity Monitoring of GPS/INS Integrated 
systems 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 has presented the potential failure modes and models of GPS, INS and their 
integration. Integrity monitoring is required to protect users from these failure modes. 
This chapter reviews, in detail, the existing integrity methods employed in the case of 
INS, GPS and the integrated system. 
Integrity monitoring techniques for Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are explained 
first including the algorithms for sensor level integrity monitoring. This is followed by 
external and sensor level integrity monitoring techniques for GPS. The integrity 
monitoring principles of GPS are then used to explain the current algorithms and 
methods for monitoring the integrity of integrated (GPS/INS) systems. This addresses 
both the traditional single fault algorithms and the most recent algorithms that address 
the case of multiple faults. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of 
the existing integrity monitoring algorithms. 
5.2. Integrity Monitoring of INS 
Research on monitoring the integrity of inertial sensors was largely classified (i. e. not in 
the public domain) in the eighties due to the high production costs and primary usage in 
the military domain. However, due to advances in technology and production facilities, 
the field opened up considerably during the nineties (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
Monitoring of the integrity of an INS (Inertial Navigation System) is possible by 
employing redundant inertial sensors or by using other sensors that act as a reference. 
These aiding sensors could be air data sensors, radars, altimeters and/or satellite based 
navigation systems. After the advent of GPS, most of the aiding for the purpose of 
integrity monitoring has been provided by GPS. This is due to the lower cost of the GPS 
receiver (than other aiding systems e. g radar) and its global operational capability. 
Hence, during the past decade, GPS has been (and continues to be) the most important 
system used to monitor INS performance. 
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It should be noted here that guidelines for single-string (no redundancy) detection of 
failures in INS are not developed by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
(RTCA) as reported in RTCA, (2001) (see Chapter 2). Hence, external systems are 
needed to provide integrity monitoring. 
Nevertheless, alternative integrity monitoring techniques exist. Integrity monitoring 
methods internal to INS architectures (Le. self monitoring) are discussed in next section. 
It should be noted that for these methods, performance levels are not mentioned since 
these are not in the public domain. There are four types of integrity monitoring 
techniques applied to INS. These are fault containment design, provision of geometric 
redundancy, integrity monitoring using frequency domain characteristics and specific 
techniques to monitor MEMS (MicroElectroMechanical Systems) based INS. These are 
discussed below. 
5.2.1. The Honeywell Approach 
Honeywell is one of the leading providers of inertial navigation systems. Attempts by 
Honeywell to provide self monitoring of INS dates back to the seventies. In brief, the 
following two methods are used to provide self monitoring (McClary, 1992; Sheffels, 
1993; McClary and Walborn, 1994). 
a) At least four sensors within a single INS platform are needed to provide integrity 
(navigation requires three Le. one for each axis). Four or more sensors are 
arranged in a skewed configuration (not mounted orthogonally) and called 
Strapdown Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU). These four sensor outputs are then 
used to solve for the three unknown axes attitude and velocity increments. In 
this way redundancy is provided that improves the integrity performance. 
b) The architecture of a Honeywell INS is designed to be fault tolerant. It is divided 
into Fault Containment Areas (FCAs) that further consist of Fault Containment 
Modules (FCMs). In each area and module, redundancy is provided in the form 
of multiple sensors. Internal algorithms exploiting this redundancy detect and 
isolate faults in the device at the FCM level. The individual FCM can be 
removed from the main bus in case of fault detection. Hence, the propagation of 
faults is inhibited by the use of modular design. Another approach of using 
redundant Inertial Measurement Units (RVIU) instead of individual sensors 
redundancy was presented by Pearson et al., (1998). This is explained below. 
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5.2.2. Geometric Redundancy 
In another approach, geometrically redundant INSs are configured at different locations 
on the fuselage of an aircraft (Pearson et al. 1998). The integrity test is at two levels, the 
raw data level and the filtered data level. Extended Kalman Filtering (EKF) is used in 
this algorithm to fuse the measurements from multiple IMUs. In case there is a fault, it 
is rectified by 
a) reconfiguring the measurement noise parameter in the faulty channel, 
b) removing the faulty sensor rows and columns from the filter matrix, 
c) nulling the parameters of the faulty sensor or 
d) nulling the error in the estimation error vector corresponding to the faulty 
sensor. 
Two IMUs are fitted at the wings while one is mounted in the cockpit. Besides being an 
expensive technique, extensive flight testing may be required to quantify the associate 
lever arm flexure errors (Groves, 2003). Lever arm (in this context) is the distance 
between the IMU centre of mass and centre of gravity of the aircraft. The observability 
of the INS errors is enhanced by use of velocity measurements for a large lever arm 
correction. However, a large lever arm also results in decreased observability due to 
greater measurement noise due to increased flexure and vibration. Hence, its 
quantification is necessary. 
Among these methods of providing redundancy, the individual sensor redundancy 
method is the best because of ease of installation and simplest in terms of computations. 
Another way of providing integrity monitoring is by the exploitation of the frequency 
domain characteristics of different types of similar sensors (measuring the same type of 
variable) as explained below. 
5.2.3. Frequency Domain Monitoring 
Frequency domain information is also used for INS integrity monitoring (Scheding et al. 
2000). The basic idea of this approach is that the sensor used to provide redundancy has 
different frequency domain characteristics from the original navigation sensor. The 
redundant sensors should ideally be based on different physical principles and 
technologies. Here the frequency domain integrity monitoring is used instead of the 
time domain monitoring of the sensor output signals. 
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A convincing example is provided that uses a fibre optic gyroscope to provide 
redundancy to a laser gyroscope which exhibits different frequency domain 
characteristics. These two sensors (with detailed models of drifts and biases) are fused 
using a Kalman filter. In this case (Scheding et al., 2000), it was shown that a fault that 
is hard to detect in the time domain can be detected through Bode frequency plots. This 
method may be employed in industrial applications where detection time in the order of 
minutes is tolerable. However in the case of aviation a real time detection algorithm is 
required. The results presented by Scheding et al. (2000) are post processed ones. In real 
time, frequency domain plots are not easy to obtain because they require a range of time 
domain data to be accumulated first. This method is most suitable for the selection of 
redundant sensors for a particular configuration. There are also self-integrity tests 
designed for MEMS based system used for safety critical system requiring low accuracy 
performance. Examples of these are automotive sensors. These are explained below. 
5.2.4. Issues specific to MEMS-based INS 
MEMS technology has matured in recent years to provide a large number of low cost 
inertial sensors. MEMS technology based INSs are now used in safety critical systems 
that do not require high measurement accuracy. This includes the use of MEMS 
technology based accelerometers in road vehicles for the detection of collisions. It is 
foreseen that an inertial grade gyroscope (with random drift < 0.01 deg1hr) based on 
MEMS technology will be commercially available by 2010 (Anderson et al., 200 1). 
Integrity monitoring has also been applied to MEMS-based inertial sensors (Madni and 
Costlow, 2001). The steps suggested by Madni and Costlow (2001) can be summarized 
as 
a) the use of redundant sensors and an error threshold, 
b) the self monitoring of sensors typically based on detection of abrupt 
changes, 
c) the monitoring of critical individual components of sensors (e. g the drive 
oscillator and tuning fork sections). In a tuning fork gyroscope, cross- 
axis vibrations of a vibrating fork are measured that are proportional to 
the applied angular rate. 
d) a self testing routine at start up. 
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Subsequent research has shown that another forin of test called Continuous Built In 
Test (CBIT) can be used to monitor tuning fork assembly and electronics sensor health 
continuously during operation (Madni, 2005). 
The self monitoring approaches described above provide step failure detection ability 
against failure modes. However, in the case of slow degradation of inertial sensor 
perfon-nance over time, tests for 'abrupt changes' are not effective. Furthermore, slow 
degradation of MEMS sensor performance must be accounted for in the navigation 
system integrity monitoring. 
Integrity monitoring of INS can be provided by the use of external systems such as 
GPS. Integrity monitoring of GPS is discussed below followed by the integrity of the 
integrated GPS/INS systems. 
5.3. Integrity Monitoring of GPS 
Monitoring of the integrity of GPS can be carried out at two levels; system and sensor. 
According to the GPS SPS (Standard Positioning Service) standard, integrity is not 
provided in real time and this precludes its use for Aviation (Department of Defence, 
2001). However, as shown in Figure 5-1, augmentation systems are being built to 
provide GPS failure warnings to users in near real time. Examples include the European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), US Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) and the Local Area Augmentation system (LAAS). EGNOS and 
WAAS are Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) while LAAS is a ground 
based augmentation system (GBAS) (see also 2.5). 
At the sensor level a technique known as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) refers to integrity monitoring using only satellite signals tracked by the receiver 
(see section 5.3.1.1). This approach is less demanding in terms of time and expenditure 
as compared to augmentation systems and hence is preferred provided sufficient 
performance is possible. RAIM takes the form of Aircraft Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (AAIM) when another navigation aid in the cockpit (e. g barometer) is 
utilised to enhance system performance within an Aircraft Based Augmentation System 
(ABAS). The sensor level integrity monitoring techniques are discussed below. 
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Figure 5-1: GPS Integrity Monitoring 
Significant research effort has been dedicated to the development of RAIM algorithms 
during the last twenty years. There are different types of RAIM algorithms, of which the 
most popular are the range comparison and the position comparison methods by Lee 
(1986), the parity space method by Sturza (1988), the least squares residuals method by 
Parkinson and Axelrad (1988) and the multiple solution separation method by Brown 
and McBumey (1988). Out of these, the position comparison method and the range 
comparison methods were shown to be similar in analytic terms by Lee (1986). 
Similarly, the position comparison, parity space and least square residual methods were 
shown to be largely equivalent in concept by Brown (1992), any differences arise only 
from the selection of the test statistics and detection threshold (these terms will be 
described later in this section). 
A key assumption in traditional GPS integrity algorithms is that only one satellite will 
fail at any given time. This is used on the basis that the probability of more than one 
simultaneous satellite failure is extremely low (< le-7) (Hwang and Brown, 2005c) 
However, this assumption must be reviewed as the likelihood of multiple satellite 
failures increase particularly in the case of safety critical applications (Lee et al., 2005, 
Hwang, 2005b). This is due to the two reasons 
a) Due to continuously improving accuracy of satellite based systems the 
applications that require tighter alert limits are being sought. Hence, this 
will result in an increased likelihood of multiple failure occurrences. This 
is because a smaller error results in 'failure' in the case of stringent 
limits. 
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b) The probability of 3 satellite failures per year (Department of Defence, 
2001) is obtained from the system design methods. However, in 
operational situations errors like multipath or ionospheric scintillations 
can occur, and hence the assumption of a single fault occurring at any 
given time is not valid for these situations. Section 5.3.1 addresses 
integrity monitoring under the assumption of a single fault. The case of 
multiple failures is addressed in section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1. Integrity Monitoring in the Presence of a Single Fault 
Basics of GPS RAIM 
RAIM performance and availability (the existence of the conditions for failure 
detection) have been shown to be a function of a number of factors 
a) The number of redundant observations available. 
b) The geometry of the available satellites. 
c) The probability with which an error must be detected. 
d) The size of acceptable effor. 
e) The quality of the observations used (Ochieng et al., 2002) 
RAIM capability of a space based system is assessed by use of simulation models with 
realistic assumptions on the accuracy of range observables. For example, a study of 
RAIM capability was performed for a combined GPS and Galileo constellation 
(Ochieng et al., 2002, Hewitson and Wang, 2006). This offline analysis showed the 
ability of the navigation system to detect outliers and can be particularly helpful in 
constellation design. 
During a typical flight, RAIM is said to be available if at least five satellite 
measurements are available in the required geometric configuration. If this check is 
successful, there are two ftirther stages in a typical GPS RAIM algorithm; detection of 
failure and computation of protection limit (horizontal and vertical). The protection 
limit is needed to decide whether the navigation systems can be used for the particular 
phase of flight. If the protection limit offered by the algorithm is less than the specified 
alert limit (for a particular phase of flight) then the navigation system is relied upon. 
Otherwise, the use of the navigation system is discontinued. For the purpose of this 
thesis, horizontal position integrity is more important because INS is not stable in the 
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vertical domain. Hence, horizontal position RAIM will be discussed. Nevertheless, it 
should be mentioned here that a vertical RAIM method follows similar principles. 
These two aspects are described ftu-ther below. 
Detection Process 
The following terms are relevant to the detection of a 'failure'. 
Test Statistic 
This is an observed quantity that is calculated from the measurements. It should 
represent the fault as closely as possible. 
Decision Threshold 
This is the value of the test statistic at which the system is declared faulty. Typically, it 
is chosen on the basis of satisfying a given probability of false detection. False detection 
is announcing an alert when there is no position failure. 
If redundant measurements are available (more than four satellites), the noise level in 
the test statistics and geometry of satellites are the factors that affect the performance of 
a RAIM algorithm. 
Suppose that there is at least one redundant satellite measurement available. Then from 
the complete measurement set with one faulty measurement, solutions are formed from 
the measurements by excluding one measurement at a time (assuming that user-satellite 
geometry for each subset is good). The solution that remains under the threshold is fi-ee 
of the failed satellite. To illustrate the basic concept this method is described using static 
regression models (Nikiforov, 2002). Assume the regression model is given by 
Y= HX +ýk +YY N(O, 5-1 kk 
A similarity transformation is used to transform Y to f (see explanation of notation 
below). In a similarity transformation, the determinant of the original matrix is equal to 
the determinant of the transformed matrix (Arfken, 1985). The transformed matrix is 
given by 
y2 -2 Y= IL 5 
Xk + ýk + TY 
The test statistics z (a scalar) is forined by 
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-T y py 5-3 
where P is given by 
P =In - 
R(H T H)-'H T 5-4 
In the equations above the - shows the similarity transformed variable (or matrix 
by use of matrix 
y is the faulty information to be detected (a scalar for a single fault assumption), 
X is the nuisance parameter which is deterministic but unknown (a column 
vector of length 4), 
Y is the vector of satellite measurements (a column vector of length n), 
n is the number of satellite measurements, 
H is the geometry matrix (of dimension nx 4), 
k is the time epoch, 
ý is the measurement noise assumed to be Gaussian with zero mean (of 
dimension n) and variance Z, 
I,, is the identity matrix of order n and 
P is the projection matrix (of dimensions n-4xn-4) 
Using the method of hypothesis testing (see Equations 5-15 and 5-16), the fault is 
detected. The hypothesis test can be applied to each set of solutions. In the case of a 
faulty measurement (assuming no noise) only the solution set excluding that 
measurement will pass the test. The rows of the measurement matrix H (or geometry 
matrix) relate to the orientation of the satellites in view of the receiver. Hence, the effect 
of a fault (in one of the measurements) on the position solution, varies with the 
coefficients of this matrix. It can even mask the error so that it has negligible effect on 
the magnitude of the test statistic. 
Due to the relative geometry of the satellites on which faults occur, there may be a 
negligible effect on the magnitude of the test statistic as compared to the nominal test 
statistic value (Macabiau et al., 2005). Hence,, the test statistic should be designed to 
disregard the nuisance parameter (X in above equation) as much as possible. However, 
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the method should ensure that the information related to the fault remains invariant 
(does not change). Hence, the theory of invariance is used for the analysis above. 
In essence, it is ensured that the information related to the fault remains unchanged 
under this invariant transformation while the effect of the nuisance parameter is 
minimised. This is done by calculating the projection Of Y on the orthogonal 
complement 91(Fl)' of the column space ýR(H). This is known as parity space in 
analytical redundancy literature. The above discussion is related to the measurement 
domain test statistics. A test statistic used in the position domain is explained in section 
5.4.2.1. 
The decision threshold that is compared with the test statistic is typically formed by 
using the assumption that the measurement errors are Gaussian in nature (will be 
discussed further in 5.4.2.1). Hence, the threshold value is calculated by using a 
Gaussian probability distribution function (Brown, 1992). 
Calculation of Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) 
The following tenninology is relevant to the calculation of the HPL. 
TT- 
horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) 
This limit specifies the performance of equipment or an algorithm. It is calculated by 
the RAIM algorithm from the horizontal position errors. Horizontal position error is the 
radial error in the horizontal plane of the aircraft. 
Horizontal Alert Limit 
This is the limit on the horizontal position error. If the HPL of the algorithm (or 
equipment) crosses this limit, an alert is raised. International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) has stringent requirements on Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) for 
different phases of flight (see section 2.5). 
The integrity problem in the horizontal domain is to meet the requirement that whenever 
the horizontal position error is greater than the horizontal alert limit, an alert is raised. 
However, in order to generate an alert the measurements have to be relied upon. 
Furthermore, the alert limit is defined in the position domain (using the position 
solution) while the test statistic is formed in the measurement domain (Brown, 1992). 
157 
The approach used for calculation of a typical HPL is as follows. It is assumed that a 
fault in a measurement is in the form of a constant bias. The effect of the measurement 
fault is now to be projected into the position domain using the concept of slope 
introduced by Brown (1992). This is the ratio of the position error and the parity 
magnitude (see Figure 5-2). It is calculated for each available satellite. The maximum 
value of the slope among the available satellites is multiplied by the assumed bias value 
to get the value of HPL. This assumption is discussed further in section 5.3.2.2. 
Other Techniques 
In loannides et al. (2005), it is shown that the criterion of the maximum slope is not 
always the most appropriate. The case when a faulty satellite is not the satellite with the 
maximum slope falls into this category. However, in the recent Novel Integrity 
Optimised Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (NIORAIM) technique (will be 
discussed in 5.3.2.1), this limitation is removed. In this method, weights are applied to 
the satellite measurements and then trained. After the training of weights it is not 
necessary that the slope used finally is that of the satellite with the initial maximum 
slope. 
In Lee (2006), an Optimally Weighted Average Solution (OWAS) is proposed that 
computes the average of the two position solutions obtained from different 
constellations. This is done by applying optimal weights to the two position solutions. It 
is shown that this method results in the same availability as the NIORAIM method (will 
be discussed in 5.3.2.1). 
Having discussed the basics of RAIM, the next section proceeds by outlining how 
RAIM methods can be classified. 
5.3.1.2. Classification of Integrity Algorithms 
RAIM algorithms are classified into two groups, snapshot (utilising only the 
measurements at the current epoch) and sequential (using both current and historical 
measurements). 
Sh apsh oI Meth o ds 
These methods utilise measurements at the current epoch to generate the test statistics as 
shown in section 5.3.1.1. This forin of test statistic for the parity space (see section 
5.3.1.1) method is in fact a Sum Squared Residual (SSR). However, there are some 
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exceptions to this, such as the maximum residual algorithm (e. g Ober, 1998). In this 
case the maximum of the residuals is chosen (residuals are an estimate of the 
measurement errors and noise in the pseudoranges). These are assumed chi-squared 
distributed and detection threshold is calculated by use of chi-square tables. This makes 
the test statistic harder to evaluate and hence the simpler SSR statistic remains popular. 
Some problems with the snapshot method are discussed below: 
In typical snapshot integrity monitoring methods, the errors in the measurements 
are assumed to be Gaussian (Brown, 1992). In this way, the analysis becomes 
simpler but real world errors may not always exhibit Gaussian characteristics. 
There is a need to address a range of failure modes by discarding this 
assumption. 
With the introduction of GPS failure analysis, the RAIM algorithms need to be 
tested against these failure modes to prove their credibility. Failure modes are 
summarized in Chapter 4. 
A typical RAIM algorithm is based on the probability of false alert and the 
probability of missed detection, on the basis of aviation requirements. These are 
to be evaluated by considering the probability of typical GPS range errors in 
such a way as to represent the actual environment more closely. Hence, the 
assumption of a single failure often made should be re-evaluated to consider the 
possibility of multiple failures. 
The error used to quantify integrity monitoring algorithms is usually a constant 
range bias which is not representative of all the errors that can occur within GPS 
based navigation (see Table 4-6). Furthen-nore,, it cannot act as a benchmark for 
a comparative study of RAIM algorithms. Ramp errors, in comparison, provide 
a more severe challenge to the detection algorithms. Consequently, rarnp errors 
are more appropriate for use in a comparative study. 
Sequential Algorithms 
In sequential algorithms, historical data is utilised to compute the test statistics. These 
methods apply to the RAIM algorithms that are based on a Kalman filter. Therefore, 
conceptually they should be better at detecting the ramp errors than snapshot methods. 
This is because these methods use historical measurements that contain the growth 
characteristics of the failure. 
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One such method is Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT) (Nikiforov, 2000). 
The test statistic is formed from the ratio of the probability distributions (of the test 
statistics) before and after the onset of the fault. Although, this model is difficult to 
implement in real time, an approximate recursive algorithm is developed in Nikiforov 
(2000). The mathematical details of this algorithm will be presented in section 5.4.2.3. 
Recent research has shown that the SPRT method can detect slowly growing errors 
faster than snapshot algorithms (Clot et al., 2006). In an example shown by Clot et al. 
(2006), a Slowly Growing Error (SGE) in the satellite measurement of a magnitude 0.5 
nils was detected in 60 seconds. More comments about these results will be presented in 
chapter 9. These results will be compared with results obtained from the rate detector 
algorithm proposed in this thesis (see section 8.2.1). 
Another method known as Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation method 
(AIME) is also a sequential algorithm. It was developed for the integrated systems but 
has the potential to be used with GPS only. Details of this algorithm are provided in 
section 5.4.2.2. In recent research, the case of multiple satellite failures is also 
discussed. This is treated in the next section. 
5.3.2. GPS RAIM in the presence of multiple satellite failures 
Traditionally, RAIM formulae are designed based on the assumption that there can be 
only one faulty satellite at a time. This assumption needs to be relaxed in the design of 
future algorithms for the following reasons: 
In the future, following the modernisation phase of GPS and the launch of 
Galileo, the accuracy of the position solution of GNSS will improve by an order 
of magnitude. This will be due to the use of multiple frequencies and the 
availability of a greater number of satellites at a given location. This will not 
only improve RAIM perfon-nance but will also enable the users to have tighter 
protection limits. However, the probability of errors previously assumed to be 
insignificant can now be considered significant for lower alert limits. Hence, the 
probability of multiple faults will increase, and this impact has yet to be 
quantified (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). 
The system reliability figure of 3 satellite failures per year is given by the 
nominal operation of the GPS and only specified for Signal In Space 
(Department of Defence, 2001). But in actual practice when GPS is used in 
harsh urban environment (see Table 6-1 for a typical multipath error magnitude), 
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the probability Of multiple failures becomes much higher e. g due to strong 
multipath errors. 
In the context of this thesis, treatment of multiple failures is important because 
the probability of multiple failures becomes much greater when two systems are 
integrated. It can be see from failure mode analysis in Chapter 4, that in addition 
to the failure modes of the individual systems, a number of failure modes also 
arise only due to the coupling mechanism of the two systems (see Table 4-5). 
In the existing literature, there are two streams of RAIM methods of multiple failures; 
developed by the navigation community and that by surveying/geodesy community. 
Each of these two approaches will be described in the next section. 
5.3-2.1. Multiple Failure Detection 
The efforts of the geodetic community are mostly concentrated on finding the 
performance capabilities of space based navigation systems. In this analysis, the satellite 
measurements are treated as measurements from a network. This is because in geodesy 
measurements from a surveying network are treated generally. In this respect two recent 
examples are by Ochieng et al. (2002) and Hewitson and Wang (2006). These are in fact 
offline simulations that are effective for prediction of RAIM availability all over the 
globe. Hence, these provide performance capability analysis of the space based 
navigation systems beforehand. 
Firstly the detection of multiple failures as proposed in the geodesy literature known as 
the Detection, Identification and Adaptation process, is reviewed. This is followed by a 
review of multiple failure detection methods presented by the navigation community. 
Since there is no apparent use of protection limit in geodesy literature hence there are no 
such terms available therein. However, some terminology similar in concept is 
described below. 
Reliability 
This term describes the probability of performing a certain function without failure, 
under given conditions, for a specified period of time. There are two types of reliability 
as applied to geodetic networks 
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Internal Reliability 
This refers to the ability of a network to detect outliers. It is quantified by the rm*m*mum 
detectable bias (MDB). MDB is the magnitude of the smallest error that can be detected 
for a specific level of confidence. 
External Reliability 
This is characterised by the extent to which an MDB affects the estimated parameters. 
These two types of reliability are related to detection and protection limit concepts used 
in the RAIM methods of navigation community, respectively. The Detection process is 
described below. 
Detection, Identification andAdaptation (DIA) 
The problem of multiple outlier detection has been well known in the surveying 
community for the last couple of decades. This is also known as data snooping method 
(Baarda, 1968). The need for outlier detection arose in the surveying of large networks. 
During the post processing phase, it is necessary to identify the outliers to avoid 
surveying errors. This problem was first addressed by Baarda (1968). Significant 
contributions were then made by Pope (1975), Forstener (1983), Cross et. al. (1994) and 
Teunissen and Kleusberg (2005). In Teunissen and Kleusberg (2005), various methods 
are presented for quality control in GPS surveying. A review of RAIM algorithms in 
this context is provided by Hewitson and Wang (2006). 
In the context of this thesis, it should be noted that in contrast to the traditional RAIM 
algorithms proposed by the navigation community, quality control in GPS surveying 
has included the consideration of multiple failures for a long time. These methods are 
structured under a general procedure known as Detection, Identification and Adaptation 
(DIA) (Teunissen and Kleusberg, 2005; Hewitson and Wang, 2006). This procedure can 
handle multiple failures as described below: 
From the regression model in Equation 5-1, the position can be calculated using the 
least squares fonnulation 
T Tp X=(H PyH)-H yy 
AA 
ý=Y-HX 
A 
Where X is a vector of m least squares estimate of X 
Y is the vector (of dimension n) of measurements 
5-5 
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A 
ý is the vector of n least squares estimate of 
H is the geometry matrix of dimension nxm 
Since the position is estimated as four components (three dimensional position and 
clock bias) m is equal to four. 
The quality matrix Py is defined as 
py = Qy' 5-6 
as the nxn weight matrix of measurements where Qy is the variance 
covariance matrix of measurements. 
Detection 
Firstly it is tested whether the above model is satisfactory and can detect the presence of 
blunders. This is done by determining the variance factor; 
AA 
Tp 
y 5-7 
n-m 
A 
where ý is the vector of n residuals, 
Py is the nxn weight (or quality) matrix for measurements 
m is the number of unknown parameters. 
The variance factor is tested by the following chi-square test 
22 ZI-el2, 
n-m < 
A2 
< 
Ze / 2, n-m 5-8 co - n-m n-m 
where n-m is the degree of freedom in the solution 
r is the significance level of the test. 
The importance of this test is that if it fails then the assumed model (Equation 5-1) is 
inaccurate. The regression model in Equation 5-1 is called adjustment model in 
geodesy. This is a term used in surveying to alter or adjust the measurement to be 
consistent to a mathematical model to estimate the unknown parameters. 
Now it is assumed that an outlier exists and in that case the Adjustment Model has to be 
modified. The new adjustment model is given by VS, where the subscript i shows the 
measurement index. 
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HX + CiVS1 Y+ S-9 
where c, is a unit vector in N%, hich tile iih cornponent has a value equal to one. III 
this way the magnitude of the outlier is added to only one of the measurements 
in the model. For example 
ci 5-10 
From the above model using the least squares method, the magnitude of the outlier can 
be estimated (Teunissen and Kleusberg, 2005). 
yp 
Tp -ICTp yCi) and vsi = -(ei ig 5-11 Qý 1 
the variance of the outlier is 
QVSi = (C Tp yp i Qe yCyl 
5-12 
The variance of the estimated parameters and estimated residuals is given as follows 
Q, t = (H"PyH)-' 5-13 
Qe = Qy - HQtH 
T 5-14 
Identification 
For the identification of the outlier, a hypothesis testing method is used. The choice is 
between the two hypothesis 
a) Null Hypothesis 
Ho E(VS) =0- N(0,1) 5-15 
b) Alternative Hypothesis 
A 
H, E(VS) = VSj #0- N(t5j 5-16 
where 45, is the non-zero mean of the faulty measurement i. 
In hypothesis testing for outlier identification, five outcomes are possible which are 
given briefly as 
1. Type I Error 
It is the incorrect rejection of the null hypotheses when it is true. The probability of a 
type I error is tenned as q and is known as the probability of false alert. 
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2. It is the rejection of the null hypotheses when it is false. 
I Type II Error 
It is the acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is false. The probability of a Type 11 
error is termed as, 8 and is known as the probability of missed detection. 
4. It is the acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is actually false. 
5. Type III Error 
This is the situation when although an outlier is detected, the wrong measurement is 
removed. The probability of a type III error is termed as r' (Hewitson and Wang, 2006). 
The w-test can be used for the identification of an outlier (Ding and Coleman, 1996) 
which is given as; 
A 
Wi = 
vsi 
5-17 
VQ-V-§, 
The ith measurement will be treated as an outlier if 
w, I> N1,112091) 5-18 
where q is the probability of false alert. 
The largest value exceeding the criterion is considered as an outlier and is removed. 
Then this test is repeated to look for further outliers. 
Adaptation 
After identification, there comes the adaptation phase that refers to corrective action. 
Two possible approaches in this respect are; 
1. To replace the data, or part of the data, by new data that results in acceptance of the 
null hypothesis. For example, when there is a blunder detected in one of the 
measurements, it is replaced by another measurement. 
2. To change the null hypothesis such that it includes the effect of the outlier. This can 
be done by changing the value of the variance in the hypotheses. 
Traditionally detection is repeated after adaptation to check whether the resultant 
solution is correct or not (Teunissen and Kleusberg, 2005). 
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RAIM availability maps for chosen values of parameters are reported by Hewistson et 
al. (2006) by using the above technique. It is shown that the capability of RAIM for 
outlier detection will be improved by the advent of Galileo since it will consist of 
nominal constellation of 30 satellites (27 plus 3 active spares) (see Table 2-5). 
The RAIM method is also used extensively by the navigation community (championed 
by the Institute of Navigation, USA), but the terminology is different. This is because it 
is primarily developed for use in Aviation. These methods basically . consist of 
algorithms required to be implemented onboard. These are meant to detect real time 
failures and provide information about the protection level that the integrity algorithm is 
offering. The next section discusses this further. 
Multiple Failure Detection as proposed by the Navigation Community 
In the failure detection methods pursued by the navigation community it is assumed that 
only a single measurement is faulty. This is due to the reason that probability of 
multiple failures occurring in GPS satellites is very low (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). 
When a typical RAIM method designed for a single failure assumption (e. g Brown 
(1992)) is used for multiple failure detection the following problems occur. 
If the test statistic is greater than the threshold it is not possible to judge whether 
this is due to a single satellite failure or multiple satellite failure 
It is also possible that due to a multiple failure the test statistic does not cross the 
threshold even if the presence of only one of the bias failures would cause the 
test statistic to exceed the threshold. This can be referred to as masking effect. 
In view of the above, in order to deal with multiple failures, a multiple solution 
separation approach may be utilised (Escher et al., 2002). In this configuration a full 
solution is formed alongside sub-solutions that are obtained by removing one 
measurement at a time. To modify this procedure in order to cater for multiple failures a 
further level of sub-solutions is to be formed for dual satellite failures. This concept of 
forming sub-solutions can be extended in similar way to address multiple failures. The 
test statistic in this case is formed from the difference between the full position solution 
and the sub-solution. Similarly, another test statistic is formed from the difference 
between the first level sub-solutions and the second level sub-solutions. The test 
statistics are compared with the threshold. A dual failure situation may be identified if 
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all of the test statistics (between full set and first level sub-filter) are below the threshold 
except the one which excludes two faulty measurements. 
The issue of effect of multiple failures on the test statistic is also discussed in Macabiau 
et al. (2005). It is shown analytically that the linear subspace of those errors that do not 
affect the test criterion has dimensions 4-(N-p) where N is the number of satellites and p 
is the number of faulty pseudorange measurements. If this value is negative, then a fault 
can be detected. 
In Feng and Ochieng (2006), another method is presented to handle multiple failures. It 
is called the group separation (GS) method (it differs from the GS method proposed by 
Lee et al. (2005) that will be referred to in section 5.3.2.2). This method is based on 
classifying the measurements on the basis of common mode faults. For example, 
measurements of one constellation are treated separately from that of another or 
measurements that belong to Rubidiurn based satellites clocks belong to a different 
group from those derived from Cesium clocks based satellites (the performance of the 
Rubidium. based clock is better than the Cesium based clock (Olynik et. al., 2002)). This 
method is especially beneficial to multiple failure detection as it substantially decreases 
the number of subfilters that are needed to be checked for failures. 
Martini et al. (2006) proposed an error reconstruction strategy from the test statistic to 
detect particular multiple failure situation. But it is limited to special cases of high 
magnitude failures (e. g 5 km). Hence, it is not applicable in the case of slowly growing 
errors. 
It can be concluded that the method of multiple failures detection by the navigation 
community (Brenner, 1995; Escher et al., 2002) is similar to the DIA procedure 
presented by the geodesy community. Hence, in fact the essence of the method is to 
form multiple subsets (by exclusion of one or more measurements) and then examine 
various test statistics which can be compared with a threshold. This method will be used 
in simulations in Chapter 8 and 9. 
5.3.2.2. Protection Limit Calculation 
There are different methods presented in the navigation literature to compute the 
horizontal protection limit for the multiple failure case. These are described below. 
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Calculation of HPL as proposed by the Navigation community 
In the context of multiple failures, there are quite a few approaches presented by 
navigation community recently. These are discussed below 
Slope Max-Max concept 
The issue of multiple failures was treated first by Brown (1997). The slope-max concept 
(discussed in section 5.3.1.1) is extended to give the slope-max-max concept. Firstly, it 
is assumed that two satellites are faulty simultaneously. The condition that two multiple 
failures can be detected requires that there is sufficient redundancy in the available 
geometry. Hence the solution of the slope calculated is only possible when the number 
of assumed failures is (n4) or less (n is the number of available measurements). In 
other cases, when the number of failures is higher than this value, the test statistic 
becomes zero hence making slope infinite. 
From the available satellites, a pair is selected. The errors due to all the other satellites 
are assumed to be negligible. Then slope-max is calculated for this pair. In the case of 
the single satellite failure assumption, the slope is simply calculated by the usage of 
geometry matrix components and parity vector components relevant to the satellite as 
described in section 5.3.1.1. The slope concept is shown in Figure 5-2. The maximum 
value of slope among the available satellites is termed as slope-max. 
The situation becomes complicated in the case of dual faults. This problem is posed as a 
maximisation problem to derive the maximum slope. As the slope is defined by 
horizontal position error divided by modulus of the parity vector, an assumption is taken 
to simplify the analysis. It is assumed that modulus ofp is unity and horizontal position 
error is to be maximised. The unity constrained modulus of the parity vector is 
multiplied by a Langrangian vector and its dot product with the horizontal position error 
is chosen as the objective function. When the derivative of this objective function is 
calculated and equated to zero it is found that this is a generalized eigenvalue problem. 
The calculation of the square root of the maximum eigenvalue gives the maximum slope 
for this pair. To calculate slope-max-max, this procedure is repeated for other pairs of 
satellites systematically choosing two at a time. The intuition that sloPe-max-max for a 
particular geometry is greater than slope-max is confirmed by a numerical example 
given in Brown 0 997). The key assumption that the satellite with the maximum slope is 
the most difficult to detect in basic RAIM algorithm is also followed in this approach. 
168 
This concept will be used further in the NIORAIM approach discussed later in this 
section. 
The HMAX (Horizontal AlfAXimum) concept 
The traditional slope max approach was analysed for the presence of multiple faults in 
the future GNSS scenario (when Galileo also becomes available along with the 
modernized GPS) by Lee (2004b). It is conjectured that due to the future availability of 
multiple frequencies and almost double the number of satellites, the navigation 
capability of GNSS as a whole will improve. This improvement will result in tighter 
alert limits as civilian users will want RAIM to be available for applications that 
demand better accuracy. In this case, the use of RAIM algorithms that are based on a 
single failure assumption is insufficient. This is especially true in the case when there 
are multiple satellite faults where none of the fault is above the threshold to classify it as 
a Hazardously Misleading Infon-nation (HMI). When there are two faults present, 
neither of which is greater than the threshold, the ratio of these two faults is important 
for their detection by a traditional algorithm. Simulated plots for different ratios of the 
dual faults with their effect on the position error are presented by Lee (2004b). 
Although Lee (2004b) only considered the vertical position error, horizontal position 
error is similar in nature and these techniques are translatable. From the simulation, it is 
found that dual-fault maximum slope is always larger than the single fault maximum 
slope. While this result is intuitively clear it is important to determine the magnitude of 
the difference in the two types of slope for a typical configuration. In a GPS 
constellation with 24 satellites there can be a ratio of dual over single maximum slope 
as large as 70. Hence the use of an algorithm based on the single fault assumption is 
inappropriate if the probability of multiple faults is not negligible. However, no such 
probability is available as part of the GPS standard (Department of Defence, 2001). For 
the case of a randomly selected numerical example, this ratio is around 7 (Brown, 
1997). 
A RAIM method that incorporates the effect of occurrence of multiple faults in GPS 
and Galileo constellation is presented in Lee (2004c). A summary of the approach is 
presented here for the case of a single constellation to illustrate a discussion of the 
method to tackle multiple failures. The basic concept of the method was presented 
earlier in Lee (1988). A quantity, HMAX, is defined that connects the maximum range 
error and the horizontal position error. HMAX is in effect a scalar that is only dependent 
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on the user-satellite geometry. When HMAX is multiplied by the maximum range error 
bound, the maximum horizontal position error is obtained. Hence depending on the 
nominal standard deviation of range error, RMAX (Range MAXimum) can be obtained 
which is the corresponding maximum range error bound. The standard deviation of 
range error depends on the quality of measurement available. Thus if we set the alert 
limit to 3-sigma value, RMAX is 3 times the sigma of range error. 
This concept is used to define two types of protection limits in Lee (2004b). Although 
the analysis given therein is for the vertical protection limit, the horizontal protection 
limit also behaves in a similar way. The new HPL is the maximum of HPLpmm and 
HPL99.9% which are respectively the protection limits for standard RAIM and the limit 
that bounds the error with 99.9% probability in the case of multiple faults. Using a set 
of assumptions that a) single and multiple faults cannot occur at the same time and b) 
RMAX is the bound for the ranging errors in case of a fault and that otherwise these 
have zero normal distribution with nominal variances, the following relation is 
obtained; 
HPL99.9% = HMAX x RAMX + 3.09 x HDOP xa 5-19 
where HDOP is the Horizontal Dilution of Precision (see section 3.3.1.1) 
and a is the standard deviation of the range error. 
The first term represents the bound of the position error due to a multiple satellite fault 
and second term caters for a 99.9% bound in a fault free case. As this formula calculates 
both the maximum protection limit provided by the conventional RAIM and that 
provided by the HMAX concept, the effect on integrity availability needs to be 
determined. It is proved for the vertical protection limit that the availability is not 
affected as long as all the ranging errors from multiple faults are within 7 standard 
deviations (Lee, 2004b). However, as given in Lee et al. (2005), this method which is 
later termed as group separation (GS) is not very efficient in terms of availability. 
Another method that specially addresses availability is the NIORAIM method. 
Novel Integrity-Optimised RAIM (NIORAIM 
A new RAIM procedure known as Novel Integrity-Optimised RAIM (NIORAIM) was 
presented by Hwang and Brown (2005a). The motivation behind this effort is to 
increase the availability of the conventional RAIM algorithm. However, this method 
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does not contribute towards detection of multiple failures and is limited to the 
calculation of protection limits. 
0 
LU 
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0 
0 
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Parity Magnitude 
Figure 5-2: Scatter plot for position vs measurement in RAIM calculations 
As conventional RAIM is based on the slope-max concept which suffers a limitation 
that even if the most difficult to detect satellite is not the faulty one, its slope (which is 
the maximum slope) is used to calculate the protection levels. The new approach in 
NIORAIM proposes the use of a non-uniform weighted least squares algorithm in place 
of the uniformly weighted least squares position solution. Hence, the impact of each 
satellite measurement on the position solution is different based on its weighting. These 
weights are initialised as uniform and then adjusted using an optimisation algorithm. 
The criterion for the change of weight is inversely proportional to the integrity limit 
provided by each satellite. In this way after a certain number of iterations, the weights 
are adjusted such that the integrity limits (or slopes) of the satellites become nearly 
equal. Although this method results in lowering the protection limit, it suffers from the 
fact that the position accuracy decreases. This is due to the use of unequal weights. As 
the position accuracy of GPS is improving with modernisation taking place, this 
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constraint is becoming less of a concern. A complication that arises in this case is that 
the covariance of position error and parity vector no longer remains zero with the use of 
non-uniform weights. The mutual correlations between the position error and the parity 
vector are zero in the case of uniform weights. However, in general, in the case of non- 
uniform weighting these become non-zero. Hence, to calculate the slope and thereby the 
integrity limit for each satellite the computations become intensive. 
Three methods are suggested to calculate integrity limits 
Monte Carlo method: This involves the simulation of a very large number of randomly 
generated measurements and calculating the probability of missed detection for varying 
sizes of faults to establish the integrity limit. This method is too computationally 
intensive for real time computations. 
Upper Bound method: This method takes a conservative approach and uses an elliptical 
approximation for the noise scatter. All of the area above the integrity limit in Figure 
5-2 is assumed to be the missed detection region. This method is applicable in real time 
but the results are pessimistic due to it being a conservative method. 
Lookup table: Another method is the use of a lookup table. The horizontal integrity limit 
is interpolated from a lookup table that contains an approximate version of the scatter 
plot shown in Figure 5-2. This approximation is based on the assumption that the 
distribution of noise is, to a first-order approximation, a Bivariate Gaussian Distribution 
(BGD)(Owen, 1956). In this way the parameter set for the lookup table is given as 
follows: 
a) Number of satellites to calculate the threshold 
b) Variance cEE (of Error) of BGD (Ang and Tang, 1975), 
c) coffelation coefficient of the BGD and, 
d) Slope of the mean of the BGD. 
The mean of the plot is assumed to be (pp,, u, ) and the covariance matrix is given by 
CP-E = 
[CPP 
CPE 
CEP CEE 
5-20 
where u, andu_, are the central values of the parity magnitude and position 
error for BGD respectively 
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C, p and c,, are the covariance 
for the parity magnitude and position error 
resPectively 
cEp and cp, are the cross-covariance between the ParitY magnitude and position 
error. 
It is further assumed that cpp is unity (this is because a normalised value of parity is 
used for ease of calculation) and hence only two terms of the matrix need to be 
calculated. 
The lookup table is formed using the Monte Carlo calculations to derive a value of the 
protection limits for the set of four input parameters. Hence, during real time processing 
the protection limit can be calculated when the values of these four parameters are 
available from the measurements. 
It is shown in Hwang and Brown (2005a), that this integrity algorithm is able to 
(salvage' a number of un-available cases in a previous study with conventional RAIM 
algorithms. Besides this good performance, two points need to be mentioned here. 
a) The table array is of 5x5xIIx 12 elements and accurate derivation of each is 
cumbersome. 
b) A plot is given in the paper that gives the difference between the lookup 
Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) and the Monte Carlo HPL. This shows that 
there can be a difference of as much as 50 m between the two. 
The value of HPL is given by 
HPL = slopemax max Sbias 5-21 
where the value ofsb., is detemlined by the use of tables of non-central chi- 
squared distribution for the given probability of missed detection. 
This approach is later extended to include simultaneous two-fault scenarios (Hwang and 
Brown, 2005c). These faults are modelled as 
y, ]= [Bsin 0] [Y2 
Bcos0 
where B is the absolute size of the fault, 
0 shows the relative effect of the two faults 
5-22 
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y, andY2 are magnitudes of the two faults. 
This type of modelling is done to provide a unified analysis for the two faults case. A 
modified slope formula is provided to cater for the non-uniform weights 
slope 
(y, Aw wjj + Y2 A,,, w1j )2 + (y, A. WN + Y2A. W2j)2 
5-23 
q 
where 
2s + y2S q -= yj ii + 2y, Y2 
SO 
2 
Aw = (WH) 
T (WH) -I (WH)T 5-24 
S=pTp 
w is the weight matrix 
H is the geometry matrix 
P is the parity matrix (see section 5.3.1.1). 
With the modified slope formula, the same lookup table approach can be used with this 
slope. The largest slope can be calculated by solving the generalized eigenvalue 
problem as given in Brown (1997). However, this slope varies with B and 0, for which 
maximum values must be determined. For B, which is the magnitude, the worst case 
condition is already taken into account in the calculation of the lookup table. However 
0 for the maximum slope is unknown. A search method for the calculation of 
is suggested. In this way, the maximum horizontal protection limit among the formed 
pairs of satellite measurements can be calculated. This suffices for the case of traditional 
RAIM with multiple faults. However, the application of NIORAIM method increases 
the availability by using a search method for appropriate weights (to be applied to the 
satellite measurements). This is carried out as follows. 
For each pair of faults we calculate a gain G, given by; 
I 
G. (k) for i=1,... n; j=i+n 5-25 
where n is the number of measurements 
A is constant whose value is 2 or 3 to achieve rapid convergence 
L, is the protection limit for the satellite pair i andj. 
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The value for the pararneterp is given by 
nn 
rl fl Ly 5-26 
i=l j=i+l 
This gain matrix is an upper triangular matrix. A full matrix is formed next by using the 
transpose of G as a lower triangular matrix. Then a composite gain. u, is determined (for 
each measurement i) according to the formula; 
T 
u, = min 
ý, 
j 1, i=1,.. n; jnI jj 5-27 
Using these gains, the weights are then updated as; 
w, (k + 1) = u, w, (k), for i=n 5-28 
where k is the index for iterations. 
In addition to this method, an approach called the weight perturbation method is also 
presented (Hwang and Brown, 2005a). In this method, initial weights are arbitrarily 
assigned and are then perturbed by positive and negative increments. The combinations 
of these weights are checked for the lowest HPL. These increments are then halved and 
the process is repeated again until convergence. This method is more computationally 
intensive than the direct method. 
5.3.2.3. Summary 
The conclusions drawn with regard to multiple failure RAIM algorithms (section 5.3.2 ) 
are 
a) RAIM needs to be extended to incorporate multiple faults. 
b) The concept of HMAX might provide the solution for multiple failure detection 
but the availability of the method is limited. This essentially means that the 
horizontal protection limit for the algorithm typically has high values compared 
to a typical horizontal alarm limit. 
c) NIORAIM is an effective method for increasing the availability as compared to 
conventional RAIM and has also been extended to include the case of multiple 
failures (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). This method is effective for protection 
limit calculations but does not address the problem of multiple failure detection. 
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d) The lookup table approach for NIORAIM is approximate and some of the 
availability limits can be in error as compared to the exhaustive Monte Carlo 
approach. 
e) The weight computation method for the NIORAIM method although ad-hoc has 
been shown to have good performance. 
f) The assumption that the faulty satellite is that with the maximum slope is not 
always valid and can result in reduced availability. 
g) Detection of multiple failures has not been attempted except in Escher et al. 
(2002) and Feng and Ochieng (2006), as much of the effort is primarily directed 
towards the calculation of protection limits for the algorithms. Significant 
research effort has been dedicated to the protection limits offered by the 
integrity algorithms in the presence of multiple failures (Lee, 2004b; Hwang 
and Brown, 2005c). The detection of multiple failures is presented for RAIM 
availability analysis (for example Hewitson and Wang, 2006) by the geodesy 
community. These methods are also applicable to online RAIM algorithms 
required for aviation and are similar in concept to the methods presented by the 
navigation community. However, the terminology is different as discussed (see 
section 5.3.2). 
After the discussion on GPS integrity monitoring, integrity of the integrated system is 
discussed. 
5.4. Integrity Monitoring of the Integrated System 
The importance of GPS/1NS integrity in the specific context of aviation is discussed in 
Braff et al. (1983). Algorithms for monitoring the integrity of the integrated system 
were first proposed in the late 1980s (Brenner, 1987). In general, the integrity 
monitoring of the integrated system followed in the footsteps of the integrity monitoring 
of GPS. The solution separation methods follow the tradition of solution separation 
which has its roots in the GPS RAIM concept (Lee, 1986; Brown and McBurney, 1988). 
Similarly, the method presented by Diesel and King (1995) i. e. AIME (Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring Method by Extrapolation will be discussed later in this section) is 
on the same line of GPS RAIM as provided by Brown (1992). 
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In this section, integrity of three architectures of GPS/INS integration will be discussed 
one by one. 
5.4.1. Loosely Coupled System Integrity 
In this configuration, the outputs of the two systems are combined in the navigation 
processor, typically a Kalman filter using a truth model (Grewal et. al., 2001). The truth 
model is a mathematical depiction of the error characteristics of the component systems. 
In essence, the position solution from GPS and INS are subtracted to provide the error 
which is used to estimate the states of the integrated system that in turn, provide the 
required navigation variables. A disadvantage of the loosely coupled system is that the 
Kalman filter heavily depends upon the GPS solution. Hence, if the GPS solution is not 
available (e. g when less than four satellites are available) the integrated solution is no 
longer possible. 
In such a case the performance of the integrated system is limited to its inertial coasting 
capability. The time for which a system can coast depends primarily on the quality of 
inertial sensors (Lee and Ericcson, 2004a). Hence the loosely coupled system provides 
benefits in terms of the navigation performance Le. accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability, over the individual systems. This means that the integrated system provides 
the following advantages over the individual systems. 
* It is more accurate. 
More trust can be placed on its output because of the redundancy provided by an 
additional navigation system. 
The integrated output can be provided at a higher rate than GPS because of the 
higher data rate of INS. 
The integrated system will be available even during GPS outage, and the 
availability of the required navigation solution is only limited by the quality of 
the INS. 
However, the output of the integrated system follows the GPS output in the case of a 
fault in the INS. In case of at least one failure in both the systems, loosely coupled 
integrated system does not have the ability of performing within the expected error 
bound and will be not be able to detect the failure/s. 
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However, to get real benefits from integrity monitoring, measurement domain coupling 
methods are recommended. 
5.4.2. Tightly Coupled System 
In the tightly coupled system, the Kalman filter processes the GPS raw measurements 
and their corresponding values predicted from INS measurements. The latter is made 
possible by using the current host vehicle position as determined by the INS and the 
broadcast ephemeris data. In this way, even with less than four available satellites, the 
navigation solution can be maintained by the Kalman filter. A disadvantage of this filter 
is that it responds more slowly to INS errors than the loosely coupled system (Gautier, 
2003). 
The methods that provide integrity service for the GPS/INS integrated system are based 
upon variations in the selection of test statistics, decision thresholds and horizontal 
protection limits. There are two main approaches normally employed to determine the 
test statistic: 
The use of the innovation of the Kalman filter (Nikiforov, 2002; Diesel and 
King, 1995) 
The use of the difference between the main filter solution and the subfilter 
solution (Brenner, 1995). This method is based on the multiple solution 
separation method presented for GPS RAIM (Brown and McBurney, 1988). 
The decision threshold against which the test statistic is compared is determined in one 
of two ways: 
The threshold is a function of the standard deviation of the separation between 
the full solution and the sub-solutions. It is multiplied by a constant that is 
statistically determined. It is assumed that the test statistic is Gaussian in nature 
and hence the constant is calculated so that the given probability of a false alert 
is not exceeded (Brenner, 1995). 
When the test statistic is a function of the innovation of the Kalman filter that 
has multiple Gaussian distributed components, the threshold is chosen using the 
chi square distribution. The probability of a false alert is used to calculate the 
value of the threshold (Diesel and King, 1995). 
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In the case of horizontal protection limits, the HPL can be determined using separation 
statistics between the full filter and sub-filters (Brenner, 1995). HPL can also be formed 
by fusing multiple ten-ns as explained in the next section. 
Three integrity algorithms are discussed in subsequent sub-sections 
a) Multiple solution separation method, 
b) Autonomous integrity monitoring by Extrapolation method (AIME) and 
c) Optimal fault detection method. 
The Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) method is based on forming the solution using 
different sub-filters by removing one measurement at a time and comparing it with the 
full solution. In effect it is a snapshot method which requires the measurements only at 
the current time. In contrast, the AIME is a sequential method that uses the current as 
well as previous measurements for its operation. Optimal fault detection is a similar 
sequential method in which the test statistic is selected to optimise detection time and 
probability of false alert. These methods are compared briefly below followed by their 
mathematical description. Firstly, the MSS method will be discussed. 
5.4.2.1. Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) Method 
The selection of the test statistics for the MSS method is based on the difference of the 
full set solution and the subset solution (Brenner, 1995). 
Assuming that the full solution is given by, 
AX0 = SOAP 
and the sub-solutions by, 
5-29 
AXn = SnAP (n = 1, N) 5-30 
Where Ap is the n dimensional measurement vector relative to the initial 
estimate,, 
So andSn are the measurement matrices for the full solution and subsolution n 
respectively (Brenner, 1995), 
and Axi is the vector of three position components and the clock bias of the 
solution (i=O.. N) where N is the number of satellites. 
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Test Statistics 
The test statistic ( d,, ) or discriminator for the horizontal position (in units of metres) for 
a subfilter n is given by, 
00) - 
Ax (1))2 + (Ax,, (2) ))2 5-31 n (Ax (1) n- AXn (2 
where I and 2 shows the latitude and longitude error states (Brenner, 1995). 
Building on this basic idea, sub-solutions, each based on a separate Kalman filter results 
in a number of Kalman filters, each excluding one satellite measurement at a time. The 
covariance matrix dP,, , calculated at each time step, describes the statistics of the 
separation between the full filter and the sub-filters. 
dP. (k) = E[(Axo (k) - Ax,, (k))(Axo (k) - Ax,, 
(k)) T 
n 5-32 
The errors are assumed to follow Gaussian distribution yielding a frequency distribution 
for Gaussian variables (q) given by, 
I-1 
oo <q< oo 5-33 V2-ir 
When there is no satellite failure, an alert may be raised due to the presence of noise in 
the measurement. Therefore, the detection threshold should be chosen based upon the 
maximum permissible probability of false detection. Hence, 
P fd =P (ý > TD) = 
00 x 
7fe2 dx 
TD 
5-34 
where the mean of random variable x is zero, 
ý is noise, 
Pfd is the false detection probability and 
a is the standard deviation of x. 
P(ý > TD) is the probability of noise being greater than the threshold. The value of 
threshold is calculated as 
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--j 
-1( 
pffl 
TD = -ýe" N 
5-35 
where e,, is the largest eigenvalue of the horizontal position error covariance matrix 
and J-is the inverse of 
00 i2 
J(q) fe2 dt 5-36 72 
q 
where J is the probability of variable j being greater than q. 
As the horizontal position error has components in x and y axes, use of largest 
eigenvalue ensures the use of a standard deviation that is maximum; either in the x or y 
direction. In the case of a satellite with faulty measurements, the noise affecting the 
measurements can potentially reduce the magnitude of the fault. This happens when the 
sign of the noise is opposite to the deten-ninistic faulty measurement. This could result 
in missed detection because the value of the test statistic will remain below the 
threshold. The faulty measurement is thus modelled as a Gaussian variable, so that the 
threshold is calculated based on the value of probability of missed detection, P.,, 
p -1 (Pmd) 5-37 an = 
ýA 
n'j 
where P,, is the covariance matrix for the estimation of subfilter states. 
A matrix referred to as dual propagation matrix is defined that is used to propagate 
and dP,, with time so that the test statistic and HPL can be computed at each epoch. The 
computation of HPL is discussed below. 
horizontal Protection Limit 
The horizontal protection limit (HPL) for the algorithm is the sum of the two thresholds 
that acts as a strict upper bound: 
HPL = max(TD. + aj over n=1, N 5-38 
Some modifications to the method of MSS are suggested by Young et al. (2003). 
Instead of the dual propagation matrix, the covariance of solution separation matrix 
termed B,, (k) is proposed in Young et al. (2003). This results in a saving in computation 
time. Further, the inverse (Moore-Penrose) of this matrix is used in the calculation of 
the suggested test statistic. However, due to the reason of B,, (k) being rank deficient 
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(rank being less than the order of the matrix), the use of this in the calculation of the test 
statistics is not recommended in this thesis. 
Further, the calculation of the detection threshold and HPL are similar to the MSS 
approach but modifications are suggested in Young et al. (2003). It is also argued in 
Young et al. (2003) that in Brenner (1995) the limit for the threshold and HPL is 
calculated using the maximum eigenvalues (Equations 5-35 and 5-38) which results in 
underestimation of both the values (HPL and detection threshold). It is also stated that 
this is due to the horizontal position being a two dimensional variable and if the 
approach by Brenner (1995) is used, this limits the case to that of a one dimensional 
variable. Hence, a better approach (in view of Young et al. 2003) is to cater for the 
second variable also (assuming it as a Gaussian variable) using a two dimensional 
approach. It is further suggested therein to use Circular Error Probable (CEP) tables for 
these calculations. These give the radius of a circle that contains the mentioned value 
(for which CEP is described) with a probability of 50%. 
The approach by Young et al. (2003) while being credible has two issues to be dealt 
with: 
* The assumption of position error being a Gaussian variable has not been 
resolved fully yet and there may not be any advantage of choosing it as a one 
dimensional or two dimensional variable. 
* The calculation of the test statistic using a rank deficient matrix may create 
numerical instabilities as recognised by the same authors. 
Hence, in this thesis the MSS algorithm is pursued as a representative method for the 
solution separation approach. This is essentially a position domain method. Another 
method that deals in measurement domain is AIME and is presented below. 
5.4.2.2. Autonomous Integrity monitoring by 
Extrapolation Method (AIME) 
The AIME is effectively a sequential algorithm in which the measurements used are not 
limited to a single epoch (Diesel and King, 1995). Test statistics are based on the 
innovation of the Kalman filter. Using the standard equations of the Kalman filter (see 
section 3.5.1.1) the innovation rk is given by, 
182 
rk = Zk+l - 
I-Hk+l 5-39 
The distribution of the components of rkis n dimensional normal with zero mean and 
known covariance, 
E[rk] =0 
540 E[rk. rkT ]= Vk 
where the covariance of the innovation, Vkis given by, 
Vk 
=H 
T 
+R 5-41 k 
I; 
kHk k 
where Hkis the measurement matrix of the Kalman filter 
P is the a posteriori covariance of state variables k 
Rkis the covariance matrix for measurements used in the Kalman filter. 
Test Statistic 
The test statistic is given by, 
2TI 
-, ) (Va-, ) (r, 542 Savg (ra, ,ga, 
) 
where, 
r" (V-l )-I F, -1 (k)r(k)) 543 avg k 
(V 
and '. 1 -1 (k) 5-44 Vavg = FkV 
The test statistic exhibits central and non-central chi-square distributions for the no-fault 
and fault cases respectively (Diesel and King, 1995). Using the same formula, three test 
statistics Sh, S2 and S3 are formed; averaged over 150 seconds, 10 minutes and 30 
minutes respectively. These time periods are chosen on the basis of operational 
considerations. For example, average landing time for an aircraft is 150 sec. 
Furthermore, it is typically not possible to track a single satellite for an extended period 
of time (e. g. in hours). The decision threshold is also based on the chi-square 
distribution. This is selected on the basis of a false alert rate of 10-5 per hour in a fault 
free environment (Diesel and Dunn, 1996). 
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Horizontal Protection Limit 
The horizontal protection limit (HPL) is the combination of three IM'Ilits: 
HPLI is given by 5.33 a (position estimate uncertainty). The a value is 
determined from elements of the horizontal position error covariance matrix. 
The value of 5.33 is chosen to reflect the probability of missed detection of 
10-7 /hr. 
* HPL2 is the maximum value of the test statistics for all sub-filters. Hence, it 
varies as a function of GPS pseudorange measurements. 
* HPL3is based on a derivation similar to that of the traditional RAIM, which uses 
the slope of the satellite that is the most difficult to detect (discussed in section 
5.3.2.2). The slope in this case is the ratio of the contribution of each satellite to 
the horizontal position error to the contribution to the test statistic (Brown and 
Chin, 2002). 
The value of HPL is calculated by the use of the equation below 
HPL -": 
V(MaX(HPL, 
5 HPL2 ))2 +HPL3 
2 5-45 
The slope calculation is carried out by the use of the Kalman filter gain matrix Kk and 
measurement variance matrix. It is given by Diesel and King (1995), 
slope(i) = 
dRl- 
ds, 
ii Vr(dXi2 
2ki 2Lbi where dR, +dx, 22), dx, K bi and ds =D 
b, is the bias in measurement i 
the subscript k shows the time epoch of the Kalman filter 
dR, is the horizontal position error due to measurement i 
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dsj is the transformed residual formed by the introduction of range bias error b, 
dx, is the effect of the bias on the solution vector, the subscripts I and 2 shows 
the latitude and longitude error states of the state vector (required for horizontal 
position error calculation). 
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D is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix for the 
innovation 
L is the modal matrix containing the eigenvectors, of the covariance matrix for 
the innovation. 
The HPL3 is given by, 
HPL3 = slopemax Sbias 547 
where the value ofsb,,,, is determined by the use of tables of non-central chi- 
squared distribution. It is proven (Diesel and King, 1995) that sbj"s is the square root of 
the non-centrality parameter of the chi-square distribution. Its value is chosen on the 
basis of specified probability of missed detection (e. g, . 00 1). 
In a later extension of this method, HPL2 is removed from Equation 545 (Lee and 
O'Laughlin, 2000). The reasons for this are: 
HPL2 is defined similarly to the Horizontal Uncertainty Limit (HUL). By 
definition, HUL is an estimate of the horizontal position uncertainty that bounds 
the error with a probability of 0.999. Defining HPL in the same manner can 
result in a situation when the position effor can exceed the value of the 
protection limit with a probability of 0.001. Hence inclusion of this 2"d term in 
the HPL violates the integrity requirement of 10-7 /hr. 
HPL2also fluctuates with measurements. Hence, if HPL is less than Horizontal 
Alert Limit (HAL) at a particular time this does not provide enough assurance 
about the continuity of the flight operation as in a short time a fluctuation in the 
measurement may increase the value of HPL above that of HAL. 
Note however, that it can be inferred from the formula for HPL3that the objection to 
HPL2also applies to HPL3 , i. e. that the position error can exceed it with a probability of 
0.001. This essentially is not the case because for the calculation of HPL, the root sum 
squared value of HPLI and HPL3is taken, which are two different entities, one relating 
to the error due to noise and the other due to the assumption that a deterministic fault is 
present in the test statistic (Equation 5-45). The expression for the first term (Equation 
5-45, the square of maximum of HPLI and HPL2) relates to the false alert probability, 
while second term (the square of HPL3) is calculated based on the value of missed 
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detection probability. The above objection is only related to the first term (HPL2) and 
not the second term. 
In both the MSS and AIME approaches, the basic aim is to keep the value of the HPL 
below that of the HAL. These methods use the detection threshold in the position and 
measurement domains respectively. However, there is no provision for the detection of 
the error rate. This idea will be further used in the detection algorithm proposed in 
Chapter 8. There is another method in the integrity literature that is based on 
minimisation of time to detect a failure known as optimal fault detection. It is explained 
below. 
5.4.2.3. Optimal Fault Detection 
Another approach that accounts in some detail for the theory of fault detection is 
presented in Nikiforov (2002). In this approach, the emphasis is on the early detection 
of a fault, with the positive result of minimising the detection time. This is an important 
factor in cases where the time-to-alert is relatively short. 
The approach divides navigation systems into two classes, those that can be described 
with regression-type models and others with state space models. For a GPS-only 
solution, the regression type approach suffices but for the integrated system, state space 
models have to be used, as described below. The fault detection algorithm is based on 
Generalized Likelihood Ratio testing (GLRT) and can be explained as follows. 
The Kalman filter innovation is selected as the test statistic and is assumed to follow a 
Gaussian distribution with a zero mean in the fault free case and a non-zero mean in the 
faulty case: 
N(O, V k< to 
r_ 
k 
k N(i7(k, to), Vk) k >to 
where q(k, t,, )is the signature of the fault on the innovation 
t,, is the fault onset epoch, 
YKdenotes measurement at epoch k, 
and Vk = cov(rk 
)- 
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To compare the test statistic with the decision threshold, a log likelihood ratio 
ZG,,,,, 
k 
is 
fonned 
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ZGLRT, 
k = log 
fl(YI3, 
***Yk) 
fi (Yi 
ý***Yk 
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where fj and f, are probability distribution functions of satellite measurements 
before and after the occurrence of a fault respectively. 
The decision threshold is calculated using a value for the probability of missed detection 
as in the case of the MSS algorithm (see section 5.4.2.1). A change in the statistical 
model due to occurrence of a fault is reflected by a change in the sign of the mean of the 
log likelihood ratio (Nikiforov, 1995). Detection of a fault is carried out by method of 
hypothesis testing (see section 5.3.2.1). The alternate hypothesis results in the 
generation of an alert that indicates a failure. This algorithm is computationally complex 
and approximations need to be used for ease of implementation. Furthermore, the 
formula cannot be written recursively (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993). An 
approximate recursive solution is proposed in Nikiforov (2000). It should be noted that 
there is no provision for the calculation of the protection limit in this method. This 
method is used recently for detection of errors in the satellite ranges, however, there is 
no mention of the protection limit calculation (Clot et al., 2006). 
This section provided a description of integrity monitoring methods for tightly coupled 
GPS/INS integrated systems in the presence of single faults. As presented in section 
5.3.2, the situation of multiple faults has also to be catered for. This is discussed in the 
next section. 
5.4.2.4. Treatment of Multiple Failure for tightly coupled 
GPS/INS System 
There are two approaches in the literature, one for failure detection and the other for the 
calculation of HPL in the case of multiple failures. These are described below. 
Detection 
In the context of GPS/INS integrated systems, the detection of multiple failure was 
addressed by Escher et al. (2002). The theoretical approach used is that of Brenner 
(1995). However,, this approach is not based on simultaneous fault assumption. It is 
assumed by Escher et al. (2002) that multiple faults only occur at different epochs. 
Hence, the second fault can be dealt with after the exclusion of the first fault if the 
method by Escher et al. (2002) is used. However, in order to address simultaneous fault 
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detection, two or more simultaneous faults should be detected. In essence, this is a 
single fault detection algorithm. This method is further discussed in Chapter 8 and 9. 
Calculation of HPL 
The NIORAIM method is applied to a GPS/INS integrated system in Hwang (2005b). 
Weights calculated using the weight search techniques are applied to the matrices of the 
Kalman filter by using the following formulae 
Rk 
= wRk 
(W-I)T 5-50 
where R is the measurement matrix of the Kalman filter 
w is the new matrix of weights to be applied to the satellite measurements. 
The results presented in Hwang and Brown (2005c) show that the introduction of the 
non-uniform weights change the behaviour of the system to yield lower protection 
levels. However, when there is a constellation change, sudden weight changes can 
induce a large transient. This problem is solved by the choice of scaling factors for the 
weights. The results for the application of NIORAIM algorithm will be discussed in 
Chapter 8 and 9. 
This section dealt with the integrity monitoring of the tightly coupled GPS/INS 
integrated system in the presence of single and multiple failures. In the integrity 
literature, a method for integrity monitoring of deeply integrated systems (or ultra 
tightly coupled systems) is also discussed. This is presented in the next section. 
5.4.3. The GI-RAIM Deep Integration Integrity Monitoring 
Algorithm 
A RAIM method suggested for ultra-tightly coupled systems is the GI-RAIM (GPS 
Inertial RAIM) method (Gold and Brown, 2004). It is based on the BOPD (BOunded 
Probability of missed Detection) concept. Based on a pre-filter, it is anticipated that a 
certain satellite is faulty. The pre-filter is an algorithm that implements reasonableness 
checks to detect blunders in the data (see section 9.3). By excluding this satellite, a 
position solution is computed. From the comparison of this solution with the full 
solution, the contribution of the faulty satellite to the radial position error is estimated 
with a high probability. The treatment is presented for a single failure case and the 
multiple failure situation is not discussed. The algorithm ensures that this fault 
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characterisation minimises the missed detection risk. However, the condition is that a 
sufficient number of satellites are available in a good geometrical configuration. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that HAL and Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) values close to Im 
can be achieved with this algorithm. Note however, that this accuracy is achieved by 
using the GPS carrier phase observable. The availability of the carrier phase solution is 
limited by the resolution of the integer ambiguity which is not always guaranteed 
(Hofmann-Wellenhof et al., 2001). In the GI-RAIM integrity monitoring, a pre-filter is 
used to flag the faulty GPS signal. In this way, corrupt GPS data are prevented from 
propagating back into the main navigation filter. 
In this section, integrity algorithms for tightly coupled systems and deeply integrated 
systems are discussed. 
Chapter 4 determined that errors that grow slowly over time fall into the category that is 
most difficult to detect. The next section assesses the best integration architecture and 
integrity algorithms that have the potential to facilitate the detection of slowly growing 
errors (SGEs). 
5.5. Selection of Integration Architecture and Integrity 
Algorithm 
Integrity monitoring techniques for the individual and the integrated system have been 
discussed in the previous sections. In the case of integrity monitoring of INS, there are 
essentially two mechanisms; redundancy provision by additional hardware, and 
implementation of integrity routines in the software. The integrity monitoring of GPS is 
carried out by the use of software techniques (RAIM) and/or special augmentation 
systems. The integrity monitoring of the integrated system is carried out typically by 
using software based methods. Software techniques are the preferred approach because 
of their ease of use and flexibility. These are also inexpensive and reside beside the 
traditional Positioning algorithms in the cockpit software. Furthermore, these techniques 
are proven and well established in the literature as already discussed. 
The integrity performance of the loosely coupled system is restrictive in nature due to 
the fact that the raw GPS measurements are not accessible. Hence, any healthy GPS 
measurements are not of use in the situation when the navigation solution is corrupted 
by a single faulty measurement. When comparing the integrity performance of the other 
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two classes of integration, in general, there are two advantages of the ultra-tightly 
coupled system over the tightly coupled system. 
a) In case of corrupted GPS measurements, as a result of either interference or 
jamming, the GPS solution obtained (in ultra tightly coupled systems) is 
better than the conventional GPS solution. This is because the noise is 
effectively reduced by direct handling of the I and Q signals in the GPS 
receiver as shown in Gustafson and Dowdle (2003) and Kim et al. (2003) 
(see section 3.5.1.3). 
b) The tracking loop of the GPS receiver is aided by the INS to lock onto the 
satellite signals. This reduces the time to fix whenever a satellite signal is 
lost. This is carried out by predicting the position of the satellite to be 
tracked using the INS based position and GPS ephemeris data. 
These two advantages are discussed below for the case of a SGE. Concerning the first 
advantage given above, following comments should be noted. Since this thesis analyses 
the behaviour of integrity algorithms in the presence of SGEs; for which the Ultra-tight 
GPS/INS integration may not be of much advantage (as the SGE is not a kind of noise), 
it is the measurement redundancy that is paramount. Two scenarios arise with respect to 
measurement-redundancy. 
If redundant satellite measurements are available, these can be fully exploited by 
the tightly coupled integrated systems, hence ultra tightly coupled systems are 
not superior in this case. 
If redundant satellite measurements are available but immersed in noise, ultra- 
tightly coupled systems have a better chance of utilising them (for further 
detection of SGEs) than tightly coupled systems. However, the error detection 
mechanism is similar,, as the test statistic for the GPS-Inertial (GI-RAIM) 
method is based on a chi-squared formulation as in Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring by Extrapolation Method (AIME). Hence, the error detection 
strategies presented later in Chapters 7,8 and 9 is also applicable to Ultra-tightly 
coupled systems. 
The second advantage of the ultra-tightly coupled system is limited by the fact that the 
INS has to be calibrated to provide aiding to the tracking loop. However, as shown later 
in section 7.4.1.1, it is not possible to calibrate INS in general, save for the usage of 
specific manoeuvres presented by Hong et al. (2005) and Groves et al. (2002) or by the 
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usage of multiple antennas (Wagner, 2005). Furthermore, it can be seen from Chapter 4 
that as the complexity of the system increases so are the number of failure modes. This 
is a major concern from the point of view of meeting the integrity requirement. Hence, 
in this thesis, only the tightly coupled integrity algorithms will be considered ftuther. 
With regard to the integrity algorithms for tightly coupled systems, the optimal fault 
detection algorithm is not considered further because its characteristics are similar to 
that of the AIME algorithm. Furthermore, the need for knowledge of fault signatures 
precludes its use as a general integrity algorithm (Nikiforov, 2002). Optimum fault 
detection is based on Generalized Likelihood Ratio Testing (GLRT) while AIME is 
based on a chi-squared distribution. These testing mechanisms are similar as given by 
Zhang et al. (1998). Hence, the tightly coupled algorithms considered ftu-ther in this 
thesis are Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) and ARýU as representatives of position 
domain and measurement domain integrity algorithms for the tightly coupled GPS/INS 
integrated system. Another salient feature of this selection is that the MSS algorithm is a 
snapshot algorithm while AIME is a sequential algorithm. Hence, this selection 
represents both the types of integrity algorithms as described in section 5.3. Simulation 
used to test these algorithms is presented in Chapter 6 and analysis of their performance 
is carried out in Chapter 7 using the developed simulation. 
As discussed in section 5.3.2, in this thesis the assumption of single failure is discarded. 
For the case of multiple failures, the HPL expressions for the AIME and MSS 
algorithms are not valid. Hence, the representative approach for HPL calculation in this 
thesis is the NIORAIM. This has the advantage of consideration of multiple failures 
along with the single failures and training of weights (for satellite measurements) that 
can result in reduced values of HPL (see sections 8.3.3.5 and 9.6.3). 
5.6. Summary 
In this chapter, integrity algorithms for the individual as well as for the integrated 
GPS/INS system are presented. It is shown that most of the existing integrity algorithms 
were designed for handling a single failure. However, recent research has dedicated a 
significant effort to the case of multiple failures. There are still gaps in the research 
which are the efficient handling of most important failure mode (Slowly Growing 
Errors) and detection of multiple failures for the GPS/INS integrated system. There are 
no algorithms that can isolate a failure in the INS in a GPS/1NS integrated system. 
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Among these failure modes the most important type is the category of errors where 
errors grow slowly over time Le. slowly growing errors (SGE). SGEs are important 
because (see Chapter 4) 
* Step faults can be easily detected within the Time-To-Alert (TTA) by 
simpler snapshot fault detection algorithms. 
Errors growing at a high rate trigger an alert early, and can thus also be 
detected by step detector algorithms. 
SGEs are typical of the GPS clocks and similar errors are present in INS (see 
Table 4-3). A snapshot algorithm would take a long time to detect these 
types of faults as they take time to reach the fault threshold (Busca et al, 
2003). 
Since this research focuses on SGEs, a selection of integration architecture and integrity 
algorithms is made in this regard. It appears that the most complex integration 
architecture i. e. ultra tightly (UT) coupled may be the best one for the cause. However, 
as analysed in section 5.5, the key benefits provided by ultra tightly coupled system are 
not helpful with respect to integrity. This is because SGE is not a kind of noise for 
which a UT system is beneficial and the most important consideration for integrity i. e. 
redundancy, is offered in full by the tightly coupled system. Also, there is greater 
potential of failure mode generation in UT systems because of their complexity (see 
Table 4-5). 
Furthermore, among the tightly coupled systems, candidate algorithms have been 
selected for further analysis; the MSS and AIME. This is because these represent both 
the classifications (see 5.3.1.2) of integrity monitoring methods. The MSS is a position 
domain and snapshot type method while the AIMIE is a measurement domain and 
sequential type method. 
In Chapter 6a simulation platform is developed to test the performance of the candidate 
integrity algorithms in the presence of slowly growing error. 
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Simulation Development 
6.1. Introduction 
Failure modes of GPS and INS were discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 then discussed 
the existing integrity algorithms designed to offer a level of protection against these 
failure modes. In this chapter, a simulation platform is developed to analyse the 
behaviour of integrity algorithms in the presence of representative failure modes. This 
emulates an INS and a GPS receiver mounted on a typical passenger aircraft. The 
simulation of GPS includes a satellite constellation model, a signal propagation model 
and a receiver data acquisition model. The equations for raw INS measurements are 
derived and simulated. Typical errors are then added to GPS and INS measurements. 
'Corrupted' raw INS measurements are then passed through typical navigation 
algorithms to generate INS outputs. 
The close to real outputs of GPS and INS are then combined by using integration 
architecture algorithms. The methodology and equations for the integration of GPS and 
INS are described. A discussion of various error models used in the Kalman filter for 
different integration architectures shows the diverse capabilities of the simulation. This 
simulation is then used to test the performance of the integrity algorithms in subsequent 
chapters. 
6.2. Simulation Overview 
The functional architecture of the simulation platform developed to test the performance 
of integrity algorithms is captured in Figure 6.1. It consists of four main components 
1. Aircraft Trajectory 
2. GPS simulation 
3. INS simulation 
4. Integrated System Simulation 
The trajectory data is generated using a typical passenger aircraft flight plan. A flight 
plan contains the location of the airports for departure and arrival, as well as the 
waypoints in between. It also contains infonnation on the altitude (flight level) and 
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velocity vector of aircraft during flight. Flight level is a standard nominal altitude of an 
aircraft, referred to a world wide fixed precision datum (Nolan, 1994). 
The flight plan data is used to simulate GPS and INS measurements. A GPS 
constellation model is used to simulate the orbiting satellites in view of the aircraft 
mounted antenna. For the signals emanating from the satellites, mathematical models 
are used and modified according to the typical error characteristics of the GPS. These 
errors are quantified as delays. The delayed signal is 'received' by an acquisition model 
of a typical GPS receiver, complete with a tracking loop. The tracking loop in a GPS 
receiver is an electronic circuit to track the GPS signals transmitted from the orbiting 
satellites. In this way, this simulation is capable of simulating advanced GPS/INS 
architectures that require internal signals from the GPS receiver (available from the 
receiver tracking loop). 
The INS measurements are derived from the trajectory data by deriving mathematical 
models of the gyroscopes and accelerometers. Furthermore, error models for a typical 
IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) are added to the raw measurements. These raw 
measurements when fed to a suite of navigation mechanization equations result in a 
16close to real' INS output i. e. position, velocity and attitude of the aircraft. 
INS and GPS are integrated using typical Kalman filter configurations for the three 
configurations; loosely coupled, tightly coupled and ultra-tightly coupled. Various test 
statistics for different algorithms are fori-ned using these configurations and integrity 
algorithms are implemented to test their performance. This is presented in subsequent 
chapters. The key features of the simulation platform are described in Section 6.3. 
6.3. Description of Simulation 
The different components of the simulation are shown in Figure 6-1. As shown in the 
figure, the trajectory data is used as input to the raw measurement generators of INS and 
GPS. The output data hence obtained is used to simulate different types of integrated 
systems. The integrated architectures simulated are the loosely coupled, tightly coupled 
and ultra-tightly coupled. The performance of integrity algorithms can then be tested 
using failure models. The integrity algorithms simulated are the Multiple Solution 
Separation (MSS) algorithm, the Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation 
(AIME) method (see Chapter 5) and the proposed algorithms rate detector algorithm 
and the piggy back back architecture (discussed in Chapter 8). The failure models were 
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described in Chapter 4. The generation of data for the aircraft trajectory is described 
next. 
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Figure 6-1: Process Diagram for simulation 
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6.3.1. Aircraft Trajectory Characteristics 
The first step is to simulate a flight trajectory using flight plan data. This is important 
for the following reasons: 
1. it enables the integrity algorithms to be validated in a simulation 
environment that is close to the actual situation. This is made possible by 
addition of realistic errors to simulated INS and GPS measurements. 
2. the trajectory may be used to fine tune the parameters required by the 
integrity algorithms before the commencement of a particular flight. This 
can be done by running a simulation of the expected flight and the expected 
failures that can occur such as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) holes or ionospheric scintillations. A RAIM hole is the situation 
when there are not enough satellites for integrity monitoring (see section 
5.3.1.1) 
For each airport, procedures for takeoff and landing are specified by the local air traffic 
control authority. These are known as Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and 
Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR). These are in the form of charts that show 
aircraft routes in the vicinity of an airport. Using these charts and flight plan data, 
different segments of flight are introduced in this simulation. These are 
a) Taxi 
b) Takeoff 
C) Climb 
d) Cruise or En route 
e) Descent 
J) Landing (see section 2.2). 
For the first three phases, data from the SID charts (for the departure airport) are used 
such as the profile of an aircraft during takeoff. Waypoints are generated for the cruise 
(or enroute) phase between the origin and the destination airport (described ftirther in 
section 6.3.3). At the end of the cruise phase, aircraft start descending towards the 
destination airport. The landing phase is the most demanding phase of a flight in terms 
of navigation. The landing phase is typically divided into 
a) First Approach Fix 
b) Intermediate Approach Fix and 
c) Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA). 
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A fix is a position measurement at a certain time by use of a navigation system. 
Approaches to an airport are classified as non-precision or precision approaches, 
differentiated on the basis of whether vertical guidance is being provided (along with 
the lateral guidance) to the landing aircraft. At the minimum descent altitude (MDA), 
the pilot decides whether to carry out the landing. The approach is termed a missed 
approach if the pilot decides to abort the landing and perform a climb to attempt the 
landing procedure again or to go to an alternate airport. Using the position fixes from 
the STAR data, the trajectory for the landing phase is defined in this simulation. The 
trajectory hence obtained for the gate-to-gate flight is in the form of position fixes 
which are latitude, longitude and height values at each time instant from the departure 
airport to the destination airport. The trajectory data in the form of three dimensional 
time tagged positions is further used to simulate GPS and INS measurements. This is 
explained in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
Note that in this chapter the term error model is used to represent propagation error 
models for the navigation equations (see section 6.3.4.1). However, it should be noted 
also that the same term is used in the literature and in this thesis for other models which 
are mathematical models for nominal errors in the sensors. Another term failure models 
is used for the mathematical models for the representative failure modes described in 
Chapter 4. 
6.3.2. GPS Simulation 
Raw measurements from the GPS receiver and the INS are needed for detailed analyses 
of the intearated systems. GPS measurements are generated using a GPS constellation 
model, trajectory data of the aircraft and appropriate measurement error models. 
Furthermore, simulation of a typical GPS receiver is also developed. In this way, 
internal receiver signals can be accessed for use in the ultra-tightly coupled simulation. 
For example, due to the detailed modelling of the receiver implemented in this research, 
in-phase (1) and quadrature (Q) signals are available in the simulation to be used directly 
in the integration filter. The various components of GPS simulation are described in the 
following sub-section. 
6.3.2.1. GPS Constellation Model 
The first step in the GPS simulation process is the development of the GPS constellation 
model. The nominal GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites. In the broadcast 
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navigation message, Keplerian parameters for the orbit of each satellite are provided. 
Keplerian parameters are a set of parameters included in the navigation message for 
each satellite that can be used to generate the trajectory of the satellite vehicles in space 
and time. This enables the GPS receiver to calculate the current position of each 
satellite. The navigation message also contains the corrections for the satellite based 
atomic clock and coefficients to calculate the ionospheric delay (GPS Receiver Standard 
IRN-200C-004,2000). GPS archive data can be accessed on the website of the 
International GNSS service (IGS). The IGS is a voluntary federation of more than 200 
worldwide agencies that pool resources and permanent GPS & GLONASS station data 
to generate precise GPS and GLONASS Products. The data products include raw 
measurements, navigation messages and precise ephemeredes. GPS data are available 
according to GPS week number for a large number of stations distributed across the 
globe. GPS week number started on 5th January, 1980 and the counter is incremented 
after every subsequent week. The precise almanac available for the nominal 
constellation from the IGS website was used to generate the positions of the satellites in 
the simulation. The signals transmitted from these satellites are modelled next. 
6.3.2.2. GPS transmitted signal model 
In order to model the impact of typical errors affecting the GPS signals, it is assumed 
that the signal that arrives at the GPS antenna contains the effect of different types of 
nominal errors. The six error sources and models considered are summarized in Table 
6- 1. For the signal simulation, a sinusoidal model that is modulated by the code signal is 
used. The carrier signal is not used as a measurement in this simulation because carrier 
ambiguity to date cannot be resolved in real time with the integrity required for aviation 
(see section 3.3.4). However it is used to smooth the code signal to mitigate multipath 
(see Table 6-1). This code signal is in fact a digital signal formed by a PseudoRandom 
Noise (PRN) generator that is specific to every satellite. The PRN signal is a random 
signal that is used to represent the signature of the satellite in the transmitted signal. The 
PRN is generated using a simulation of flip flop circuits. Flip flop is an electronic 
circuit that alternates between two states 0 and 1. The function of PRN generator is 
verified by using the sequence given in the GPS receiver standard document (IRN- 
20OC-0049 2000). 
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The behaviour of these error models are discussed ftu-ther in Chapter 7. The transmitted 
signal is 'received' by the GPS antenna and processed by the GPS receiver as explained 
in the next section. 
6.3.2.3. GPS Receiver tracking loop 
In the case of ultra-tight integration GPS receiver generated in-phase I and quadrature 
phase Q signals are needed for integration with the INS. I and Q signals are in-phase 
and out of phase signals obtained by the multiplication of GPS receiver generated 
replica signal with the received signal (Chapter 3). To generate these signals, it is 
necessary to model the GPS electromagnetic signals using mathematical models. A 
typical GPS signal is represented by: 
s(t) = D(t - r) C(t - r) As inýot + Od(t)) 6-1 
Where D(t - -r) is the data modulation. Modulation is the process of adding an 
information (signal) to a carrier signal. 
C(t - r) is the code modulation 
A is the magnitude of the signal that depends on the acquired signal's power 
wc is the carrier frequency 
0,, is the Doppler phase shift 
t is the time of transmission of the signal 
and r is the delay experienced by the signal. 
The basic principle of operation of a GPS receiver is shown with the help of the block 
diagram in Figure 6-2. The signal received at the antenna is amplified by the pre- 
amplifier and is down-converted (frequency is decreased) to an Intermediate Frequency 
(IF). A typical GPS signal frequency is in the GHz range. This signal is down-converted 
(after amplification) typically to 5 MHz to reduce the demands on the signal processing 
circuitry and therefore results in reduction of the cost of GPS receiver. This is because 
electronic circuits that operate at higher frequencies (in GHz or above) are sophisticated 
and expensive. 
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Figure 6-2: GPS Receiver Functional Block Diagram 
The frequency synthesizer block generates receiver internal code and carrier signals. It 
generates a replica of the incoming carrier signal (using the reference oscillator) along 
with its 90 degree phase delayed component. These two signals are multiplied with the 
incoming signal (that has been passed through the pre-amplifier and down-converter) to 
generate demodulated in-phase (1) and quadrature phase (Q) signals. The I and Q signals 
are multiplied by the output of the code generator. Typically, a code generator (in the 
frequency synthesizer block) generates three types of replica signals (for the incoming 
signal); prompt (P) I and Q signals, early (E) I and Q signals and late (L) I and Q 
signals. The Early signal is advanced from the Prompt signal while the Late signal 
follows the Prompt signal with one chip difference (typically) (Braasch and Dierendock, 
1999). These resultant signals are then fed to the integrate and dump algorithm in the 
signal processing block. This algorithm computes averages of the input signal over a 
programmed sample time. The result is subsequently fed to the discriminator (also in 
the signal processing block). The output of the discriminator jumps to a high value 
when the replica code generator has the same delay as the incoming code signal by 
virtue of GPS code signal design. In the discriminator, for initial acquisition of the 
signal, the root mean square (rms) value of the I and Q signals is formed 
E,. s= 
IT + 6-2 
The rms error, Er,,,, is monitored to obtain an initial lock (lock is the acquisition of the 
incoming signal by the receiver and identifying its PRN). However, since a GPS 
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satellite and receiver move relative to each other, the code signal delay changes with 
time. This change is reflected in the feedback signal provided by the discriminator (in 
the signal processing block) to the code generator (in the frequency synthesizer block). 
The code generator, in turn modifies its frequency to match with that of the incoming 
signal by using this feedback error. In this way, lock is maintained amidst the relative 
movement. The discriminator equation used after the initial lock is obtained is given by; 
2+ -%2) (12 +Q2) L 
UE VE LL 6-3 
where subscript E is used for the early component while L is used for the late 
component that describes the phase of the signal with respect to the prompt 
(nominal received code) signal. 
The delay obtained between the standard PRN signal (a copy of which is saved in the 
receiver) and the output PRN signal of the code generator is the delay measurement. 
This is known as the code pseudorange and will be used in the next section. The 
operation of the simulated receiver tracking loop is verified by comparing the delay 
obtained from the code generator with the delay that was introduced in the signal by 
error models. This comparison demonstrates internal consistency and ensures that the I 
&Q signals are generated correctly in the simulation and can be used further in the 
integration with INS. 
6.3.2.4. GPS Receiver Calculations 
The next step is to compute the elevation and azimuth angles from the user receiver to 
the satellites using the corresponding coordinates (i. e. between the satellite and 
trajectory point coordinates). The elevation angles are then used to screen out 
measurements that are likely to be affected badly by delays due to relatively longer 
propagation times through the atmosphere. A mask angle of 10 degrees has been used 
for screening. The geometric ranges from the aircraft position to each satellite are then 
calculated using aircraft and satellite coordinate data. The error models (see Table 6-1) 
for a variety of error sources are then applied to the geometric ranges in order to 
generate typical pseudoranges. 
The position solution from GPS measurements contains the three dimensional user 
position and an estimate of the receiver clock bias. Consequently, at least four 
pseudoranges are required. The pseudorange observation equation was discussed in 
section 3.3.3.2. The generation of the pseudorange from the received signal is explained 
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in section 6.3.2.3. Assuming, four available satellite measurements (from code signals), 
we have; 
)2 +(Yl )2+odt Pr = 
I(XI 
-- Xr -Yr)2 +(Zl -Zr r _, Cd4 +6r 
2 )2 +Cdt Pr ý 
V(X2 
-xr )2 +(y2 -Yr )2 +(Z2 -Zr +er- 
6-4 
Pr3 =V(X3 _Xr)2 +(y3 -Yr )2 +(z3 -Zr )2 + cdtr -cdý +er' 
#or4 =V(X4 _Xr)2 
+(y4 
7 
_ )2 -Z )2 +Cdr_ c. 
4 
Yr + (Z t cdt, 4r4 +`r 
where x, y and z are position components (subscript r is for receiver and i is 
used for satellite) where i-- 1,4. 
cdt,. is the receiver clock bias 
cdti is the clock bias for the ith satellite 
P'. is the pseudorange between the A satellite and the receiver r 
C" is the range error due to signal propagation in the atmosphere, multipath, and r 
receiver noise between the receiver and the A satellite (see Equation 3.1). 
These equations need to be solved simultaneously. As they are nonlinear in nature, they 
are difficult to solve in real time. Hence, a linearised version of these equations is used 
in a typical GPS receiver processor. Firstly, an initial guess for the position is used (for 
example, the last known position). The increments to this position solution are 
calculated by the use of a linearised equation. This is given by; 
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The Jacobian matrix (in Equation 6-5) represents the change in the pseudorange due to 
the corresponding position parameter. The values of these are obtained by 
differentiating Equation 6-4 (Kaplan, 2005). 
A least squares solution is computed in the cases where more than four satellite 
measurements are available. The algorithm is repeated by feeding back the obtained 
solution to calculate new pseudorange values (from the most recent user position 
obtained). Iterations are terminated when the difference between two consecutive 
solutions is less than a given threshold. Typically for a threshold of 10-5 m, the solution 
converges in a few iterations. The GPS position solution can also be obtained using a 
Kalman filter. This provides advantages of continuous output and less noise in the 
position solution (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996). In this case, the GPS pseudorange is 
modelled by use of mathematical models. These models are similar to the error models 
described in section 6.3.4.1. 
6.3.3. Inertial Navigation System Simulation 
INS simulation consists of three segments; a) raw measurement simulation, b) error 
models and c) navigation equations mechanization. Aircraft trajectory data (section 
6.3.1) are used as the basis for the simulation. In addition, velocity and angular rate data 
for the aircraft are required. These are generated as follows. 
As explained in section 6.3.1, position data were obtained from flight charts and flight 
plan data. However, these position fixes are to be converted to velocities and angular 
rates with smooth profiles in order to represent real flight data. 
For the en-route phase, nominal aircraft trajectories can be defined by arc segments on a 
great circle that contains the origin and the destination airport coordinates. In this 
research, this approach has not been used because great circle trajectories are constant 
speed trajectories and in practice aircraft fly with varying velocity and acceleration. The 
use of the great circle approach results in discontinuities in velocities and angular rates 
values, which is not a real situation. However, for this purpose, a Two Point Boundary 
Value Problem (TPBVP) needs to be solved at the two boundaries of an arc segment. 
The linking of constant velocity segments can also be carried out by the use of 
smoothing functions such as cubic splines. A cubic splines technique is based on data 
interpolation and results in smooth output data. Both of these methods (TPBVP and 
Cubic Splines) involve a trial and error approach. Furthermore, in the case of the cubic 
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spline method, the data generated to join two segments do not necessarily correspond to 
the physics of aircraft manoeuvres. 
The solution to this problem used in this simulation is to link constant velocity segments 
with turning segments containing a velocity variation. This is carried out by using the 
start and end velocity data of the adjacent segments. Hence, a constant acceleration 
value is used so that the turn segments are generated in a smooth manner. 
Note that the aircraft trajectory represents flight profile of a typical passenger aircraft 
from one airport to another, however, complex manoeuvres are not modelled. This 
means that for the case of airports where an aircraft has to undertake a tight turn before 
aligning with the runway centreline has not been implemented. This can be done by 
introducing extra turn segments as described above. 
The smoothed position data obtained in this way is used to generate velocity and 
angular rate values. Velocity is assumed to be linear between two adjacent time epochs 
and hence is calculated from the position difference divided by time. Similarly, from the 
three dimensional position values at successive instants, values of three angles (pitch, 
yaw and roll) are obtained. Hence, angular velocity is calculated in a manner similar to 
the linear velocity calculation. These are used as input to the expressions for raw INS 
measurements i. e. specific forces (sensed by accelerometers) and aircraft body angular 
rates (sensed by gyroscopes). These are explained flirther in the next sub-section. 
6.3.3.1. Simulation of Raw Measurements 
For the purpose of simulation development of INS, raw accelerometer and gyroscope 
measurements are required. The expressions for these are derived as follows. 
Raw Accelerometer Measurements 
The equation of an accelerometer is given by (Titterton and Weston, 2004) 
=a+g 6-6 
Wheref is the specific force that is the output of the accelerometer 
a is the acceleration of the host vehicle 
g is the acceleration due to gravity. 
Since an accelerometer cannot differentiate between the applied acceleration and the 
acceleration due to gravity, the former is obtained from the equation above. 
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Consequently, the value of gravity must be calculated at each position along the flight. 
The value of gravity is calculated using the formula given below (Titterton and Weston, 
2004) 
g(h) = 
9.780318 (1 + 5.3024 x 10 -' sin 
22L 
-5.9xlO-' sin 
2 2L) 6-7 
+h 
Ro 
Where L is the latitude of the current location 
h is the height of the current location 
RO is the mean earth radius. The Earth's mean radius is determined as the 
average distance from the physical centre to the surface, based on a large 
number of samples. 
The accuracy achieved by Equation 6-7 is suitable for use with accelerometers with a 
random bias value greater than 10 micro-g (for example for a passenger aircraft). For 
more accurate and detailed modelling of gravity, the gravitational potential function 
approach can be used (Brittings, 1971). The Earth's gravitation potential function is 
expressed as a summation of terms that are function of the position of the aircraft. The 
parameters for a detailed model are available from the NASA (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration) website for the model known as EGM (Earth Gravity Model) 96. 
The parameters for EGM are estimated using extensive satellite tracking data. 
For clarity of understanding, the definitions for the reference frames used in this 
simulation are repeated here (see section 3.4.2), prior to the details on the accelerometer 
and gyroscope models. The orientation of these frames is shown in Figure 3-5. 
Earth Frame (e): This coordinate frame has its origin coincident with the mass centre of 
the Earth and its Z axis is defined along the spin axis of the Earth. The X and Y axes 
(perpendicular to each other) are defined in the equatorial plane of the Earth. This frame 
is known as Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) frame or WGS (World Geodetic 
System)-84 (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
Body Frame (b): This is a three dimensional coordinate frame with its centre defined to 
coincide with the centre of gravity of the aircraft. Traditionally, the X-axis is along port 
(left side or opposite to starboard), Y-axis along the fuselage and Z-axis is in the 
downward direction. 
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Navigation Frame (n): In general., navigation frame is the frame which is used for the 
numerical integration of the navigation differential equations. In this thesis, the term 
navigation frame is used for the NED frame. This is a three dimensional coordinate 
frame in which the X axis is along local North, Y axis is along local East and Z axis is 
along the local vertical in the downward direction. Its centre is assumed to be coincident 
with the centre of gravity of the aircraft. 
Inertial Frame (i): This is a three dimensional coordinate frame with the origin that 
coincides with the mass centre of the Earth and its axes are assumed not to rotate with 
respect to the fixed stars. The Z axis is defined along the spin axis of the Earth. Since 
the Earth rotates, the inertial frame is assumed to be coincident with the Earth frame at 
the time of start of the aircraft flight. 
In general, it is possible to choose a different navigation frame. A good choice of a 
specific navigation frame can result in savings in terms of hardware or computation 
time. For example, the use of North, East, Down frame in a passenger aircraft requires 
only two accelerometers instead of the three required for an INS. 
Since this thesis considers a strapdown INS configuration, acceleration is measured in 
the body frame of reference, and is expressed as a'. In the strapdown configuration, an 
INS is directly fixed on the body of the aircraft in contrast to the platfon-n configuration 
(see Chapter 3). The transformation between the acceleration expressed in the body 
frame and acceleration expressed in the navigation frame is given by; 
ab =Cb an 6-8 n 
where ab is the acceleration vector expressed in the body frarne 
a' is the acceleration vector expressed in the navigation frame 
C, ' is the transformation matrix from the navigation frame to the body frame. 
Hence, we need the transformation matrix and acceleration vector (in the navigation 
frame) to get the measured acceleration (in the body frame). The transformation matrix 
calculations are explained in the next section on raw gyroscope measurements. The 
expression for a' is derived as below. 
From Titterton and Weston (2004), we can write the expression for the acceleration in 
the navigation frame as 
209 
+ (2wn +O)n )X Vn 
e ie en e 6-9 
Where v,, " is the velocity of the aircraft with respect to the Earth expressed in the 
navigation frame 
is the rate of change of aircraft-earth relative velocity expressed in the 
navigation frame 
co, ", , 
is the earth spin angular rate expressed in the navigation frame 
,, 
is the angular rate of the navigation frame with respect to the Earth frame w,, " 
expressed in the navigation frame. 
The values of and v" are detemlined as follows: To detemiine ý" the Coriolis e 
equation must be applied (Titterton and Weston, 2004). According to the Coriolis law: 
dv, dVe 
= dt O)in X Ve dt 
n 
6-10 
e is the subscript representing the Earth. Note that when e is used as a 
superscript it represents the ECEF frarne. 
i represents the inertial frame 
n represents the navigation frarne 
ect with respect 
to the Earth v is the velocity of air raf 
w,,, is angular rate between the navigation frame and the inertial frame. 
Expressing Equation 6-10 in the navigation frame gives 
dv, n= dv, n- 
wn xvn dt 
n 
dt i 
in e 
6-11 
,, 
because it is the derivative of the vector y. with respect to The LHS can be written as ý" 
the navigation frarne and expressed in the sarne frarne, i. e. 
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n CndVe 
ICn 
t) 
nxv 
eI dt 
in e 6-12 
where C, " is the transformation matrix between the inertial frame and the 
navigation frame. Its values are obtained by the propagation of its derivative 
. ), n 
r, using the angular rate vector n 
Applying Coriolis law, the following can be written for 
dv 
e 
dt 
dVe dvi 
+ Ct)ie xve 6-13 dt i dt 
Equation 6-13 can be expressed in the inertial frame either as 
dVe dVe I+ 
O)i 
ieX 
Ve 6-14 
dt dt 
or 
dVe 
=CidVe + Co l, x vi. 6-15 dt ,' dt 
ie e 
where C, ' is the transformation matrix from the Earth frame to the navigation frame. 
Substituting Equation 6-15 in Equation 6-12, ' can be written as ýe 
e 
n= Cn Ci 
dve 
eie dt 
e 
+0) 1. xv1. - (t) 
nxvn 
ie e in e 6-16 
The three tenns in equation 6-16 are subsequently calculated as given below. 
ýýVe 
e 
ýe 
a) The derivative _ can be written as e and can be approximated by dt 
e 
veve 
e e, k e, k-I 
e At 
where k is the number of time epochs and 
At is the sample time between two epochs. 
6-17 
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This expression is to be evaluated at a high data rate (smaller At) for a 
rapidly manoeuvring aircraft. 
b) The tenn w, ", =[QcosL 0 -nsinL]T contains the earth spin rate ie 
components along the navigation (NED) frame axes. 
c) The expression for w, " , 
is given by 
wn= (j) n+wn 6-18 in en ie 
where w" can be calculated as (Titterton and Weston, 2004) en 
-T 
n 
VE VN VEtan L 6-19 Wen :- 
[Ro 
+h Ro +h Ro +h 
_ 
where Ve' = 
[VN 
VE v, ]" is the velocity vector of the aircraft with 
respect to the Earth 
v, is the component of the velocity along local North direction 
VE is the component of the velocity along local East direction 
VD is the component of the velocity along the local vertical (towards 
centre of mass of the Earth) 
0 is the earth spin angular rate 
L is the latitude of the current position 
h is the height of the aircraft 
w' is the angular rate from the navigation to the Earth frame ex ressed en p 
in the navigation frame 
is the angular rate from the Earth frame to the inertial frame 
expressed in the navigation frame 
w, ', , 
is the angular rate from the navigation frame to the inertial frame 
expressed in the navigation frame. 
d) The values of v" for a specified trajectory are calculated based on the e 
latitude, longitude and height data for the trajectory waypoints. This is 
carried out by differencing the position values (in the inertial frame) for 
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the adjacent points and dividing by sample time. This results in velocity 
vector of the aircraft with respect to the Earth expressed in the inertial 
frame. To convert this to velocity vector in the navigation frame (v"), 
the angular rate vector between the two frames is used (as obtained in 
step c i. e. 'fhe cross product of this angular rate vector with the 
position vector is subtracted from the velocity vector (in inertial frame) 
to obtain v". e 
Using the results of the computation steps above, a" can be calculated using Equation 
6-9. The value of ab can then be calculated using Equation 6-8. 
The determination of the raw gyroscope measurements is presented in the next sub- 
section. 
Raw Gyroscope Measurements 
The process for the derivation of aircraft body angular rates (gyroscope measurements) 
starts with aircraft attitude data. Aircraft attitude is derived using trajectory data as 
given below: 
" Pitch angle data are obtained from the relative height between two adjacent 
points. 
" Azimuth angle data are obtained from the latitude and the longitude of two 
adjacent points. 
Bank angle is assumed to be a constant value at the time of turning. 
Based on these three dimensional attitude and aircraft position data, approximate 
derivatives are calculated using an appropriate sample rate (100 Hz in the simulation). 
The above calculations regarding the attitude angles imply that there is no considerable 
movement during the intermittent period between two consecutive states of the aircraft. 
This assumption is not valid for the case of a military aircraft with rapid manoeuvres. 
However, for the purpose of the simulation of a commercial aircraft, it is valid because 
for a typical sample rate used in this thesis (100 Hz), aircraft movement can be 
considered to follow a linear path. 
The output of the body mounted gyroscope is derived from the approximate derivatives. 
A set of inertial gyroscopes strapped directly to the aircraft body measures the angular 
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rate vector of the body. This angular rate vector denoted by Wb is the an lar rate of the ib gU 
body of the aircraft with respect to the inertial frame, expressed in the body frame. This 
is obtained from 
wb= ü)b +wb 6-20 ib nb in 
whereWin is the angular rate of the navigation frame with respect to the inertial 
frame expressed in the body frame and 
wb is the angular rate of the body frame with respect to the navigation frame nb 
expressed in the body frame. 
The two tenns in Equation 6-20 are obtained using the following steps 
a). The angular rate w' is expressed in component form as nb 
6-21 nb 
which is given by 
0) 
x 
'ý (0 (0'ý 0' oý 
wy0+ C3 
j+ C3C2 0 6-22 
\WZ 
0j 
\O/ 
uýJ 
CI 
31 
C2 and C3 are rotation matrices for the angular rotations denoted by 
angles y/, 0 and ýp. These rotations are around z, y and x axis respectively (in 
that order). These angles are known as Euler angles and used to describe a 
rotation in space . Their order (which rotation 
is performed first) has to be 
maintained consistently throughout a series of calculations (Titterton and 
Weston, 2004). The transformation matrices for each of the angular rotation 
(for q/ ,0 and (p respectively) are given 
by: 
11 COSY/ sin Y/ 0" (cos 0 0 - sin 0" 1 0 o 'ý 
C, = -sin cos 0 3IC2 
0 1 0 &C3 = 0 cos (p sin ýp 
0 0 1j 
,, sin 
0 0 Cos 0" 0 - sin (p cos p,, 
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It should be noted that C, is not used in Equation 6-22. However, it is used in 
the calculation of the transformation matrix from the navigation to the body 
frame Cb. It is given by the multiplication of the three matrices i. e. [C, C C n2 31* 
For the sample period chosen (100 Hz), the angular rateso, d& yý are 
calculated by dividing the consecutive values of the angles by the sample 
interval. 
b) The vector coib,, is determined by applying a transformation matrix tow, " ,, 
(using 
Equation 6-18), and wibb is then calculated using Equations 6-20,6-21 and 6- 
22. The transformation matrix Ch is obtained by the multiplication of three n 
angular rotation matrices i. e. 
[CC2C3], 
Two limitations of the above algorithms are notable 
*When an aircraft performs a turn, it performs a bank-to-turn manoeuvre. In this 
simulation, a constant bank angle is used at the time of execution of a turn. Although 
this does not represent the real situation, it is sufficient for this thesis. This is because 
the effect of banking on blockage of GPS signals can be successfully simulated using 
a constant bank angle. It is thus not strictly necessary to cater for small variations 
during the turning manoeuvre. 
*The fon-nulae for the simulation of raw measurements are not available in the open 
literature. These are derived in this chapter from basic navigation equations. 
However, an assumption is taken that the underlying data that is fed to these models 
is piece-wise linear. This essentially means that during the intermittent period 
between the two sample points, the motion of the aircraft is assumed to be linear. 
This assumption needs to be carefully analysed if these formulae are to be utilised for 
high speed aircraft such as those used in the military. 
In order to generate realistic measurements, typical (or nominal) INS errors are added to 
the measurements. These errors are described in the next section. 
6.3.3.2. Simulation of Failure Modes of MS 
Tbe next step in the simulation is to add errors to accelerometer and gyroscope 
measurements. A summary of the models used to generate these errors is given in Table 
6.2. 
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Table 6-2 shows the models applied to the INS sensors to generate 'close to real' 
measurements. Note that there are common terms used in Table 6-2 and Table 4-6 
(failure mode characterisation). However, Table 6-2 refers to the nominal INS 
behaviour. The nominal behaviour of an INS changes to a failure when due to the 
growing nature of the error, the failure threshold is crossed (section 9.5.1). These 
(corrupted' measurements are subsequently applied to the navigation differential 
equations so that the output of the simulated INS is as realistic as possible. The 
navigation equations are described below. 
6.3.3.3. Navigation mechanization Equations 
Navigation equations are used to solve for velocity, position and attitude (or orientation) 
of the aircraft. Mechanization is a term used for implementation of navigation 
differential equations in a processor (numerical or mechanical) to generate position, 
velocity and attitude of the host vehicle. The velocity vector differential equation is 
given in the navigation frame as: 
n 
=f" -(2w" +w" )x v" +g" 6-23 e ie en e 
where f' is the vector of specific force output obtained from the accelerometers 
expressed in the navigation frame 
is the vector of acceleration due to gravity expressed in the navigation frame 
,, 
is the Earth spin angular rate vector expressed in the navigation frame. W, ', 
w' is the angular rate vector between the Earth frarne and the navigation frame en 
expressed in the navigation frarne (see Equation 6-19). 
v" is the velocity of the aircraft with respect to the Earth. 
The velocity vector is used to find the position vector (p) in the navigation frarne by 
the following equation 
Vn Pe 6-24 
The attitude of the aircraft is calculated by an update of the transformation matrix using 
a nine dimensional differential equation written usually in matrix form as: 
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C 
nb 
f? 
n 6-25 
where Q' is the skew symmetric matrix (section 3.4.2) nb formed from the 
components of w' nb 
In this simulation, the position of the aircraft in the ECEF frame is also needed. This is 
to be utilised in the prediction of GPS pseudoranges. For this purpose, a separate 
mechanization of equations is required in the ECEF frame. The navigation equations 
used are: 
e =fe - 2w 
e xv e +9 e 
e ie e 
Pe =ve 6-26 e 
Oe 
= CeQb bb eb 
Where the subscript e shows the earth frame 
Oj 
b 
=Cob _ co 
b 
and Ob is the skew symmetric matrix formed from the eb ib ie eb 
components ofWeb (see section 3.4.2 for an explanation of a skew symmetric 
matrix). Note that the variables are the same as used in the previous set of 
equations but now expressed in a different frame. 
The trajectory is reconstructed from the output of the navigation equations. This is then 
compared with the reference trajectory described in section 6.3.1 to study the effect of 
INS errors on the position output. This is discussed further in section 7.3.1. The models 
of GPS and INS are then utilised to form the integrated system as discussed below. 
6.3.4. Simulation of the Integrated System 
Simulations for the loosely coupled system, the tightly coupled system and the ultra- 
tightly coupled system have been developed. The prime focus of thesis is on the use of 
tightly coupled systems as described in section 5.5. This is because with respect to 
integrity, tightly coupled systems offer the best integration architecture due to their 
access to raw measurements and relatively simpler structure. The basic configuration for 
the Kalman filter was shown in Chapter 3. In this section, the formation of measurement 
vector, measurement matrix and dynamic matrix (in error model) is discussed. Details 
on the selection of a full Kalman filter configuration are provided in section 8.3. 
Since the measurement from each satellite (i. e. pseudorange) is available in a tightly 
coupled system, the Kalman filter (see Chapter 3) measurement is given by: 
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A 6-27 Zk ""ý PGPS -PINS 
where the dimensions of z are nxI 
n is the number of available satellites 
is the pseudorange calculated from the coffected INS position and the PRVS 
Kalman filter generated clock bias and lever arm correction. Lever arm 
correction is the distance between the INS centre of gravity and GPS receiver 
antenna phase centre. 
The measurement (or geometry) matrix Hk (Equation 6-28) consists of line of sight 
vectors that convert pseudorange errors to position domain errors. There are n rows of 
this matrix (equal to the number of the available measurements). Note that the columns 
of this matrix depend on the Kalman filter number of states e. g. in this case there are 
four states for three dimensional position and receiver clock bias. The last column 
consists of I's which represent the weight for the clock bias, 
Hi, 
k = [-xijos - Yoos - Zoos 1] 6-28 
r. r. -r where x,,,,,., - rrx 11 Yi, ly 
ly &Z 
i'los = 
riz - rz are the three line of Ir, I, - Ir, I Ir, I 
sight (Ios) vectors along the x, y and z axes (in ECEF frame) 
the subscript i indicates the relevant satellites and r the receiver 
ri is the geometric range vector between satellite i and the receiver. 
The Kalman filter accepts the measurements and propagates the navigation error states 
through time. This propagation is carried out by the use of truth models that characterise 
the error behaviour of the modelled system/s. These error models are described below. 
6.3.4.1. Error Models used in the Kalman filter 
Navigation state equations are non-linear in nature. However, to obtain the error 
response of an INS, a linearisation approach is used. This results in the generation of 
linear error models. These error models are utilised to provide error information about 
the systems to be integrated in a traditional Kalman filter. The error models are different 
from the sensor errors models (for the INS) or the error models used for the GPS code 
delays. These are in fact differential equations that describe the evolution of errors 
through time. 
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The use of error models for INS has been investigated over the last 50 years (Brittings, 
197 1). Due to the random nature of the INS errors, there has been an interest to quantify 
the performance of an INS. Assuming different values for the sensor errors the effect on 
the navigation variables has been studied using the time propagation of these error 
models. However, these were later utilised in the integration of INS with other 
navigation sensors. The treatment of error models provided in this section is limited to 
three types of error models utilised in this thesis. 
The development of an error model for navigation equations can be described by means 
of a very simple example. The vertical channel navigation equation for an INS is given 
by 
A= 6-29 
where h is the height and 
VDis the downward velocity. 
When there is an error in the variables VD and h it can be written 
h =h+gh 6-30 
and 
- 
=V 6-31 VD D +SVD 
where - represents the erroneous variable and 8 represents the error. 
The propagation equation of an erroneous variable is then given by 
v 6-32 
Or 
4+ bý = VD + t5VD 6-33 
Subtracting Equation 6-29 from Equation 6-33, the following results 
S; = 6VD 6-34 
Equation 6-34 is the error equation for the simple vertical channel navigation equation. 
By using this equation error analysis of height can be performed due to error in 
downward velocity measurement. This equation is example of a single channel error 
model. The error equation for the height of the aircraft is chosen because it is simple 
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and is not coupled with other equations. it is only for the purpose of clarification and is 
not used in this thesis because of vertical channel instability of an INS. 
Applying this principle to the whole set of navigation equations yields a set of coupled 
error equations known as error model (Brittings, 1971; Rogers, 2000; Titterton and 
Weston, 2004). For example, a full set of navigation error equations is given by 
Titterton and Weston (2004), as: 
= -0) 
nxv+ (M - 
cngo)b 
in in b ib 
fnx v/ + cngf b 6-35 b 
where V/ is the vector of misalignment angles i. e. V/ = [Sa 5,6 8y] 
Sa and 45ý6 correspond to the attitude errors with respect to the horizontal plane 
(about x and y axes respectively) 
8, v corresponds to the error about the vertical 
,, 
is the angular rate of the navigation frame with respect to the inertial frame w, " in 
expressed in the navigation frame 
8WIh is the error in the angular rate of the body frame with respect to the inertial 
frarne expressed in the body frarne 
& is the velocity error vector of the aircraft 
is the specific force output vector of the accelerometers 
, dp is the position error vector of the aircraft 
Cn 
b' is the transformation matrix between the navigation 
frame and the body 
frame. 
The matrix form of the error model is given by 
&= Fdr + G& 
where & is the vector of error states 
& is the vector of inputs 
F is the system dynamic matrix 
G is the input matrix. 
6-36 
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Hence for Equation 6-34 F=O, G=l and 
44 iS 
t5VD * 
Three specific error models are presented below starting with the position velocity (PV) 
model for GPS used by Kalman filters implemented in GPS receivers, followed by a 
representative INS error growth model. Finally, another error model that is preferred for 
use in tightly coupled integrated GPS/INS systems is presented (Wagner and Wieneke, 
2003). It must be mentioned here that for use in Kalman filter formulation, input 
variable in Equation 6-36 is not used hence it is not discussed. This is replaced by noise 
in the conventional Kalman filter formulation (see section 3.5.1.1). This is because of 
the assumption that the dynamic model represents dynamics of the error completely 
while any random component can be modelled through noise (Brown and Hwang, 
1992). Note that the theory behind these three models is the same however notations 
vary due to the particular applications. This is not changed so that these remain 
comparable with the original references. 
GPS Receiver Kalman filter truth model 
GPS receivers may incorporate a Kalman filter instead of a least squares algorithm to 
compute position change (from the previous position value) at each time epoch. This 
not only provides continuous position solution but also reduces the magnitude of noise 
in the position solution. In contrast to the least squares approach, information about the 
dynamics of the antenna is to be incorporated in the dynamics matrix of the Kalman 
filter. Depending on the nature of the dynamics of the receiver, a low dynamic or high 
dynamic model is used (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996). A low dynamic model is used for 
the case when the host vehicle is not undergoing substantial acceleration. However, a 
high dynamic model is required for high-dynamic vehicles such as aircraft. This 
dynamic model is also called the truth model of the system. The outputs of the Kalman 
filter are the estimated changes to the values of the navigation variables computed at the 
last time epoch. A typical error model is given by 
03x3 13x3 03x3 p 
03x3 03x3 ON3 v 
02x3 0 
2x3 (Dc 
-Lc_ 
where (DC = 
'I 10 
0 
I3x3 is an identity matrix 
6-37 
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03x3 is a matrix with zero entries, of dimension 3x3, 
p is the position error vector of three positions expressed in ECEF coordinates 
v is the velocity error vector of three velocities expressed in ECEF coordinates 
c is the vector of clock error states i. e. clock bias and clock bias rate of change. 
Since the clock present in a typical GPS receiver is inexpensive and relatively 
inaccurate, its parameters are estimated by the Kalman filter. The clock characteristics 
are modelled using the parameters related to their Allan variance response (Parkinson 
and Spilker, 1996). Allan variance is a measurement of stability in clocks and 
oscillators. It is defined as one half of the time average of the squares of the differences 
between successive readings of the frequency deviations sampled over the sampling 
period. A typical INS error model is described next. 
Local Level Based INS Error Model 
In the development of the INS error model for a Local Level or NED frame 
configuration, perturbation analysis of the navigation differential equations is used. The 
NED frame is also known as local level frame because its horizontal axes (x and y) are 
in a plane that is perpendicular to the local gravity vector. An error model presented by 
Titterton and Weston (2004) has the system matrix F given by 
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where &= 
Pa 48 0 8VN t5VE t5VD & gA Af are the system 
states. 
Sa and t3,8 correspond to the attitude errors with respect to the horizontal Plane 
(about x and y axes respectively) 
(5, v coffesponds to the effor about the vertical 
0 is the Earth spin angular rate 
61 is the geodetic latitude error 
&A is the geodetic longitude effor 
bh is the geodetic height error 
&N 
31 
gVE 
and&D are velocity effors along North, East and Down axes. 
R is the mean radius of the Earth 
fN, f, and f, are specific forces (outputs of accelerometers) along North, East 
and Down axes. 
The INS error model is augmented by GPS Clock error states for use with the integrated 
system similar to the configuration shown in the GPS receiver error model. Hence, the 
augmented states are angle errors for roll, pitch and yaw, three velocity error states for 
the north, east and down velocity and three position error states for latitude, longitude 
and height along with two GPS clock states. 
In addition to the eleven states described in the NED frame mechanization equations, 
six states for gyroscope and accelerometer biases are also added (one for each). The 
error states of the Kalman filter used in the main navigation Kalman filter (referred in 
section 5.4.2) are shown in Table 6-3. 
In the case of a loosely coupled system, the error comparison of the two systems is 
carried out in the position domain and hence the NED error model is traditionally 
utilised. But in the case of tightly coupled system, fewer computations are required 
when an ECEF frame based error model is used (Wagner and Weineke, 2003). This 
model is described below. 
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Table 6-3: The states of the Kalman Filter Truth model 
State ID Description 
1,2,3 i5a , 9,8 , 9, Y are the INS attitude errors with respect to the vertical for 
x&y components and azimuth respectively. 
4,5,6 &N 31 &E & L*Dare the INS velocity errors in North, East and Down 
directions. 
7,8,9 8L , 5A & 6h are the INS position errors for latitude, longitude and 
height. 
10,11,12 89b 89b "9b. are bias errors for the x, y and z gyroscopes. 
Y 
13,14,15 &b, gab, & gab, are bias errors for the x, y and z accelerometers. 
16,17 & &&dot are the GPS receiver clock parameters for clock bias and 
clock frequency errors. 
ECEF mechanization based INS Error Model 
When GPS and INS are integrated using a tightly coupled method, the INS position 
output is required in the ECEF frame (see section 6.3.3.3). For this reason ECEF based 
mechanization is typically used for the INS navigation equations (Wagner and Weineke, 
2003). The error model for such mechanization is given below (Rogers, 2000) 
21 
+3a) 
2ri 
s 3x3 s 
03x3 
0 
2x3 
oo 115 
where F2x3 000 
, 
3x3 
03x3 03x3 
- 2(we') ie f ex 
03x3 
03x3 - 0)ie 
03x3 
0 
2x3 
0 
3x3 F 2x3 
[C 
6-39 
p is the position error vector of three position errors expressed in the ECEF 
coordinates 
v is the velocity error vector of the three velocities expressed in the ECEF 
coordinates 
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c is the vector of two clock error states L e. clock bias and clock bias rate, 
C13C, 
3 
C13C23 C, 
3C33 
rl= C23C, 
3 
C23C23 C23C33 and CU are the components of the 
-C33C, 
3 
C33C23 C33C33 
transformation matrix from the NED frame to the Earth frame, 
2- 
co; is given by -L is the Schuler constant (Rogers, 2000), wherep is Earth's R3 
gravitational constant 
T is the set of attitude angles errors (effors for pitch yaw and roll) 
ex ex co, -, an are the skew symmetric matrices for Earth angular rate and 
accelerometer specific forces respectively (see section 3.4.2 for explanation of a 
skew symmetric matrix). 
The simulation developed in this chapter will be used in the subsequent chapters to test 
integrity algorithms in the presence of representative failure modes. 
6.4. Summary 
This chapter has presented all the tools needed to develop and realise the simulation 
platform used in the rest of this thesis to study the integrity of integrated GPS/INS 
systems. Starting with the aircraft trajectory characteristics, it has developed a 
simulation capability for INS and GPS measurements as individual systems using 
appropriate error models. This has been followed by the development of the simulation 
of integrated GPS/INS systems using the relevant error models defined in this thesis. 
The most important part of the integrated systems Le. the error models for the 
navigation equations are described in detail. 
The limitations of the simulation are summarized below 
The aircraft trajectory represents flight of a typical passenger aircraft and does 
not support complex manoeuvres required for simulation of fast manoeuvring 
military aircraft. 
When an aircraft performs a turn, it performs a bank-to-turn manoeuvre. 
However, in this simulation, bank angles during a turn are assigned a constant 
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value. This assumption is valid for this thesis because the antenna blockage 
failure mode can be simulated by the use of a constant bank angle. 
* For the derivation of the raw INS measurement formulae, it is assumed that the 
trajectory data is piecewise linear. This essentially means that during the 
intermittent period of two sample points, the motion of the aircraft is assumed 
linear. This assumption needs to be carefully analysed if these formulae are to be 
utilised for fast moving aircraft such as those used in the military. 
* The treatment of INS and GPS error models provided in section 6.3.4.1 is 
limited to three types of error models utilised in this thesis. Their future use 
requires careful consideration of compatibility with the application of interest. 
This simulation is the foundation stone for the analysis of integrity algorithms in 
forthcoming chapters. 
229 
7. Simulation Analysis of Existing GPS/INS 
Integrity Algorithms 
introduction 
A detailed description of a simulation platform for GPS and INS was presented in 
Chapter 6. This is used in this chapter to support the analysis of existing integrity 
algorithms for integrated GPS/INS systems. In order to verify the performance of these 
algorithms, the worst case failure mode has been selected. The analysis in Chapter 4 
showed this to be the failure due to Slowly Growing Errors (SGEs). Furthermore, a 
comparison between the integration architectures in Chapter 5 revealed that the best 
integration structure to tackle SGEs is the tightly coupled system. 
The other two architectures; loosely coupled and ultra tightly coupled are not 
considered suitable for this purpose. A loosely coupled system does not provide much 
benefit because of restricted access to raw measurements. The ultra tightly coupled 
system generally contains complex couplings between INS and GPS. Increasing the 
complexity of the integration architecture mainly provides benefit in the situation when 
there is noise present in the signals. Since SGEs do not exhibit only noise characteristics 
this analysis is limited to tightly coupled systems. 
In this chapter, simulation characteristics are discussed in general with the help 
of plots to validate its use for further analysis. The models for INS and GPS errors are 
discussed with the help of simulation results. The results for the representative 
algorithms for a single SGE are discussed. The representative algorithms are the 
Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) method and Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by 
Extrapolation (AIME) method. The behaviour of these algorithms is also discussed in 
the case of multiple SGEs with the help of simulation results. 
7.2. Simulation Characteristics 
As described in Chapter 6, a typical trajectory of a commercial airliner was simulated. 
Figure 7-1 shows the block diagram of the simulation process as used in this chapter. 
The flight trajectory data is fed to the models of GPS and INS to generate raw 
measurements. These are then converted to GPS and INS observables by the use of 
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respective positioning algorithms. A Kalman filter is then utilised for the tight coupling 
of the two systems. Finally, the MSS and AIME algorithms are implemented and their 
performances assessed. 
INERTIAL PREDICTION OF NAVIGATION PSEUDORANGES SYSTEM 
FLIGHT 
TRAJECTORY 
I 
DATA 
I 
GPS DYNAMIC AND 
RECEIVER MEASUREMENT MATRICES 
MULTIPLE 
SOLUTION 
SEPARATION 
METHOD 
KALMAN FILTER 
AIME METHOD 
Figure 7-1: Block Diagram for Simulation (see Chapter 6) 
The simulated time of flight is approximately two and a half hours (9000 sec). This 
provides ample time to reach the steady state of the Kalman filter. This also allows for 
the evaluation of the effect of errors that grow very slowly with time. In general, the test 
statistic follows the trend of the error (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999) hence the longer 
simulation time allows the test statistics to cross the detection threshold, even for slowly 
growing errors. This makes detection possible for existing and proposed algorithms. 
The characteristics of the simulation that can be used for validation are discussed below. 
By comparing different outputs from the simulation with known system behaviour 
(from the literature) it is possible to evaluate the reliability of the simulation process in 
terms of analysing the performance of integrity algorithms. 
The position data, along the trajectory in the form of latitude and longitude, and height, 
are shown in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 respectively. The simulated flight is almost parallel to 
the equator and so only a short span of latitude is traversed. The maximum height of the 
aircraft is around 29,000ft for the en-route phase. The flight route is between the Ohio 
State University Airport and John F. Kennedy Airport in the USA. These airports are 
selected based on the following considerations: 
data for Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival 
Route (STAR) are available for these airports. 
the distance between these airports is suitable for the requirements of simulation 
flight time (discussed earlier) and typical velocity of a commercial airliner. 
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In Figure 7-3, the height of the aircraft starts from zero and ends at 200 metres above 
sea level. This is because the departure airport is at sea level while the landing airport is 
200 metres above sea level. 
The velocity of the aircraft varies according to the phase of flight and approaches its 
maximum value during the en-route phase. The maximum horizontal velocity is around 
150 m1s. The velocity vector of the aircraft is resolved to its components in the 
navigation frame. This navigation frame is North, East, Down (NED) frame (see section 
6.3.3.1). The North, East and Up velocities are shown in Figures 74,7-5 and 7-6 
respectively. Note that the 'Up' velocity vector shown in Figure 7-6 represents the 
nature of the flight of the aircraft. 
From Figure 7-4, it can be seen that the velocity component in the North direction, is 
mostly negative as the aircraft is travelling in the direction of decreasing latitude. The 
turning manoeuvre after about 10 minutes of flight can be seen in both Figures 7-4 and 
7-2. Similarly from Figure 7-5, it can be seen that the East velocity is positive and 
dominates the horizontal velocity. This also follows from Figure 7-2, where it can be 
seen that there is a large change in position along the trajectory in the direction of 
increasing longitude (a result of excessive east velocity) compared to latitude. 
From Figure 7-6, it can be seen that the Up velocity is positive during the ascending 
segment of the flight and negative during the descending segment. It should be noted 
that the Up velocity does not change suddenly in Figure 7-6 at the transition between 
two adjacent segments. This only appears so because of the small duration of the turn 
segments. Turn segments are introduced in the trajectory between two adjacent constant 
velocity segments (see section 6.3.3). One of these transitions i. e. from taxiing to 
takeoff is shown in Figure 7-6a. Errors for GPS and INS are added to this nominal 
trajectory to develop a 'close to real' simulation capability. The characteristics of the 
simulated errors (whose models are described in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3) are presented 
in the next section. 
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Figure 7-5: East velocity profile during the simulated flight 
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7.3. Simulation of GPS and INS measurements 
plus Errors 
The trajectory data discussed above fonn the input to the raw data simulation routines 
for INS and GPS. Apart from simulating the nominal outputs of the systems, simulated 
errors are also introduced. These are described in the following sections. 
7.3.1. INS Errors 
Errors are introduced in the simulated INS raw measurements to represent a real INS as 
closely as possible. The models, described in section 6.3.3.2 assume mathematical 
functions for different error types such as the Gaussian model for random bias. For a 
navigation grade INS, a constant bias with a mean value of 0.01 deg1hr for the 
gyroscopes is used while the corresponding bias for the accelerometer is I micro-g. 
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Figure 7-7: The error in North velocity due to INS errors during the flight 
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Figure 7-10: The error in aircraft longitude due to INS errors during the simulated 
flight 
The errors in the horizontal velocity in terms of the north and east velocities are shown 
in Figures 7-7 and 7-8. The magnitude of north velocity error is greater than that of the 
east velocity error although the north velocity magnitude is less than that of the east 
velocity as shown in Figures 7-4 and 7-5. This is due to the presence of cross product 
terms in the INS error model for velocities as can be seen in Chapter 6 (section 6.3.4.1). 
This essentially means that the east specific force term is present in the equation for the 
north velocity error and vice versa. Hence, a larger north specific force results in a 
larger east velocity error and north velocity error is proportional to the east specific 
force. 
Figures 7-9 and 7- 10 show the resulting error in latitude and longitude (respectively) for 
a typical navigation grade IMU incorporating the biases, for the duration of the flight. It 
can be observed that the error in latitude is greater than in the longitude. This is because 
the latitude error varies directly with the error in the north velocity (which is greater 
than the corresponding error in the east velocity). Furthermore, the longitude error (and 
the east velocity error) variation is attenuated by a factor that is equal to the cosine of 
the current latitude (Titterton and Weston, 2004). The mathematical equations for east 
and north velocity errors are presented in section 6.3.4.1. 
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In this way, the INS data generation process is validated. This is because the error 
characteristics of the 'corrupted' INS data are in accordance with the standard error 
models as presented in the literature (see section 6.3.4.1). 
Errors are also introduced into the GPS ranges using the models described in section 
6.3.2.2. The simulated behaviour of each of the error models is described in the next 
section. 
7.3.2. GPS Errors 
GPS errors are introduced into the ranges. There are six types of errors that are 
introduced into the ranges Le. ionospheric, tropospheric, multipath, satellite orbit, 
satellite clock and receiver noise (see section 6.3.2.2). The principles behind these error 
models were discussed in Table 6-1. Table 7-1 shows the average range error of each of 
the error sources for the simulated trajectory where EGNOS stands for European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service. The values given in this table are used to 
discuss GPS error behaviour in the next sub-section. 
Table 7-1: The Average value of the errors for the simulated error sources 
Source of Error Average Trajectory 
Range Error (metres) 
Ionosphere (Klobuchar model) 2.37 
Ionosphere (Bent Model) 3.77 
Troposphere (EGNOS Model) 4.87 
Troposphere (Modified Hopfield Model) 3.91 
Troposphere (Saastarnoinen Model) 4.17 
Multipath (Airframe) 0.66 
Multipath (Airport) 0.38 
Orbit (Radial) 0.40 
Satellite Clock 1.75 
Receiver Noise 0.0024 
239 
7.3.2.1. Ionospheric Delay 
As discussed in Chapter 3, two of the models used to mitigate the ionospheric delay are 
the Bent and Klobuchar models. However, it was recognised that the Bent model is 
more accurate than the Klobuchar model. This is because seasonal variations are 
accounted for in the Bent model by use of real data archives. 
The Bent model is a complex formulation. To validate its implementation, the classic 
Total Electron Count Curve given by Lwellyn et al. (1973) has been generated by the 
simulation developed in this thesis. Figure 7-11 shows the variation of the number of 
electrons (Total Electron Count or TEC) in the ionospheric region. It can be seen that 
this number reaches its peak around 300 km and then gradually decreases with the 
increase in height. Furthermore, the TEC is almost zero below 200 km (Lwellyn et al., 
1973). 
The Klobuchar model is validated using a different method. The values of delay for a 
satellite signal received by a static GPS receiver during a mean solar day are simulated 
and shown in Figure 7-12. It can be seen that there is a cosine profile that verifies the 
modelling principle of the Klobuchar model (Klobuchar, 1987). The delay values 
generated by these two models are now compared using the data generated during the 
simulated flight. From Table 7-1 it can be seen that there is a difference of around I 
metre between the delays generated by the use of two ionospheric models. The 
difference in the values of the two models can also be seen in Figure 7-14. Figure 7-13 
shows the change in the elevation angle between the aircraft and a satellite for the 
duration shown in Figure 7-14. 
The difference between the two models is due to the modelling approaches in their 
formulation. The Klobuchar model is a relatively simpler model designed to be used in 
an inexpensive GPS receiver while the Bent model is a detailed model. The Bent model 
takes into account annual seasonal variation and a large set of empirical data was used 
to refine it (Lwellyn et al., 1973). 
7.3.2.2. Tropospheric Models 
The primary model used in this simulation is the EGNOS model although two other 
models; Saastamoinen and Modified Hopfield are also utilised (see section 3.3.3.1 for 
description of these models). 
240 
1000 
900 
800 
700 
600- 
E 
500- 
7: 400 - 
300 
200 
L 
100 
0 
02468 10 12 
Total Electron Count (e/(m*m) 
x 1010 
Figure 7-11 : The Variation of the TEC with height in the ionospheric region 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
2.1 
E 
jý 2 
Z 
1.9 
0- Co 1.8 0 c 0 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
1A 
0 10 15 20 25 
Local Time (hours) 
Figure 7-12: The variation in the Ionospheric delay as depicted by Klobuchar 
model during a solar day 
241 
50 
48 
46 
44 
8, 
42 
40 
c 
.2 38 co 
36 
34 
32 
. qn 
/ 
/' 
02468 10 12 14 16 18 
Time (min) 
Figure 7-13: The variation of the Elevation Angle for a satellite during the 
simulated flight 
7 
6 
(1) 
0 
3 
2468 10 12 14 16 
Time (min) 
Figure 7-14: Ionospheric delay obtained by the use of two models during the 
simulated flight 
242 
4.5 
4- 
3.5- 
2 3- 
z 
E 
>l. 
711$ 2.5- 
2- 
1.5- 
0 
EGNOS Model 
Saastamoinen Model 
Modified Hopfield Model 
2468 10 12 14 16 18 
Time (min) 
Figure 7-15: The troposphere delay estimation by the three models 
From Table 7-1. it can be seen that the average range error from the Saastamoinen and 
Modified Hopfield models is around 4 metres while that from the EGNOS model is 
around 5 metres. It can also be seen from Figure 7-15 that the Saastamoinen and the 
Modified Hopfield models have a similar trend different from that of the EGNOS model 
(the elevation angle profile for the period shown in Figure 7-15 is shown in Figure 
7-13). This is due to the differences in the modelling approaches of the Saastamoinen 
and Modified Hopfield models which are theoretical while the EGNOS model has been 
derived empirically. Furthermore, the EGNOS model is relatively detailed based on a 
number of lookup tables (see section 3.3.3.1). In this thesis, the EGNOS model is 
preferred because it agrees well with the tropospheric model developed at the Centre for 
Orbit Determination in Europe (CODE) as shown by Farah et al. (2005). 
7.3.2.3. Multipath and Other Error Sources 
Multipath error has strong dependence on the elevation angle, signal frequency and the 
surrounding environment of the GPS receiver. The multipath delays for the elevation 
angle profile in Figure 7-13 are shown in Figure 7-16. The airframe multipath does not 
change much but there is a larger variation in the multipath generated by the airport 
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model. The inverse relationship between the airport multipath and the elevation angle 
can be seen in Figures 7-16 and 7-13. The average values of these can be seen in Table 
7-1. The average value for the airport based multipath is smaller than that of airfratne 
multiPath because an aircraft only experiences airport multipath at the time of departure 
and during landing and surface movement while airframe multipath is experienced 
throughout the flight. 
Other error sources such as satellite clock, orbit and receiver noise are modelled using 
simpler models. The average values for these are listed in Table 7-1, with the 
instantaneous values for a part of the trajectory shown in Figure 7-17. The satellite 
clock and receiver noise are Gaussian in nature while the radial orbital error is in the 
form of a very slowly growing ramp (of the order of I metre/hour). Only the radial 
orbital error is modelled (among the three dimensional orbital position errors). This is 
because it directly affects the range as compared to other variations which are 
perpendicular to the line of sight. Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 have presented the simulation 
of INS and GPS measurements. Section 7.3.3 simulates the integrated system. 
7.3.3. Integrated System 
The output of the integrated system is shown in Figure 7-18. It must be noted that the 
red line (integrated system output) and the blue line (GPS only output) overlaps for 
most of the time. Hence, the red line is visible only in the later part of the flight (left 
side) when INS errors become excessive. In this case the integration is performed using 
the tightly coupled algorithm described in Chapter 3 (section 3.5.1.2) and Chapter 6 
(section 6.3.4). 
Due to the integration of GPS and INS, growth of INS errors is curtailed (the INS error 
growth is evident in Figures 7-9 and 7-10. Hence, the effect of INS errors is reduced by 
the bounded accuracy of GPS. The theoretical basis for this was provided in Chapter 4 
where detailed failure mode analyses for GPS and INS were presented. 
In summary, it was concluded in Chapter 4, that failure modes of GPS are bounded in 
nature while errors grow during the operation of an INS. This section verified that the 
simulated behaviour of the individual systems and their integration reproduce the 
expected system characteristics. The simulation of the integrated system is used 
for the 
analysis of integrity algorithms in the next section and in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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7.4. Simulation Results for Integrity Algorithms 
This section presents the simulation results of the MSS and AIME algorithms. As 
explained in Chapter 5, these algorithms were selected for further analysis because they 
are representative of existing integrity algorithms for tightly coupled GPS/1NS systems. 
This is because MSS is a position domain method while AIME is a measurement 
domain method as far as their test statistics are concerned. Furthermore, MSS is a 
snapshot method and AIME is a sequential method in the way they deal with the 
measurements. In this way, these two methods represent both the types of classification 
of integrity methods (see section 5.5). 
In this section, the simulation results are used to compare the two algorithms in terms of 
their detection performance (in the presence of SGEs) and horizontal protection levels. 
Furthermore, investigations are carried out into the behaviour of the algorithms in the 
cases of MEMS (Micro Electromechanical Systems) technology based INS and fault 
occurrence in the INS. These are similar because MEMS based INS are typically 
inaccurate and errors in the sensors result in faulty performance of the INS. 
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Simulation Scenario 
The following scenario has been used in the analysis 
* Non Precision Approach Phase (NPA) of flight. 
* The nominal 24 satellite GPS constellation. 
*A mask angle of 10 degrees. 
The Kalman filter is initially allowed to settle for the first flight hour. This is 
required so that the Kalman gains become nearly constant and avoids the 
unpredictable results associated with the transient period. 
It should be noted here that for a tightly coupled integrated system, it is a limitation that 
the coupling needs to reach a steady state to provide integrity. Hence, it is typically not 
possible for the initial phases of flight (such as takeoff) to take advantage of integrity 
benefits of tightly coupled integrated GPS/1NS systems. However, a typical navigation 
grade INS does not degrade substantially (in accuracy) in the first flight hour (order of 1 
nmi/hr). A RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) hole is introduced by 
switching off two of the six available satellites after the first 50 minutes of the flight. In 
this way, traditional RAIM is not available. This is the worst case scenario as no 
integrity information can be deduced from the GPS measurements alone. A slowly 
growing error is introduced after 60 minutes. 
The next section investigates the sensitivity of the integrity monitoring algorithms in the 
presence of INS errors. This is to demonstrate that the effect of GPS errors can be 
monitored effectively with a fully calibrated INS. Otherwise, the test statistic can be 
corrupted by INS errors and hence will preclude efficient detection of GPS errors. 
Hence, the tests conducted involve the detection (integrity monitoring) of GPS failures, 
assuming a fully functional INS. Detection of multiple failures (including the INS) is 
very complex. This is addressed in Chapter 8. 
7.4.1.1. Effect of Azimuth Gyro Error 
Fault detection is very complicated when INS errors are introduced in the simulated INS 
measurements. To illustrate this, an ideal (effor-free) INS 
is simulated followed by the 
introduction of an error in the azimuth gyroscope. For the sake of clarity, only one of 
the gyroscope biases is introduced during the flight. A value of 
0.01 deg1hr is 
introduced which is typical of an aviation-grade INS. The bias is applied to the azimuth 
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gyroscope as this is the most difficult to calibrate in-flight. The other two gyroscopes; 
(roll and pitch) can be calibrated during level flight using level sensors and 
accelerometers. The test statistic chosen for fin-ther analysis is the measurement domain 
test statistic given by the AIME method. The expression for the test statistic TSk is 
given by 
T '-ý rT -irk Sk "k Vk 
where rk is the innovation of the main navigation Kalman filter 
is the covariance matrix of the innovation k 
k is the epoch. 
7-1 
This equation was described in section 5.4.2.2. The nominal value of the innovation is 
zero for the error free case. However, when an error is present, the behaviour of the 
innovation follows the characteristics of the error (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). This is 
not so in the case of presence of INS errors such as a gyroscope bias. In this regard, the 
expression for Kalman filter measurement (Equation 3-19) is repeated here for 
convenience (for a single satellite measurement) for an epoch k 
-Z PGPU - PIN. Sk -2 k 
where the dimensions of zk are nxI 
n is the number of available satellites 
P,, S, kis the pseudorange (dimension nx 1) calculated from the corrected INS 
position and the Kalman filter generated clock bias and the lever arm correction 
PGPS, kis the pseudorange (dimension nx 1) obtained from the GPS receiver 
When a gyroscope bias is present, the prediction A is in error and hence reduces or PINS, k 
increases the value of the measurement (Equation 7-2). For example, the effect of a 
failure in the GPS range (on the measurement) may be reduced when the error induced 
in P" flVS, k (by gyroscopic 
bias) is positive. The test statistic is based on the Kalman 
filter innovation which is updated using the measurements. Hence (for a growing error) 
the test statistic may grow relatively slowly and reaches the threshold later than 
expected. This results in a larger Time To Alert (TTA). A failure should be detected 
within the TTA for a particular phase of flight (see Table 2-7). 
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Figure 7-19: The effect of azimuthal gyroscope bias on test statistic 
Conversely, if the gyroscope has a bias with the effect opposite in sign to the slowly 
growing error, the TTA ill become smaller. It can be seen from Figure 7-19, that the wi 
value of the test statistic for the error free case is larger (nearer to a positive threshold) 
than in the case of the test statistic with the gyroscope bias included. Also shown in 
Figure 7-19 is the test statistic derived from the use of the gyroscope corrected by an 
estimated calibration constant. This estimation is done by using in-flight calibration. 
In-flight calibration of the INS is attempted using the truth model of the Kalman filter 
that estimates the biases of the three gyroscopes (see section 6.3.4.1). The calibration 
time is around 20 minutes and is carried out before the introduction of the RAIM hole 
so that the maximum number of measurements from GPS are available. From Figure 
7-19ý it can be seen that the performance of the calibration is not good and it is hard to 
discriminate between the two plots of the test statistics: with a bias and with an 
attempted in-flight calibration. The reason for this is that the observability of INS errors 
is very low for a typical commercial flight. There are two approaches proposed in 
research literature to increase INS Parameters observability 
* by performing specific aircraft manoeuvres (Hong et al, 2005; Groves et al., 
2002). 
* employment of multiple antennas on the fuselage of the aircraft (Wagner, 2005) 
The trajectory data simulated in this research is for a transport jet aircraft for a typical 
conunercial flight. This is assumed to be equipped with a single GPS antenna as 
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multiple antennas aircraft are not in current usage. Performance of specific manoem'rý: " 
is not possible for a commercial aircraft due to passenger safety consideration. Hence, 
the attempted calibration of INS errors is not accurate due to absence of the two factors 
discussed above. Note however, that in future, for in-flight calibration of INS (for civil 
air navigation), use of multiple antennas is envisaged (Wagner, 2005). 
Because of the effect of the INS errors on the detection of GPS errors, in the next 
section, faults will only be introduced in the GPS measurements. The situation of a fault 
present in the INS will be tackled later in section 7.4.2 where it is shown that the 
existing integrity methods are not designed to detect GPS failures in the presence of 
INS errors. A failure in the INS can be detected, but it is not possible to isolate the 
failed INS measurement. In the next section, the behaviour of the test statistic in the 
presence of a growing fault in a GPS pseudorange is analysed. 
7.4.1.2. Growth of the Test statistic 
The detection of an error is only possible when the test statistic manifests the signature 
of the error. 
In order to test this property, SGEs are introduced in the GPS pseudorange 
measurements. If the test statistic generated by the simulation faithfully follows them, 
this ensures the validity of the simulation for fault detection purposes. In this case, the 
SGE is introduced after 60 minutes of flight when the Kalman filter is in steady state. 
An error is introduced in one of the satellites at a time. The plots of values of the test 
statistic (from Equation 7.1) for SGEs of different rates are shown in Figure 7-20. 
It can be seen that the value of the test statistic grows with time so that detection can be 
performed using the threshold assigned by the detection algorithms discussed in section 
5.4.2.2. These thresholds are assigned on the basis of assuming a statistical model of the 
test statistic (for example Gaussian) and using the specified probability of false alert. 
The important point to be noted from these graphs is that an alert will be generated 
when the test statistic crosses the threshold. Hence, if the clock failure rate is relatively 
large, e. g. 2 mls then the TTA can be in seconds. However, the TTA can be on the order 
of minutes for a slower fault rate of 0.1 nils. This property of the test statistic will be 
exploited in the rate detector algorithm proposed later in Chapter 8. The capability of 
existing integrity algorithms to detect SGEs is investigated below. 
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7.4.1.3. Detection of SGEs by the MSS and AIME methods 
The integrity algorithms described in detail in Chapter 5 (section 5.4.2.1 and section 
5.4.2.2) have been tested for their performance in detecting slowly growing errors 
(SGEs). As discussed earlier in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.1), SGEs belong to the category 
of errors that are most difficult to detect. The simulation results are presented and 
discussed in this section. 
Figure 7-21 shows the detection of a slowly growing error at a rate of 0.1 mls using the 
MSS and AIME approaches. In the case of MSS (which is a snapshot method) the test 
statistic has to grow above the threshold to be detected. The test statistic is developed in 
section 5.4.2.2 and is in the position domain. It crosses the threshold in 190 seconds. 
AIME is a sequential method (see section 5.4.2.2) that processes current as well as 
historical measurements. The averaging mechanism for the formation of test statistic in 
AIME is especially designed to detect this type of error as discussed in section 5.4.2.2. 
Different test statistics are designed to capture errors with varying rates. The first test 
statistic (si) of the AIME algorithm is able to cross the threshold early (in 160 seconds) 
and for this particular case, the other two test statistics are redundant. However, in 
general s, cannot exceed a certain value, depending on the characteristics of the growing 
fault. In such a caseS2andS3are helpful in detection (Lee and O'Laughlin, 2000). 
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Figure 7-21: Detection of 0.1 m/s fault by the Two algorithms 
Hence, the AIME method is able to detect the error earlier than the MSS method. The 
performance of these methods is also tested for a relatively faster SGE at the rate 2 m1s. 
Figure 7-22 shows the detection of a slowly growing error at a rate of 2 mls whose 
detection takes place in 45 seconds by the MSS algorithm and 40 seconds by the AIME 
algorithm (using si). 
Also, in this case, the AIME method can detect the error slightly earlier than the MSS 
approach. Therefore, the detection time increases as the rate of growth of error 
decreases (from Figure 7-21 and Figure 7-22). 
The detection behaviour of the two algorithms as studied in Lee and O'Laughlin (1999) 
also shows that the detection times for different ramp errors are similar. It should be 
noted here that the thresholds for the two algorithms are different because for the MSS 
algorithm the threshold is defined in the position domain while for the AIME algorithm, 
it is defined in the measurement domain. 
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The performance of an integrity algorithm is judged typically by its detection 
performance and the protection limit offered by it (Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). The two 
algorithms are compared in terms of their Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) in the next 
section. It should be noted here that in this thesis only HPL is discussed because the INS 
(and to some extent GPS) is not stable vertically so VPL (vertical protection limit) is not 
discussed (see Table 4-3 for vertical channel behaviour of INS). 
7.4.1.4. Comparison of HPL for the MSS and AME 
methods 
The section compares the Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) values as given by the 
MSS and AIME algorithms. For every phase of flight, the required value of the 
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is defined (see Table 2-7). An integrity algorithm can 
only be used if the HPL is less than the corresponding HAL. It can be seen from Figure 
7-23 that the HPL that is provided by the MSS algorithm is larger than that for the 
AIME algorithm. 
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Although these results are only for one trajectory, this confirms an observation in Lee 
and O'Laughlin (1999) that the AIME algorithm results in lower protection limits. This 
implies that if the AIME algorithm is used, there will be a higher margin between the 
HPL and the Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL). 
In this way, relatively tighter alert limits can be satisfied by the AIME algorithm. For 
example, as shown in Figure 7-23, the AIME algorithm could be used in the case where 
the HAL is 70 m for a particular phase of flight while the MSS algorithm cannot. 
Therefore, based on these results, it can be concluded that the AIME algorithm performs 
better than the MSS algorithm with regard to early detection and lower protection limit. 
However, this claim cannot be absolutely validated unless a very large number of runs 
are executed or a comprehensive covariance simulation is performed (Lee and 
O'Laughlin, 2000). With regard to the HPLs for the two algorithms, it should be noted 
that the determination of HPL is based on single failure assumption (see section 5-4). 
However, this assumption may not always be valid (see section 7.4.2). Hence, in the 
case of multiple failures, the HPLs offered by these algorithms may be inadequate. 
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The multiple failure case is discussed ftu-ther in Chapter 8 where results for the HPL 
offered by the Novel Integrity Optimised Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(NIORAIM) are discussed (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). The NIORAIM algorithm 
offers the flexibility of inclusion of more than one failure in its formulation (see section 
5.3.2.2) and training of weights (for satellite measurements). The latter can result in the 
reduction of HPL values. 
Section 7.4.1.5 uses the simulation to study the use of lower accuracy MEMS based INS 
for aviation. This is because in future, MEMS based INS are expected to be used in 
aviation mainly because of relatively low cost. 
7.4.1.5. Usage of MEMS-based INS in Aviation 
To test the possibility of using a MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS) based INS 
for aviation, a typical MEMS INS is simulated. The simulation parameters are taken 
from the data sheet of a commercially available MEMS based IMU (Inertial 
Measurement Unit) called SIMU-01 (BAE systems, 2006). It is a strapdown Eý4U with a 
gyroscopic bias in the 10 deg1hr range. It can be seen from Figure 7-24 that the error 
becomes relatively large in a very short time even in the absence of a fault. The red line 
shows the threshold for the two algorithms while the blue line shows the growth of the 
test statistic. In the case of AIME, only the s, test statistic is shown as others are 
redundant (which is also the case in Figures 7-21 and 7-22). 
For calibration of a typical INS, either specific manoeuvres (Hong et al., 2005) or 
multiple antennas are used (Wagner, 2005). But for the case of NEMS technology 
based INSs, this becomes very impractical as relatively frequent re-calibration are 
required to maintain their accuracy. However, there is the possibility that detailed 
algorithms (for IMU calibration) combined with a multiple antenna configuration can 
provide the solution in the future for MEMS based integrated navigation solutions. 
The results that are obtained for the MEMS based INS indicate the fact that MEMS 
based INS are still not ready for use in aviation. Note that there has been some progress 
in this regard such as shown by White and Rios (2002) where the system is under the 
certification process. However, it will take some time before MEMS based INS will be 
used in commercial aircraft. The timeline provided by Anderson et al. (2001) suggests 
that commercial navigation grade MEMS may be available by 2010. 
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The integrity algorithms analysed above can be used for detection of a fault in a GPS 
measurement. However in the case of a failure in INS, the failure cannot be isolated. 
This is discussed in the next section. 
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7.4.2. Detection of multiple slowly growing errors 
This thesis also considers the multiple failure scenario for integrated GPS/INS systems. 
The reasons for this are given in Chapter 5 and are repeated here for easy reference a) 
the probability of multiple failures (assumed to be low) increases in an operational 
environment, b) due to modernisation of GPS and the launch of Galileo, tighter alert 
limits may be utilised hence multiple failures are to considered, and c) the probability of 
multiple failure becomes higher in the case when GPS is integrated (with INS) because 
a number of failure modes arise due to integration (see Table 4-5). 
When a failure occurs in the INS, it needs to be detected (Fault Detection capability) 
and isolated (Fault Detection and Isolation capability) to continue using the same 
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navigation system. However, the integrity algorithms analysed in this chapter and 
discussed in Chapter 5 do not provide the exclusion capability in the case of an INS 
failure. The reason for this is that the INS is effectively used as a reference in these 
algorithms. This approach is also pursued in a very recent approach by Honeywell (Curt 
et al., 2006) where consideration of INS failure is not taken into account. Consequently, 
the INS output cannot be isolated from the GPS measurements and hence there is no 
provision for exclusion of a failure in the INS. 
This effect can be shown with the help of Figures 7-25 and 7-26. It can be seen from 
Figure 7-25 that the test statistic (blue line) of the AIME algorithm has reached a quasi- 
steady state (from an initial value of 10) in the case when the INS is error free. This 
value is significantly below the threshold (red line). After 60 minutes, a gyroscope error 
of 0.1 deg1hr is introduced in the INS to all gyroscopes. It can be seen from Figure 7-26, 
that the test statistic (blue line) has crossed the threshold (red line). Hence, it is detected 
that there is a failure present in the INS. But the AIME configuration (same for MSS) 
cannot isolate this INS failure. Hence, an algorithm is needed in which the individual 
INS measurements can be isolated to account for the case of failure in one of the INS 
measurements. 
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It is very interesting to note the sinusoidal-like behaviour of the test statistic growth 
from 60-70 minutes. It imitates typical INS error behaviour in the presence of a 
gyroscopic bias (see Table 4-3 for INS errors). 
7.5. Summary 
In this chapter, the proposed simulation was first evaluated so as to ensure that it may be 
trusted for further analysis of the integrity algorithms. This was done through the 
analysis of different navigation outputs of the simulation at different stages of the flight 
trajectory. After establishing that the simulations behaved according to typical 
characteristics of the individual and integrated systems, subsequent analysis followed. 
The algorithms tested in this Chapter are the MSS and AIME algorithms. These were 
selected in Chapter 5 as they represent existing integrity algorithms for integrated 
GPS/1NS systems. The analysis of the integrity algorithms began by studying the effect 
of INS error on the test statistic. It was concluded that a credible comparison of the 
algorithms is possible only with a fully functional INS. Using SGEs of different 
magnitudes, detection was performed using the two algorithms. It was shown that the 
two algorithms detect SGEs in minutes. Furthermore, the performance of the algorithms 
258 
was tested for MEMS based INS. The conclusion was that currently MEMS technology 
is inadequate for Aviation. 
A number of limitations of the existing systems were observed from the simulations. 
These are in addition to the limitations discussed in the theoretical analysis in Chapters 
4 and 5. The limitations discussed therein are longer detection times and inability to 
isolate an INS failure. 
From the simulations conducted in this chapter, it has been observed that 
* the test statistic for the AIME algorithm is independent of the truth model while 
for the MSS method, a new test statistic is needed with the change in the 
Kalman filter truth model (see section 6.3.3.3). This is because the expression of 
the test statistic of the MSS (Equation 5-33) contains horizontal position states 
(of the Kalman filter) which are to be transformed if a mechanization in another 
frame (such as an ECEF frame) is used. 
*a constraint of the AIME approach is that the receiver needs to track a satellite 
continuously for 10 and 30 minutes to generate the required test statistics s2and 
S3respectively'. In an operational environment it may not always be possible to 
track a single satellite for such a long period of time. 
The next chapter attempts to develop new algorithms to cope with SGEs and 
multiple failure detection including failures in the INS. 
1 Personal communication with Dr. Shaojun Feng, Centre for Transport Studies, Imperial College 
London. 
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8. Enhanced Algorithms for Detection of Slowly 
Growing Errors 
Introduction 
In Chapter 7, the existing integrity algorithms were analysed using the simulation 
platform developed in Chapter 6. The worst case failure mode i. e. slowly growing error 
(SGE) as identified in Chapter 4 was used to quantify the performance of the integrity 
algorithms. The simulation results showed that the representative existing algorithms 
need relatively long periods in the order of minutes, to detect SGEs. Furthermore, it was 
shown that the existing algorithms cannot isolate INS measurements if a fault occurs in 
the INS. This chapter proposes new algorithms to address these two Problems. 
The chapter starts with the description of the rate detector algorithm proposed for 
detecting SGEs earlier. This is followed by the simulation results for the rate detector 
algorithm. A new GPS/INS tightly coupled architecture is then proposed and its 
performance demonstrated by simulation. This is referred to as piggy back architecture. 
Results for horizontal protection limits with the new architecture (using the Novel 
Integrity Optimised RAIM method) are presented. The chapter ends with a summary of 
the main points. 
8.2. An Improved GNSSXINS Sensor Level Integrity 
Algorithm 
The current integrity algorithms; Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) and Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation (AIME) method have been discussed in Chapter 
5 and their performance assessed in Chapter 7. The most challenging test for these 
algorithms is the detection of SGEs (see section 4.5.1). These rarnp type failures are 
more difficult (and time consuming) to detect if the rate of growth is lower (e. g. less 
than 2 mls for a satellite range). Due to the relatively long periods required to detect 
these failures, the requirement of Time-to-Alert (TTA) becomes larger. As explained in 
Chapter 2, TTA is specified for each phase of flight. This in turn limits the usage of 
these algorithms only to those phases of flight for which the TTA is relatively long. 
Hence, in order to decrease the detection time and subsequently the TTA, an efficient 
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algorithm is required for early detection of rwnp type errors (SGEs). As mentioned in 
section 7.4.1.2. the concept of detection of the rate of test statistic can be utilised for 
early detection, especially in the case of SGEs. 
The proposed algorithm is based on the detection of the rate of the conventional 
measurement domain test statistic (Equation 8-1). The algorithm is referred to in this 
thesis as the rate detector algorithm. This idea of rate detection is similar to drift 
detection methods applied typically to gyroscopes (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993). In 
the case of a gyroscope (with a small bias) the error in the output increases due to 
numerical integration in the navigation processor. Hence, the detection of rate is useful 
in detecting occurrence of a failure. The proposed algorithm is developed below. 
8.2.1. Simple Rate Detector Configuration 
The rate detector algorithm is based on the concept of detection of the rate of the test 
statistic. The test statistic for which the rate is detected is the one used by the 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation (AIME) method. This test statistic 
is formed by using the innovation of the main navigation Kalman filter and covariance 
matrix of the innovation (see Equation 8-1). The test statistic of the Multiple Solution 
Separation (MSS) algorithm is not used because it is in the position domain and 
transformation is needed if the Kalman filter truth model is implemented in a different 
coordinate frame (see section 6.3.4.1). Hence, the AIME test statistic is more general in 
nature. 
It was proposed in the AIME method that averages of these values (innovation and its 
covariance matrix) are to be used. Three types of test statistics are used in the AINM 
method which are based on 2.5 minutes, 10 minutes and 30 minutes averages (see 
section 5.4.2.2). However, in the rate detector algorithm, the test statistic is formed by 
instantaneous values of the innovation and its covariance matrix. The reason for this is 
that the averaging process is no longer required, since the rate is estimated directly from 
the signal. 
This test statistic acts as an input signal to a simple Kalman filter configuration. To 
detect the rate of a signal, a Kalman filter can be utilised (see Chapter 3). This has the 
advantage that noise in the signal can be accounted for in the noise matrices of the filter. 
The Kalman filter is programmed so that the rate of the measurement or its velocity can 
be estimated. This estimated velocity is one of the states of the Kalman filter. It is then 
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compared with a detection threshold (see section 8.2.5). An alert is generated when this 
velocity state crosses the calculated threshold (see section 8.2.5). 
A high level configuration of the proposed rate detector algorithm is shown in Figure 
8-1. The GPS and INS measurements are integrated using a tightly coupled Kalman 
filter configuration. From the Kalman filter, using the innovation and its covariance, the 
measurement for the rate detector algorithm is fon-ned. This measurement is in fact the 
test statistic defined by the AIME method. This is used by the Kalman filter for the rate 
detector algorithm as its measurement. The rate detector algorithm estimates the 
velocity of this measurement and compares it with velocity threshold to set or reset the 
status of the integrity flag. 
GPS 
Tightly Coupled AIM E test 
Kalman Filter statistic 
INS 
Rate 
Detector 
Kalman 
Filter 
Integrity 
Flag 
Figure 8-1: The proposed rate detector configuration 
The basic assumption used in the design of this algorithm is that the conventional test 
statistic (see Equation 8-1) follows the behaviour of the error. This was confirmed in 
Chapter 7 by simulation (see section 7.4.1.2). In this way, slowly growing errors can be 
detected by detecting the rate of the test statistic. The algorithm steps are given below: 
1. The underlying configuration for this algorithm is the AIME method. It consists 
of a tightly coupled GPS/INS architecture. The innovation of the main navigation 
Kalman filter and its covariance matrix are used to form the test statistic. The 
instantaneous value of the test statistic is given by: 
T -'r TSk = rk Vk k 8-1 
2. The time domain signal formed by the above expression acts as a measurement 
for the rate detector Kalman filter. An implementation of a typical Kalman filter system 
requires a dynamic matrix, a measurement matrix, a system noise covariance matrix, a 
measurement noise matrix along with the initial values for the state vector and the state 
estimate covariance matrix. The state vector is chosen as being composed of two states, 
which are called the position state and the velocity state of the input signal (Equation 8- 
1). The state vector is given by 
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8-2 
where p is the position state 
v is the velocity state for the test statistic. 
The initial values of these states are assumed zero since no information about them is 
available beforehand. By the time the Kalman filter reaches the steady state these values 
converge to their estimates. 
These states are propagated through time (at each Kalman filter epoch) by the use of 
dynamic matrix. The dynamic matrix is formed from the system dynamic equations. 
The equations are given below: 
fi 
8-3 
V= 
where jb 
is the rate of change of position 
and -ý is the rate of change of velocity. 
It is assumed that the variation in the input signal is only first order in nature and hence 
the velocity signal does not change with time (this is discussed further in section 8.2.2). 
In order to use a Kalman filter the dynamic Equations above take the general form: 
i= Fx + Gu 84 
where x are the states of the dynamic system 
F is the dynamic matrix 
G is the input matrix 
u is the vector of inputs 
It should be mentioned here that these equations are in time domain and the equations in 
Chapter 3 (Equations 3-9 - 3-17) for the implementation of the Kalman filter are in the 
discrete domain. The conversion from the time domain to the discrete domain is 
required for implementing a Kalman filter in a computer program. For details, any 
standard text on control systems can be consulted such as Dorf and Bishop (2004). 
Writing the dynamic equations in Equation 8-3 in the form of Equation 84, the matrix 
form of the dynamic equations is obtained as: 
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8-5 
Hence the dynamic matrix is given by 
8-6 
while in this case u=O in Equation 8-4. 
3. A measurement matrix is utilised to link the states of the Kalman filter to the 
measurement/s. The measurement of the Kalman filter is given by Equation 8-1. The 
measurement matrix utilised is: 
H=[1 o} 8-7 
This matrix 'tells' the Kalman filter that the first state corresponds to the input signal. 
Hence, the second state is the velocity of the input signal as defined by the dynamic 
matrix in quation -. 
The measurement noise covariance matrix is calculated from the variance of the 
measurement signal. This value is then tuned for optimal performance from multiple 
runs of the Kalman filter. 
4. The output y of the filter is taken as the velocity of the test statistic. The general 
form for y in terms of the output matrix C and the state matrix is given by 
CX 8-8 
The states of the filter are position and velocity and the relationship between the output 
and the states is given by, 
Y=[O IP 8-9 
V 
Hence,, the output matrix C is given by 
C=10 11 8-10 
The initial values of the state estimate covariance matrix are also needed. This matrix is 
typically a diagonal matrix containing large entries (e. g. 1000,10000). This is because 
there is no information available about the states at the start of the algorithm (Brown 
and Hwang, 1992). These large values typically result in faster convergence. 
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5. The system noise covariance matrix is typically a diagonal matrix. The entries are 
related to the information of the covariance of the noise present in the states. These are 
be discussed in 8.2.3. 
6. The matrices and initial values given above are used to program a Kalman filter. 
There are two calculation steps in the Kalman filter at each time epoch. The first is the 
propagation step in which the system states and the covariance matrix are propagated in 
time. This is followed by an update step in which the Kalman gain matrix is calculated 
and estimation is performed (see Chapter 3). The equations of the Kalman filter are 
repeated here for convenience. Based on the system model, the system state vector is 
propagated as follows 
A 
xk+l = (Dk Xk 8-11 
where Ok is calculated by using the approximation (D =I+ FAt +P 
(AW 
2 
(Dorf and Bishop, 2004), where F is the dynamic matrix (in Equation 8-6) 
At is the sample time which is assumed I second for the rate detector 
configuration, hence it provides an output every second. 
Xk 'Sthe system state vector (Equation 8-2) at epoch k 
^ is the estimated state vector at epoch k. Xk 
The covariance of the state is also propagated through time: 
Ak 
(DT T P (D P 8-12 k+l k+l k+ rk Qk rk 
where 
! ýk is the a priori covariance matrix for state estimate, 
rk is the input noise matrix at epoch k which is assumed to be a unity 
matrix, 
A 
P is the a posteriori state covariance estimate at epoch k, k 
Qkis the process noise covariance matrix at epoch k. 
The new estimate is based on the Kalman gain (Kk, l ) calculation 
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HTT )-l k+l Pk+, H +R 8-13 k+l 
pk+l 
k+I(H k+l k+l 
where Rkis the measurement noise matrix. 
This is further used to update the state and covariance as follows 
A 
Xk+l -'z Xk+I+K -H x 8-14 k+l 
[Zk+l 
k+l k+l 
A 
P =[I-K H 8-15 k+l k+l k+1 lpk+l 
where Xk+l denotes a posteriori estimate of the state at epoch k+ I 
A 
Pk+l is a posteriori covariance for the state estimate at epoch k+ I 
Hk+j is the measurement matrix which is constant for all epochs as given in 
Equation 8-7. 
The equations for innovation, covariance of the innovation and the AIME test statistic 
are given in Equations 8-35,8-36 and 8-37 respectively. 
The output of the Kalman filter (the velocity state) is obtained in the update step (using 
Equation 8-14 and Equation 8-8) and compared with a detection threshold (that uses the 
covariance value from Equation 8-15). The detection threshold is obtained by using 
probability of false alert and is discussed in section 8.2.5. 
Simulation results (Figure 8-2) using the platform developed in Chapter 6 show that this 
detector does not work efficiently because of the presence of noise in the estimated 
velocity. 
In Figure 8-2, the velocity signal is shown in green colour. Note the shift of the mean of 
the velocity signal before (blue line) and after (black line) the error (the time of 
introduction of the error is 60 min). However, due to the effect of noise, the threshold 
(red line) is crossed by the green line significantly before the introduction of the error. 
Hence, the proposed rate detector algorithm is modified as shown below. 
8.2.2. Proposed Rate Detector Configuration 
To tackle the problem associated with the noise of the estimated velocity (Figure 8-2), 
another state is added to the formulation. The new formulation then takes the form: 
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P00P 
0aIV 8-16 
000a 
where ct is a constant (explained in section 8.2.3) whose value can be adjusted 
according to the magnitude of noise in the system, and 
a is the new state added that represents the acceleration of the signal. 
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Figure 8-2: The performance of the simple rate detector algorithm (without noise 
modelling) 
The new measurement matrix is given by 
H=[I 0 0] 8-17 
The new output matrix is 
c40 , 0] 8-18 
The initial state covariance matrix for the Kalman filter is chosen with large 
diagonal values for faster convergence (Farrell and Barth, 1998). The impact of 
choice of measurement and dynamic noise matrices is discussed below. 
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8.2.3. Choice of Noise Matrices and Correlation constant 
The choice of noise matrices is crucial to the operation of the Kalman filter. Selection of 
wrong models can result in sub-optimal operation of the filter (Brown and Hwang, 
1992). Typically, the value for the measurement noise covariance is obtained from the 
covariance values calculated from measurement data. The value of the covariance noise 
matrix for the dynamic model is dependent on the selection of the correlation constant 
a. This is because the assumed underlying velocity model is of the form 
At) = At) a(t) +ý 
where v is velocity 
a is acceleration and 
ý is noise and 
is the correlation constant. 
8-19 
Equation 8-19 is a model for a time-correlated random process (Rogers, 2000). The 
magnitude of a shows the correlation between velocity and its derivate state. The 
adjustment of this parameter is linked to the amount of noise (Equation 8-19). If a and 
acceleration are zero, the derivate of velocity is only noise (the case of the simple rate 
detector algorithm). The values used for the noise modelling (covariance matrix) and a 
are discussed below. 
From the simulation runs, the detection time is less than 2 minutes (see Figure 84) for a 
value of correlation constant between 0.5 and 0.9 and covariance noise value for 
ranging from 10-7 to 10-9 (the first diagonal entry of the covariance noise matrix, others 
are zero). This shows the robustness of the proposed method for a variety of situations 
that can arise due to different types of noise present in the measurements. The 
characteristics of the noise are determined by the types of GPS receiver and INS utilised 
in a particular situation. 
8.2.4. Computation of the Test Statistics 
The test statistic in the case of the rate detector algorithms is the velocity state of the 
Kalman filter. For this the output matrix C is defined (Equation 8-18) so that the output 
of the Kalman filter is the estimated velocity of the input signal. 
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8.2.5. Computation of Detection Threshold 
It is assumed that the velocity v is a Gaussian variable L e. normally distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance. This assumption is valid for the case when there is a 
single ramp failure and the contribution of other measurement errors in the test statistics 
is close to zero. This is in fact a realistic situation when the main navigation Kalman 
filter is in steady state and so the value of the error components of the innovation vector 
are generally small. The value of the decision threshold is chosen on the basis of the 
statistical characteristics of the test statistic such that a false alert (that occurs in a fault 
free condition) occurs no more frequently than a specified rate which is typically 10,5 /hr 
(Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). The velocity detection threshold is given by, 
p 
vj-l 
fa p 8-20 VD 
ý7 
2n 
00 v 
where J(V) = V2; r 
fe 2a dv 8-21 
VD 
VD is the velocity threshold 
v is a zero mean Gaussian variable with standard deviation c 
n is the number of satellite measurements available 
P is the covariance for the velocity state as obtained from the rate detector V 
Kalman filter covariance equation (Equation 8-15). 
Pf, is the probability of false alert . This is selected on the basis of a false alert 
rate of 10-5per hour in a fault free enviroranent (Diesel and Dunn, 1996). 
From Equation 8-20, the value of the detection threshold can be calculated (Brenner, 
1995). This is carried out by using a trial and error method. The integral in Equation 8- 
21 is calculated numerically for a chosen value of the detection threshold. The value for 
the parameter v needed for this purpose is obtained using a random number generator 
with zero mean and unity variance. It is checked whether the value obtained from the 
P 
expression on the right hand side is equal to fa or not. This is continued until a 2n 
suitable value of the velocity threshold is found. These calculations are carried out 
offline for different number of satellites because of their trial and error nature and 
excessive computations required. 
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8.2.6. Practical Implementation of the Rate Detector Algorithm 
The rate detector algorithm needs the test statistics of the AIME configuration. Hence, 
in practice it can be implemented alongside the AIME algorithm to detect the slowly 
growing errors early. The flowchart for practical implementation of the rate detector 
algorithm is shown in Figure 8-3. 
Main Navigation Kalman Filter for the 
AIME method 
(sections 3.5.3.1,3.5.3.2,5.4.2.2 and 
6.3.4.1 
1. Initialize Kalman filter 
2. Perform propagation step 
3. Accept measurements from GPS and INS 
3. Perform update 
Test Statistic Calculation 
(Eqs. 8-37,8-38 and 8-39) 
No 
Initialize Rate Detector Kalman Filter 
(Section 8.2.1 steps 1-5) 
1. Initialize State Variables 
2. Initialize State Estimate Covariance Values 
3. Define Measurement Noise Matrix 
4. Define Dynamic Matrix 
5. Define Sample time 
Kalman Filter operation 
(Section 8.2.1 step 6) 
1. Propagate state variables through time (Eqs. 8-5 and 8-11) 
2. Propagate state covariance through time (Eq 8-12) 
3. Calculate Kalman Gain (Eq 8-13) 
4. Perform update step (Eqs 9-2,8-14 and 8-15) 
5. Calculate Innovation and its covariance (Eqs. 8-37 and 8-38) 
6. Calculate velocity of the test statistic (Use Equation 8-18) 
velocity of the test statistic > 
velocity threshold 
Equation 8-20, section 8.2.5 
Yes 
I Integrity Flag I 
Offline calculation of 
Velocity Threshold 
(Section 8., 
Figure 8-3: The flowchart for the rate detector algorithm 
It can be seen that the AIME test statistic is obtained from the main navigation Kalman 
filter and fed to the rate detector algorithm. The equations for the main navigation filter 
are described in sections 3.5.3.1,3.5.3.2,5.4.2.2 and 6.3.4.1. The rate detector algorithm 
estimates the rate of the test statistic and compares it with the threshold values 
(computer offline). An integrity flag is set if velocity is greater than the corresponding 
threshold. Otherwise new measurements from GPS and INS are accepted and the 
process continues. 
Furthermore, in this thesis the rate detector algorithm is also utilised with a newly 
proposed tightly coupled architecture (referred to as the piggy back tightly coupled 
architecture). The flowchart for practical implementation of the rate detector algorithm 
with the piggy back architecture (section 8.3) is shown in Figure 8-9. 
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8.2.7. Simulation Results 
The rate detector algorithm has been simulated using the simulation platform developed 
in Chapter 6. The main navigation Kalman filter is allowed to settle to its steady state 
for one hour. An error of magnitude 0.1 mls is injected in a satellite pseudorange at this 
point in time to test the integrity performance. In Figure 8-4, the velocity of the test 
statistic is shown along with its detection threshold. 
It can be seen that there is more than a forty percent reduction in the detection time 
compared to the results presented in Chapter 7 (Figure 7-2 1), where the detection of the 
same error by the two existing algorithms (AIME and MSS) is depicted. This efficiency 
is possible due to the detection of the rate of the test statistic in contrast to only 
monitoring its magnitude. A sensitivity analysis has been performed for the proposed 
rate detector algorithm. It can be seen from Figure 8-5, that the proposed algorithm is 
successful in detecting errors with different rates. These include step error of 100 m and 
growing errors of I m1s, 2 m/s and 3 mls introduced in a satellite pseudorange. It can 
also be noted that the faster the growth of the error, the earlier the detection. This is 
because this algorithm detects the rate of the signal. 
The proposed rate detector configuration is efficient in detecting a single slowly 
growing error. The results can be affected if the modelling of measurement signal 
(Equation 8-3) is not accurate. The performance can be improved by varying the 
measurement noise matrices and covariance matrices (i. e. tuning) of the Kalman filter 
for the rate detector algorithm (Brown and Hwang, 1992). This will minimise the effect 
of measurement noise on the estimation of the rate of the test statistic. 
8.2.8. Summary 
This section (8.2), has presented a rate detector algorithm that can detect a SGE earlier 
than the existing algorithms. However, in order to detect multiple SGEs, a configuration 
with different levels of subfilters is required. For example, in the Level I subfilters, one 
measurement is excluded while in Level 2 subfilters two measurements are excluded. A 
rate detector in front of each subfilter should provide a solution for the detection of 
multiple failures. However, this type of configuration is not useful when there is a fault 
in the INS as a fault in the INS cannot be isolated. This is because in conventional 
tightly coupled architecture, INS measurements are included in all the components of 
the measurement vector (see section 7.4.2). 
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Figure 8-5: Detection of different types of errors using the rate detector algorithm 
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To allow for the isolation of INS in the case of INS failure, a new architecture is 
required. Details of this architecture are presented in the next section. 
8.3. A new architecture for multiple failure 
detection for GPSIINS integrated system 
Generally, the concept of conventional G-PS RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring) is adopted for monitoring the integrity of the integrated system. In this 
concept there is little emphasis on the problem of detecting a fault in the INS should one 
occur. 
A very recent example of this is presented by Curt et al. (2006) where failure in INS is 
not considered alongside GPS integrity monitoring in an integrated GPS/INS system. It 
is argued by Lee and O'Laughlin (1999) that due to the very nature of the INS based 
Kalman filter, it is a great challenge to design an algorithm to cater for the errors in the 
INS. This is because the Kalman filter adapts itself to the slowly growing nature of the 
nominal errors in the INS. Hence slowly growing errors in an INS are very difficult to 
detect. However,, this is important because most of the errors in the INS grow slowly 
over time (see Table 4-3). 
In the traditional form of the tightly coupled architecture, the differences of the 
available satellite measurements from their predicted counterparts are formed. This 
prediction is obtained by the use of the receiver position estimated from INS 
measurements (see section 6.3.4). However, this method suffers from the fact that an 
error in the INS affects all the components of the measurement vector. Hence, INS 
cannot be excluded in any of the subfilters. This can be accepted when using a very 
good quality INS with very large Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) values. In 
effect, the INS literally acts as a reference to the Kalman filter in such configurations. 
However, this method is not suitable for the situations when a low cost INS with lower 
MTBF values is utilised (for example a typical MEMS (Micro Electromechanical 
Systems) based INS). 
Hence, a method is needed which exploits the advantages of INS but also allows it to be 
excluded for the purpose of fault isolation. Due to the manifold increase in the number 
of commercial aircraft and severe competition between airlines, there is a drive to keep 
total service provision costs down. In terms of aircraft navigation systems, therefore, 
significant research and development activities are aimed at the use of low quality 
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MEMS based INS (Strachan, 2000). In this case, the INS cannot be used as a reference 
due to performance limitations. For this purpose, a scheme is presented in this thesis, in 
which it is possible to isolate an INS if it fails. The basic configuration for the proposed 
architecture which will be referred to in this thesis as the piggy back architecture is that 
of the GPS receiver Kalman filter. In a GPS receiver pseudoranges are fed to a Kalman 
filter which incorporates a dynamic model of the receiver, and a new position calculated 
every epoch (see section 6.3.4). 
8.3.1. Configuration of the "Piggy Back" Tightly Coupled 
Architecture 
For the case of integrity monitoring of an integrated GPS/INS system with a low cost 
INS, a configuration similar to a GPS receiver Kalman filter can be utilised. In a typical 
receiver, a Kalman filter estimates the position of the aircraft (or host vehicle) on the 
basis of satellite measurements. The receiver accepts the satellite measurements and 
updates the position solution at each epoch. 
A new approach is presented here in which a position derived from INS measurements 
can be used in the GPS Kalman filter configuration by treating it as afictitious satellite 
measurement. This idea is similar to the non line of sight (NLOS) concept used in 
Wireless Broadband Communications (WBC) (Correia and Prasad, 1997). In this case, 
the INS derived position is used to predict an extra pseudorange measurement for a 
satellite for which orbital information is available in the GPS broadcast message. 
Tightly Coupled AIME test Integrity GPS Kalman Filter I statistic Flag 
INS Conversion to Range Ephemeris 
Measurement Data 
Figure 8-6: The piggy back tightly coupled architecture for integrity monitoring 
This new configuration is referred to as piggy back tightly coupled architecture because 
it is based on the idea that the INS measurements piggy back on the GPS range 
measurement. A high level schematic of this architecture is shown in Figure 8-6. As 
shown, the tightly coupled Kalman filter accepts pseudorange measurements from the 
GPS. The INS position is converted to an additional pseudorange measurement by the 
use of broadcast ephemeris data. The AIME test statistic (Equation 8-1) can then be 
274 
used for monitoring a fault in the measurements (be it a GPS or an INS fault). The steps 
of the algorithm are as given below (Figure 8-7): 
Initialize Main Navigation Kalman Filter 
(Section 8.3.1) 
1. State Variables (Eq 8-25) 
2. State Estimate Covariance matrix (Eq 8-26) 
3. Measurement Noise Matrix (see Eq 8-31) 
4. Define Dynamic Matrix (Eq. 8-27) 
5. Define Sample time 
Measurement Processing 
1. Accept Pseudorange Measurements from GPS Receiver 
2. Convert INS position to predicted pseudorange by using 
lever arm correction (Eqs. 8-22 and 8-23) 
3. Form measurement of the Kalman filter (Eq. 8-32) 
Kalman Filter operation (section 8-3.1) 
1. Propagate state variables through time 
2. Propagate state covariance through time 
3. Calculate Kalman Gain 
4. Perform update step 
5. Calculate Innovation and its covariance 
Test Statistics Calculation 
by using AIME method 
(Eqs. 8-37,8-38 and 8-39) 
Figure 8-7 : The implementation of the piggy back architecture 
I. Lever arm correction is applied to the INS position to get the INS predicted GPS 
antenna position. These calculations are carried out in the Earth Centred Earth Fixed 
(ECEF) frame (see section 3.4.2). This INS based GPS receiver position vector is given 
byý 
R rec , pred =R INs + 
LA 8-22 
where 
Rrec, 
pred is the predicted GPS antenna position from INS based 
measurements, 
RINs is the position of the centre of gravity of the INS 
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LA is the ]ever arm correction between the GPS antenna phase centre 
and INS centre of gravity. It should be noted here that this measurement 
does not include the effect of receiver clock bias. 
2. This predicted INS based GPS antenna position is used to calculate the range 
between the GPS receiver and a fictitious satellite. The fictitious satellite can be a non- 
line of sight GPS satellite. The orbital data for this satellite are obtained from the 
Broadcast Ephemeris. Priority must be given to the satellite that improves the geometry 
of the available satellites. For example, if there is an available satellite directly overhead 
the aircraft, a fictitious satellite on the other (opposite) side of the Earth may provide 
benefits in terms of improved geometry. This will reduce vertical errors associated with 
usage of an overhead satellite measurement. The fictitious range is calculated by (in the 
ECEF frame) 
P fic, -= R f1c, - 
Rrec 
, pred 
8-23 
where p,,,, is the fictitious satellite measurement 
Rjjcj is the position of the fictitious satellite obtained from the broadcast 
ephemeris 
Rrec, 
predis the predicted GPS antenna position as calculated above. 
3. This new 'pseudorange' is added to the available GPS pseudoranges. It is 
appropriate to call it pseudorange because it contains errors of INS and errors in the 
orbital position of the fictitious satellite (errors in a typical broadcast ephemeris). Hence 
the dimension of the new measurement vector is n+l, where n is the number of GPS 
measurements. The measurement vector is then given by 
pI 
P2 
PB 
fict 
4. 
where PB refers to piggy back. 
The sates of the Kalman filter are 
8-24 
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p 
v 
C 
a 
where p is the position error vector (of dimension 3) 
v is the velocity error vector (of dimension 3) 
c is the clock states vector (of dimension 2) 
a is the acceleration error vector (of dimension 3) 
8-25 
5. The covariance matrixpPB is initialised as shown below. Since it is a diagonal 
matrix only the diagonal entries are shown: 
diag ([ 1e5 le5 le5 100 100 100 10 10 10 10 
The dynamics matrix FPB iSgiven by: 
10 ]) 8-26 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
The value for the diagonal noise covariance matrix QpB are given by 
8-27 
diag([Ie-9 le-3 le-3 1 100 le-3 le-18 2e-19 00 0])8-28 
The measurement noise matrix is an identity matrix multiplied by a constant value. The 
constant value can be adjusted according to the noise in the measurements. Since it is 
assumed that all measurements are equivalent an equal weight is assigned to each. In the 
case of higher amount of noise in any of the satellite measurement, the corresponding 
entry can be reset accordingly. 
Based on the system model, the system state vector is propagated as follows: 
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A 
(DPB, 
k XPB, k XPB, k+l .. 8-29 
where (DPB, k is calculated by using the approximation 
(D =I+F 
2 
PB PB6ýt+ FýB 
2 
(Dorf and Bishop, 2004), where Fp, is the 
dynamic matrix (in Equation 8-27). The choice of sample time depends on the 
rate at which data is available and the processor speed. This is used as I second 
in the simulation since GPS simulated data is available at I Hz, 
XPB, kis the system state vector (Equation 8-25) at epoch k, 
andXPB, k 'Sthe estimated state vector at epoch k. 
The covariance of the state is also propagated through time: 
p 
(DPB, 
k+lp k 
(DT +f r- T 8-30 PB, k+l PB, PB k PB, k QPB, k PB, k 
wherepPB, k is the a priori covariance matrix for the state estimate, 
]FPb, k is the input noise matrix at epoch k (is chosen as the identity matrix 
of order that is equal to the number of state i. e. 11), 
A PPB, 
k 'Sthe a posteriori state covariance estimate at epoch k, 
and QPB, k'S the process noise covariance matrix at epoch k. 
The new estimate is based on the Kalman gain calculation 
KHTHT +R )-1 8-31 PB, k+l ý 
kB, 
k+l PB 
, 
k+I(HPB, k+IPPB, k+l PB , 
k+l PB, k+l 
where 
RPB, 
kis the measurement noise covariance matrix at epoch k. It is a 
diagonal matrix of order n+l. Each diagonal entry is the covariance of 
noise in the corresponding measurement. Hence, first entries will be 
according to the noise in the pseudorange measurements and last 
according to the noise in the INS measurements. 
KPB, 
k+l iSthe Kalman gain matrix 
and 
HPB, 
k is the measurement matrix. 
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The geometry or measurement matrix HpB, k has numbers of rows equivalent to the 
number of measurement (n+ 1) and columns equal to the number of the states of the 
dynamic filter (i. e. 11). 
HPB, 
i, k = [-Xi, los - Yijos - Zoos 0001000 0] 8-32 
where xj, jo, = 
ri, - rrx 
3, Yoos = 
ry - rry &zi, los = 
riz - rrz are the three Ir, I Ir, I Ir, I 
line of sight (Ios) vectors along the x, y and z axes (in the ECEF frame). 
Subscript i indicates the relevant satellites (i=l, n+l) and r the receiver, 
for example, r. is the x component of the position vector of the ith 
satellite and r,., is the x component of the receiver position. 
ri is the geometric range vector between satellite i and the receiver r, 
the entry I corresponds to the clock bias state in the Kalman filter. This 
entry remains zero for the fictitious satellite measurement because that 
does not contain receiver clock error. It is possible that the algorithm is 
skewed towards the INS derived measurement because of it being free of 
the receiver clock error. This situation is mitigated by use of lower 
weight for this measurement than those for other satellite measurements 
(in matrix RpB ). This 'tells' the Kalman filter not to rely too much on this 
measurement. Different values for this weight can be used depending on 
the quality of the INS used. 
The Kalman gain is used to finiher update the state and covariance as follows 
A 
+K -H XPB, k+l = XPB, k+l PB, k+l 
IZPB, 
k+l PB, k+IYPB, k+l 
PPB, 
k+l -'ý 
[In+lxn+l - KpB, k+, 
Hk+l lpk+l 
whereXPB, k+l denotes the a posteriori estimate of the states at epoch 
k+ I 
A 
PPB, 
k+l 'Sthe a posteriori covariance for the state estimate at epoch k+ I 
8-33 
8-34 
ZPB, k+l is obtained by the difference in pseudorange vector in Equation 8-24 and 
geometric range calculated by the corrected position from the recently obtained 
states (Equations 8-33 and 8-32). The geometric ranges are obtained from the 
filtered position. This filtered position is obtained by adding the newly estimated 
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corrections (states) to the position value at the previous epoch. The geometric 
range R'(t) is given by r 
R'. (t) = 
V(Xi Xr )2 + (yi Yr )2 + Vi (t) - Zr )2 8-35 
r 
where Xj (t), Y'(t) and Z'(t) are the components of the geocentric position 
vector of the satellite (in Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) frame) at the current 
epoch (M), 
X, Y,, and Z, are the three ECEF coordinates of the filtered estimated position 
(m). For description of ECEF (Earth Centred Earth Fixed) frame see section 
3.4.2). Hence the measurement ZPB, kat each epoch is expressed as 
-'ý PPB, k-R ZPB, k ' PB 8-36 
where Rp. is the vector of geometric ranges obtained in Equation 8-35 for the 
available satellite and the fictitious range (of order n+l) 
PPB, k is the vector (of order n+l) for satellite pseudoranges and the fictitious 
range (obtained from the INS derived position and lever arm correction). 
This completes the description of the main navigation Kalman filter for the piggy back 
architecture. The innovation obtained at each epoch is, 
rk = Zk-Hk Yk 8-37 
The distribution of the components of rk is n+l dimensional normal with zero mean 
and known covariance. The covariance of the innovation, 
Vkis given by, 
Vk 
=H T+R 8-38 k 
I; 
kHk k 
Therefore the test statistic is given by 
8-39 riT v- k k 
This is compared with the chi-squared threshold obtained from statistical tables 
2 
TSk < 
ZýI-ic)12, 
n-3 840 
n-3 
where n-3 is the degree of freedom in the solution. This includes one additional 
measurement obtained from the INS position solution. 
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n is the number of satellites 
Ic is the significance level of the test. It is chosen as 10-51hr according to the 
integrity requirement. 
A single SGE can be detected using a rate detector algorithm with piggy back 
architecture. Figure 8-8 shows this configuration at a high level. The measurements are 
input to the piggyback architecture. The test statistic formed from the output of the 
piggy back architecture is fed into the rate detector algorithm to generate the integrity 
flag. The flowchart for this implementation (Figure 8-8) is presented in Figure 8-9. 
Multiple configurations of this type (Figure 8-8) are required for detection of multiple 
SGEs. The detection of a satellite fault (or an INS fault) is achieved by the use of 
subfilter hierarchical configuration as explained below. 
To detect multiple SGEs, the following approach can be used in conjunction with the 
piggy back architecture. Multiple filters are fori-ned at different levels (see Figure 8-10). 
In level 1, one measurement is excluded in each of the filter as compared to the main 
filter. In level 2, two measurements are excluded in each of the filters as compared to 
the main filter. Hence, there will always be a filter that excludes the faulty 
measurement. 
Such a filter (with excluded faulty measurement) can be spotted by monitoring its test 
statistic that will remain below the threshold. This approach is presented for a dual fault 
scenario (Figure 8-10) and is readily extendible to the case of more than two failures. 
Sv 1 
SV 2 
SV 3 Piggy Back Architecture 
SV4 
SV 5 
INS 
Rate Detector Algorithm 
Flag for Main 
Filter 
Figure 8-8: Use of Piggy Back architecture for detecting of slowly growing errors 
281 
Initialize Main Navigation Kalman Filter 
(Section 8.3.1) 
1. State Variables (Eq 8-25) 
2. State Estimate Covariance matrix (Eq 8-26) 
3. Measurement Noise Matrix (see Eq 8-31) 
4. Define Dynamic Matrix (Eq. 8-27) 
5. Define Sample time 
Measurerwnt Processing 
1. Accept Pseudorange Measurements from GPS 
Receiver 
2. Convert INS position to predicted pseudorange by 
using lever arm correction (Eqs. 8-22 and 8-23) 
3. Form measurement of the Kalman filter (Eq. 8-32) 
Kalman Filter operation (section 8.3.1) 
1. Propagate state variables through time 
2. Propagate state covariance through time 
3. Calculate Kalman Gain 
4. Perform update step 
5. Calculate Innovation and its covariance 
Initialize Rate Detector Kalman FUter (Section 
8.2.1 steps 1-5) 
1. Initialize State Variables 
2. Initialize State Estimate Covariance Values 
3. Define Measurement Noise Matrix 
4. Define Dynamic Matrix 
5. Define Sample time 
Kalman Filter operation 
(Section 8.2.1 stop 6) 
1. Propagate state variables through time (Eqs. 8-5 and 8-11) 
Test Statistic Calculation by 2. Propagate state covariance through time (Eq 8-12) 
using AIME method (Eqs. -03. Calculate Kalman Gain (Eq 8-13) 
8-37,8-38 and 8-39) 4. Perform update step (Eqs 9-2,8-14 and 8-15) 
5. Calculate Innovation and its covariance (Eqs. 8-37 and 8-38) 
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Figure 8-9: Flowchart for implementation of the Rate Detector Algorithm with the 
piggy back architecture 
The practical configuration required for multiple failure detection is in the form of 
parallel filters. A high level block diagram for the practical implementation of parallel 
filters is shown in Figure 8-11. As shown, the full set solution consists of a Kalman 
filter that is formed by all the available measurements (five measurements are assumed 
to be available) and a measurement that is predicted by the use of the INS (represented 
by INS ) are shown. There is a rate detector filter at the output of each of the filter or 
subfilter. Further levels of subfilters are formed using a subset of the full set of 
measurements. 
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In order to detect additional failures (more than two), ftirther levels of subfilters are 
required. The potential benefits of the piggy back architecture are listed in the next sub- 
section. 
Main filter 
SVI SV2 SV3 SW SV5 INS 
Level 1 subfilter a Level I subfilter b Level I subfilter c Level I subfilter d Level 1 subfilter e SV1 SV2 SV3 SW SV5 SV1 SV3 SW SV5 INS SVI SV2 SW SV5 INS SVI SV2 SV3 SV5 INS SVI SV2 SV3 SW INS 
Level 2 subfilter bi 
SV3 SW SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter cl 
SV2 SW SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter Q 
SV1 SW SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter dI 
SV2 SV3 SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter d2 
SV1 SV3 SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter d3 
SV1 SV2 SV5 INS 
Level 2 subfilter el 
SV2 SV3 SW INS 
Level 2 subfilter e2 
SV1 SV3 SW INS 
Level 2 subfilter e3 
SV1 SV2 SW INS 
Level 2 subfilter e4 
SV1 SV2 SV3 INS 
Figure 8-10: The hierarchy of subfilters for detecting multiple failures 
8.3.2. Benefits of the Piggy Back Architecture 
There are many potential benefits of the use of the piggy back architecture, some of 
these are given below: 
* Existing GPS positioning software can be utilised (which are based on a Kalman 
filter configuration) with minor modifications (see section 6.3.4.1 for GPS 
receiver Kalman filter). In the filter, only one addition is required. This is the 
computation of a fictitious satellite range using the INS derived antenna position 
and lever arm correction. 
* The various existing RAIM methods for GPS can be directly used for the purpose 
of monitoring the integrity of the integrated GPS/INS systems. 
* Slowly growing errors in the INS are treated in the sarne way as errors in GPS 
satellite measurements. This also answers an issue raised in the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics Minimum Operational Performance Standard 
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(RTCA MOPS) (RTCA, 2001) that there are no guidelines for single string (no 
redundancy) detection of failure/s in INS (see section 2.5). "Single string" 
essentially means the standalone operation of an INS. Hence in this architecture, 
GPS integrity guidelines are applied for INS integrity. 
The fictitious satellite measurement (derived from the INS position) can be 
chosen such that it makes the geometry of the satellites taking part in the position 
solution stronger (see Chapter 3). Stronger geometry has the potential to 
positively influence positioning accuracy depending on the range error 
(measurement precision). This is because positioning accuracy is empirically a 
function of geometry and range accuracy (Ochieng, 2006). 
If measurements from more than one INS are available, this method is readily 
extendible. Another fictitious satellite measurement can be added to the position 
solution. 
This method essentially treats INS not as a continuous system but as a system like 
GPS in which at each epoch, a new measurement is obtained independent of the 
previous measurements. Although this method is applicable to all classes of INS, 
it more suited to a low quality INS. 
The error in the fictitious range measurement derived from the INS position 
depends on a number of factors including the contribution of the orbital errors. 
Clearly, there is the possibility to use more precise and accurate sources of orbital 
information e. g EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), 
WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) and indeed other celestial bodies. 
It was stated in Chapter 5 that the Novel Integrity Optimised Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (NIORAIM) method is the preferred method in this thesis for 
providing protection limit values. This is because it can reduce the Horizontal 
Protection Limit (HPL) by training of satellite measurement weights. It should be noted 
that this method does not provide a mechanism for the detection of multiple failures for 
which the proposed method in thesis is utilised (the piggy back architecture). The 
NIORAIM method is compatible with piggy back architecture to provide HPL values. 
This is because the NIORAIM method is developed for use with GPS measurements 
and the piggy back architecture has a similar measurement structure (INS derived 
measurement is converted to satellite pseudorange). 
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The performance of the piggy back architecture is assessed by simulations as Presented 
in the next section. 
SV 1 Main Navigation Filter Integrity Monitoring 
SV 21i 
SV 3 
Piggy Back Architecture Flag for Main SV4 Filter 
SV 5 
INS 
Level 1 subfilter a 
SV 1 
SV 2 
SV 3 10 Piggy Back Architecture 10 Rate Detector Algorithm Integrity 
Flag for 
0 
SV4 Main Filter 
SV 5 
Level 1 subfilter e 
SV 1 
SV2 Integrity Flag for SV 3 0. Piggy Back Architecture 0 Rate Detector AJgorithm 10 subfilter e SV4 
INS 
Level 2 subfilter bl 
SV3 Integrity Flag for 
SV4 10 Piggy Back Architecture 10 Rate Detector Algorithm 0 subfilter bl SV 5 
INS 
Level 2 subfilter e4 
SV 1 
SV 2 Piggy Back Architecture 10 Rate Detector Algorithm 10 
Integrity Flag for 
subfilter e4 SV 3 
INS 
Figure 8-11: Implementation of parallel filters using the piggy back architecture 
for monitoring multiple SGEs 
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8.3.3. Simulation Analysis of the proposed Piggy Back Architecture 
Simulations for the case of a single failure, multiple GPS satellite failure and the case 
when a single failure occurs in GPS as well as INS are discussed below. 
8.3-3.1. Single Failure in a GPS measurement 
The test statistics (TS) for each filter including the main filter, subfilter and subsequent 
level subfilters (Equation 8- 1) are formed as shown in Figure 8-11. Each of these test 
statistics is checked to determine whether the TS value rises above the threshold or not 
(i. e. presence or absence of a failure). For detecting slowly growing effors, each 
filter/subfilter is followed by a rate detector Kalman filter as described in section 8.2.2. 
The arrangement works as follows: 
A single failure is in ected to one of the satellite measurements, for example, the 
measurement from Satellite Vehicle (SV) 4 (as per the arrangement shown in Figure 
8-11). At the subfilter level, the subfilter without the failed satellite is the only one with 
the test statistic lower than the threshold. This scenario is shown in Figure 8-12. The 
cyan line shows the TS of subfilter e and blue lines are for other subfilters. Hence, in 
this scenario, subfilter e is the one with the TS below the threshold. 
Therefore, all the other subfilters will not be used further, as these contain the 
measurement from SV 4. However, in the situation where SV No. 4 becomes 
unavailable and is replaced by any other satellite measurement, other subfilters may be 
used subsequently. 
For the remaining flight time, subfilter e will be the primary filter and its lower levels of 
subfilters will assume the role of new subfilters. A dual fault situation in GPS is 
considered below. 
8.3.3.2. Dual Failure in GPS Measurements 
A failure of magnitude 2 mls is introduced in SV3 at 300 seconds. For clarity, not all the 
test statistics are shown in Figure 8-13. However, the conventional measurement 
domain test statistic (Equation 8-1) is shown. 
It can be seen that one of the subfilters that contains the measurement from satellite No. 
3 crosses the threshold. The subfilter with SV3 excluded now becomes the primary 
filter. Another failure of 3 nkls is injected into SV2 at 15 minutes and this is detected at 
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21 minutes at a second detection point. The second detection is achieved by the TS of 
the subfilter level that contains the measurement from SV2. 
It should also be noted from Figure 8-13 that detection point I was achieved early by 
the injection of the second error. This is because the subfilter that is without the 
measurement from SV3 contains the measurement from SV2 (in which an error is 
injected). For such a scenario, level 2 filter is used (which excludes two measurements). 
The black dotted line shows the TS of the level of the subfilter that does not contain the 
measurements either from SV2 or SV3 and hence is below the threshold for the entire 
period. Note the transition of threshold due to the decrease in the number of available 
satellites. Hence, detection of multiple failures in GPS is possible by using the subfilter 
architecture. The case of a failure occurring in GPS as well as the INS is discussed 
below. 
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Figure 8-12: The case of multiple filter test statistics for occurrence of single 
failure 
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Figure 8-13: The sequential detection of dual failures one by one using the multiple 
filter configuration 
8.3.3.3. Case with a failure in INS as well as GPS 
In the proposed piggy back tightly coupled architecture, the INS position is represented 
by a fictitious range. This is used in a manner similar to the other satellite 
measurements. Hence, if there is a failure in the INS, subfilter a is chosen as the 
primary filter for the rest of the flight (see Figure 8-11). 
When there is an error in the INS, the test statistic grows due to this error and goes 
beyond the threshold. The INS fault may be identified because only the test statistic 
from the subfilters that have excluded the INS will be below the threshold. In Figure 
8-14, the INS is declared faulty after around 8 minutes (blue line crosses the red 
threshold line) due to the errors that are representative of a typical automotive grade 
INS. For a typical automotive grade INS, gyroscope biases are chosen as I deg1hr, 2 
deg1hr and I deg1hr respectively for x. y and z axes. The biases for x. y and z 
accelerometers used are I milfi-g, 2 milli-g and 3 milli-g. 
j satellite measurement from SV3 at An error of magnitude 3 mls is in ected in the GPS 
25 minutes and is detected shortly afterwards (green line crosses the red threshold line). 
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Hence, the piggy back architecture is successful in the detection of multiple failures 
even if the fault is present in an INS. In the simulations presented, multiple failures are 
shown occurring one after the other and are subsequently detected. However, the piggy 
back architecture has the capability to detect multiple errors occurring simultaneously 
by monitoring the test statistics of all the filters/subfilters. 
The case of simultaneous onset of failures is shown in Figure 8-15. The onset time is the 
same for both the GPS and INS failures (10 minutes). However, since the INS error 
growth (blue line) is less than the corresponding growth of the green line representing 
the GPS failure (3 m1s), the INS failure is detected after the GPS failure. 
Using a fictitious range has a further benefit in improving the DOP value as shown in 
the next section. 
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Figure 8-14: The detection of fault in INS and as subsequent failure in a satellite 
measurement 
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Figure 8-15: Case of simultaneous onset of failure in INS and GPS 
8.3.3.4. DOP Improvement by the use of Piggy Back Tightly 
Coupled Architecture 
In the case of the piggy back architecture, the INS is used to predict the position of a 
satellite for which data are available in the broadcast ephemeris irrespective of the 
existence of a line of sight between the GPS antenna and the satellite. 
The immediate effect of this is the possibility of using those satellites for prediction that 
enhance the dilution of precision offered by the current geometry. For example, if a 
satellite in view is directly overhead, a satellite from the broadcast ephemeris (using the 
values of elevation angles from the aircraft to the relevant satellite) directly below the 
aircraft on the other side of the Earth can be chosen for maximum benefit. This will 
minimise the vertical errors and enhance the value of DOP obtained by the GPS 
measurements alone. 
This effect is illustrated in Figure 8-16. It can be seen that there is an improvement of 
around 50% with this algorithm in the horizontal dilution of precision. The DOP value 
is calculated from the trace of the geometry matrix (Kaplan, 2005). 
In this way, a potential benefit in accuracy is envisaged. This is because the accuracy of 
a ranging system depends on the accuracy of the ranges used and their geometry 
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(Ochieng, 2006). Hence, improving the DOP value has the potential to increase the 
accuracy if the precision of the INS derived range is close to or better than the GPS 
pseudorange precision. 
In this case, the satellite whose measurement is predicted using position derived from 
the INS is on the other side of the earth and hence the benefit is evident. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, an integrity algorithm is not only characterised by its 
detection performance but also by its protection limit. Since this thesis is concerned 
with integrated GPS/1NS systems only, it is the horizontal protection level (HPL) that is 
relevant. This is because the INS is not stable in the vertical domain (see Table 4-3). If 
the corresponding HPL of the algorithm crosses the Horizontal Alert limit the algorithm 
cannot be used anymore. 
The NIORAIM method has been adopted in this thesis for provision of HPL (as 
described in section 5.5). This method has the ability to reduce HPL (by optimisation) 
with consideration of multiple failures. However, it should be noted that the NIORAIM 
method is limited to protection level calculations and does not provide solution to 
detection of failures. The HPL performance is described in the next section. 
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Figure 8-16: The value of HDOP obtained by augmenting the GPS solution with a 
INS based fictitious range 
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8.3.3.5. HPL offered using the NIORAIM method 
The HPL is used to determine whether the position solution can be used for the 
particular phase of flight or not (whether HPL < HAL). In Chapter 7 respective values 
of HPL plotted for the two existing integrity algorithms; MSS and AIME were 
presented. These methods assume the occurrence of a single failure at a time. However, 
as presented in section 5.3.2.2, a recent algorithm to determine HPL in the presence of a 
dual fault scenario was proposed by Hwang and Brown (2005c). The flowchart for 
calculation of HPL using the NIORAIM algorithm is presented in Figure 8-17. This 
algorithm was explained in section 5.3.2.2. 
In the case of piggy back architecture, dual fault scenario covers both the classes of 
faults whether these are in two GPS measurements or in one GPS measurement and in 
the INS measurement. This is because the INS position is transformed to a GPS range 
measurement and is treated as such for the fault scenario. The HPL as calculated by the 
NIORAIM method (Hwang and Brown, 2005c), is shown in Figure 8-18. 
Initialization of the weights to be 
applied to satellite 
measurements 
Calculation of slope for two faults 
Calculation of HPL 
Training of Weights 
FR-e-calculation of 
=HPL 
Is HPL 
decreasing ? Ye"S 
No 
F-Finalization of weights 
Figure 8-17: The NIORAIM algorithm for HPL calculation (section 5.3.2.2) 
In this method, weights are applied to the satellite measurements and then these are 
optimised to reduce the HPL. The 'start value' is the value of the HPL arrived at by the 
use of initial weights while the 'trained value' is determined after the training of the 
weights. In this method, a dual fault situation was considered. It can be seen that the 
value of HPL is very high and is in kilometres (this is discussed 
further in section 9.5.3). 
The HPL values are quite high when compared to those shown in section 7.4.1.4 
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calculated by the use of existing GPS/INS integrity algorithms. This is because those 
algorithms assume the case of a single failure. There can be a difference of an order of 
magnitude when a dual fault scenario is considered as compared to the single failure 
case (Brown, 1997). The point to be noted from Figure 8-18 is that the NIORAIM 
training method is successful in decreasing the HPL substantially (up to 50%) for a part 
of the flight. However, this is not true in general as it is always not possible to find the 
weights that can optimise the HPL value. This is because of the limitation of numerical 
optimisation methods. The weights that are trained during the iteration process are 
shown in Figure 8-19. The initial value for all of the weights used is unity. After 
training, these are reduced to significantly smaller values. In Figure 8-19, only the final 
values of the weights at each time epoch are shown. However, the important aspect of 
these weights is their relative value with respect to each other and not their absolute 
values (Hwang, 2005b). 
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Figure 8-18: The start value and trained value of HPL for the simulation 
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Figure 8-19: The values of weights used for the satellite measurements after 
training 
The change in weights is generally associated with a decrease in position accuracy. 
However, this accuracy is degraded at the expense of improved 'availability' of RAIM 
(getting a reduced HPL). Hence, in the case of successful training of the weights, 
NIORAIM is a very effective method in increasing the availability in a given geometry. 
However, there are associated problems of non-divergence of weights or excessive time 
to find the minimum HPL which are common for training methods (Hwang and Brown, 
2005a). In such a case, the HPL is calculated by initial weights (unity) (see flowchart in 
Figure 8-17 and details in section 5.3.2.2). 
The algorithms developed in this chapter are subjected to real data in Chapter 9. 
8.4. Summary 
This chapter has presented the algorithms proposed in this thesis that enable early 
detection of SGEs both in GPS as well as INS in a tightly coupled architecture. These 
are the rate detector algorithm and a novel tightly coupled architecture referred to as the 
"piggy back" architecture. 
The basic principle and configuration of these methods are described in detail. A 
comparison with existing integrity algorithms (Multiple Solution Separation method and 
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Autonomous Integrity monitoring by Extrapolation method) shows that the detection 
performance is enhanced by the use of the proposed rate detector configuration. 
The problem of handling multiple failures in GPS by use of the proposed piggy back 
architecture is also discussed. This also works in the case of isolating a fault in the INS 
should such a situation occur. Further benefits in accuracy are also discussed including 
the improvement in geometry measured in terms of the DOP. Another component of an 
integrity algorithm, the calculation of the HPL, is also discussed. The results are shown 
for the most recent method available. This is the Novel Integrity Optimised (NIO)RAIM 
method. It is shown that the NIORAIM is an efficient method to reduce HPL by way of 
optimisation. Hence, this chapter has presented the proposed algorithms and 
demonstrated their performance using the simulation platform developed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 9 subjects the new algorithms to real data. 
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9. Performance Validation Using Real Data 
Introduction 
Chapter 7 suggested that existing integrity algorithms for integrated GPS/1NS systems 
suffer from a few problems. These are that they a) take a relatively long time to detect 
slowly growing errors (SGEs) and b) cannot isolate Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
measurements from the main filter if a failure occurs in the INS. These problems were 
addressed by the new algorithms presented in Chapter 8 and their performance assessed 
by simulation. To validate these results, the proposed algorithms are subjected to real 
data in this chapter. The data consist of GPS pseudoranges and INS velocity and attitude 
measurements, obtained from a GPS receiver and an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), 
mounted on a road vehicle. 
The chapter starts with a description of the characteristics of the real data. This is 
followed by an assessment of the validity of the data and the detection of a sample SGE 
failure. The chapter then proceeds to address the case of multiple failures using the 
proposed piggy back architecture (developed in Chapter 8). This is followed by an 
analysis of protection limits offered by the recently introduced Novel Integrity 
Optimised Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (NIORAIM) algorithm. The 
chapter concludes with a comparison of the performance of the algorithms with 
simulated and real data. 
9.2. Proffle of Real Data 
The real data consist of IMU and GPS data. The IMU data consist of velocity and 
attitude increments time tagged with GPS time. GPS data are in the form of the 
Receiver INdependent EXchange Format (RINEX) file set. GPS data were captured by 
the Novatel OEM dual frequency receiver. The data were collected in Nottingham on 13 
August 2005 by staff of the IESSG (Institute of Engineering Surveying and Space 
Geodesy), The University of Nottingham. RINEX is the most common exchange format 
for GPS data in the Geodesy community. This RINEX data is in the fonn of two files; 
observation and the navigation file. The observation 
file includes GPS observables, 
code phase and carrier phase measurements (LI and L2) 
for the observed satellites 
temporally referred to the receiver time (UTC) (LI is used in this analysis because this 
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is the only observable available to a typical aviation user). The navigation message file 
contains the broadcast ephemeris, ionospheric coefficients and clock correction 
parameters (see Chapter 3). The IMU data are available at 200 Hz while GPS data are 
available at 4 Hz. The IMU used is a Honeywell Commercial Inertial Measurement Unit 
(CIMU). It is a navigation grade IMU with the performance specifications shown in 
Table 9-1 (Hide et al., 2005). From Table 9-1, it can be seen that the Honeywell CIMU 
is a very good quality IMU. It was mounted on the back of a vehicle. The vehicle and 
the equipment are shown in Figure 9- 1. 
Table 9-1: CIMU performance specifications 
PARAMETER VALUE 
Gyro Rate Bias 0.0035 deg/hr 
Gyro Rate Scale Factor 5 ppm 
Angular Random Walk 0.0025 deg/hrl/2 
Accelerometer Range ± 30 g 
Accelerometer Scale Factor 100 ppm 
Accelerometer Bias 0.03 mg 
As can be seen from Figure 9- 1, the IMU and GPS antenna are not collocated. 
Therefore, lever arm corrections are required in this case. The lever arm was measured 
using a metal ruler from the centre of the IMU to the reference point on the antenna. 
The centre of the IMU axes is defined by a drawing provided by the manufacturer 
(Honeywell) enabling the offset between the reference point on the antenna and the 
origin of the inertial axes to be calculated (see Table 9-2). The ruler used has a 
measurement resolution of a millimetre hence the accuracy of the lever arm is suitable 
for the purpose of this thesis since it is much smaller than the inherent accuracy of the 
GPS code signal which is in centimetres. These parameters were provided by the 
Institute of Engineering Surveying and Space Geodesy (IESSG) at the University of 
Nottingham. These are required because GPS pseudoranges, are predicted from positions 
derived from INS measurements in a tightly coupled architecture (see section 3.5.1.2). 
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Table 9-2: Lever Arm corrections between IMU and GPS antenna 
AXIS VALUE 
X-axis 0.015 m 
Y-axis 0.169 m 
Z-axis 0.240 mI 
Figure 9-1: The GPS/INS equipment and the van used to collect real data (INS is 
grey box while white GPS antenna can be seen) 
9.2.1. GPS data profile 
Figure 9-2 shows the position profile (trajectory) of the vehicle obtained from the raw 
GPS data from the RINEX files. The data were captured from multiple runs of the 
vehicle along the same trajectory. The vehicle positions were computed using the least 
squares algorithm to process the pseudoranges (see section 6.3.2.4). The start point is 
marked by a red asterisk '*' and endpoint is marked by a red 'o' (Figure 9-2). 
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The error compensation for the delays due to the ionosphere and troposphere was 
carried out as described in sections 6.3.2.2 and 7.3.2. However, multipath compensation 
has not been attempted in this work. It will be addressed in Riture work. Due to the 
nature of the data capture scheme adopted, repeated trajectories facilitate a level of data 
validation against blunders. Figure 9-3 shows an enlarged part of the repeated ground 
track presented in Figure 9-2. The origin for Figure 9-2 and Figure 9-3 has a Latitude of 
52.113 degrees (North) and a Longitude of 4.564 degrees (West). These are equivalent 
to an Easting of 224531.057 m and a Northing of 249175.401 m on the UK National 
Grid. It can be seen that the measurements are precise enough to discern the trajectory 
of vehicle within 4-5 m. Hence, the closeness of these measurements is suitable for the 
purpose of analysis of integrity provision for the Non-Precision Approach phase of 
flight (see Table 2-7). From preliminary analysis, these data seem to be suitable for the 
approach phases, hence it is suggested that a further analysis should be carried out to 
fully characterise code based performance. Furthermore, further research is required to 
address the potential of carrier phase measurements to support landing and surface 
movement. A point to note is that u-turn at the bottom left comer appears to stand out 
from the rest of the u-tums. This is an initial turn carried out to locate the track over 
which multiple runs were subsequently conducted and hence should not be seen as an 
anomaly. . 
The number of satellites in view of the vehicle mounted antenna is shown in Figure 9-4. 
It can be seen that the minimum and maximum number of satellites available during the 
run are six and nine respectively. The Dilution Of Precision (DOP) values during the 
trajectory are shown in Figure 9-5. It can be seen that the improvement in the PDOP in 
the later part of the trajectory (Figure 9-5) is principally due to the availability of a 
larger number of satellites (Figure 9-4) in a good geometric configuration. 
9.2.2. The INS Data Profile 
Figure 9-6 shows the ground track of the vehicle using INS based positions. The typical 
error growth which is a well known characteristic of inertial measurement units is 
evident in Figure 9-6. This is in contrast to GPS derived positions that have long term 
error stability. The INS velocities in the North and East directions are shown in Figure 
9-7 and Figure 9-8 respectively. 
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Figure 9-8: East (Y-axis) velocity of the vehicle as obtained from the INS 
It is very interesting to observe that the magnitude of both the velocities change with the 
turns of the vehicle. The East and North components of the velocity vary during a turn, 
even if the magnitude of the horizontal velocity does not vary much. This cross- 
validates the multiple about-turn manoeuvres of the vehicle as seen from the GPS based 
trajectory (in Figure 9-3). 
The divergence in the position estimate by the INS (Figure 9-6) can be controlled by 
GPS/INS integration. This is discussed in the next section. The results shown are for the 
tightly coupled integration because it is the representative configuration selected for 
best performance with regard to integrity (see section 5.5). 
9.2.3. Integrated System Data 
After discussing the characteristics of the data obtained from the individual systems, 
this section addresses the output of the integrated GPS/INS system. GPS and INS are 
integrated using the tightly coupled architecture as described in section 6.3.4. In this 
Kalman filter based configuration, measurement is formed from GPS pseudoranges and 
their predicted counterparts (obtained from INS data and broadcast ephemeris). Figure 
9-9 shows the integrated position output for the vehicle trajectory along with the 
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position obtained from the GPS data only. The origin of Figures 9-9 and 9-10 is the 
point with a North latitude of 52.1128 degrees and West longitude of 4.5642 degrees 
(Easting 224516.578 m and Northing 249153.645 m). 
From Figure 9-9 it can be seen that at the turns, the spread of the integrated output is 
greater than the GPS based position. This is because the Kalman filter needs time to 
settle (when there is a relatively large change in the measurement). This shows that the 
accuracy of the integrated system is not as good as the GPS at the turns. This is 
essentially not a limitation of the integrated system. This is because the real benefit of 
integration is achieved when there are less than four satellites available (minimum 
number required to obtain a GPS position solution). A GPS based solution loses its 
output but an integrated system maintains its solution. This is illustrated in Figure 9-10 
where an artificial blockage of satellites is created so that only three satellite 
measurements are available. It can be seen that the vehicle turning manoeuvre on the 
left side of the figure cannot be supported by the GPS only solution. Furthermore, even 
if four satellites were available, fault detection (integrity) would not be possible with a 
GPS only solution. Integration of GPS and INS would address this issue. 
9.3. Data Validity 
Before analysing the data further it is important to ascertain that the data are valid and 
do not contain any blunders. Given two independent navigation systems installed on the 
same vehicle, there is no need to validate it using methods such as carrier phase 
processing or map-matching. The following points are notable in this regard: 
The vehicle repeatedly traversed a specific path hence, validating the data for the 
presence of large blunders. Since the purpose of this thesis is to compare 
integrity algorithms, very precise measurements such as carrier phase are not 
required. 
2. The position data from the INS cannot be used to validate the position data from 
the GPS because of excessive INS error growth. However, velocity data from 
the INS show the vehicle turning very clearly for a number of times (as is 
evident from the GPS based data). Hence, this also validates the data against the 
presence of large blunders. 
3. In the preliminary analysis of the real data, it was found that the GPS position 
solution started to diverge after approximately half an hour. After a detailed 
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investigation Of the data files (RINEX observation files), it was discovered that 
one of the pseudorange measurement is significantly below the typical value 
expected to be observed onboard a typical road vehicle (= 20,000 km). This led 
to the implementation of a data reasonability check to filter the pseudorange data 
so that only satellite measurements with reasonable values were used in 
subsequent analysis. This is in effect a simple comparison of pseudorange values 
with a threshold. This threshold is calculated by assuming typical trajectory in 
question whether for an aircraft or a road vehicle. This is an effective test for 
blunders. 
4. The test statistics for the integrity algorithms should reach a steady state such as 
shown in Figure 9-15 (black dotted line). This is only possible when there are no 
faults in the data. 
After the description of the characteristics of the real data and assessment of validity, 
the following sections assess the capability of the current and proposed algorithms to 
provide adequate integrity monitoring. Since integrity performance is characterised in 
terms of Fault Detection (single failure and multiple failure) and protection limits, these 
are addressed in sections 9.4 and 9.5 respectively. Failure exclusion is required to 
continue the use of the same navigation system. This capability is addressed in section 
9.5.3. 
9.4. Detection of a single SGE in real Data 
The current and proposed integrity algorithms are applied to the tightly coupled 
integrated system for the real data case. From the simulation results in Chapter 7, it was 
observed that the test statistics for the integrity algorithms attained steady state (see 
section 7.4.1) in around 60 minutes. An interesting observation here is that the steady 
state is reached earlier with real data. The steady state with real data is reached earlier 
because of the following reasons: 
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* The data rate of the IMU and GPS is 400 Hz and 4 Hz for real data as compared 
to 100 Hz and I Hz in the simulation environment, respectively. The Kalman 
filter sample time was chosen according to the GPS data rate available. 
The manoeuvres in the simulation are related to aircraft dynamics which are 
quite fast compared to a road vehicle. Hence, the Kalman filter reaches the 
steady state earlier because of the relatively smooth data. 
Hence, to test the detection performance of these algorithms, artificial failures are to be 
injected. For this purpose, the worst case slowly growing error (SGE) of 0.1 nils was 
injected in one of the pseudoranges during the steady state. 
The attainment of steady state in the case of the rate detector algorithm is comparatively 
later (8 minutes) than the existing algorithms (for AIME (Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring By Extrapolation) and MSS (Multiple Solution Separation) it is 100 second 
and 2 10 second respectively). This is because the rate detector algorithm is in effect an 
arrangement of cascaded filters and hence takes more time to settle. This is not 
essentially a limitation in general, because enough time (e. g. 60 minutes) is allowed for 
a Kalman filter to settle before it is expected to detect a failure (see section 7.4.1 and 
Lee and O'Laughlin, 1999). 
The performance of the Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Extrapolation method 
(AIME) algorithm is shown in Figure 9-11. It can be seen that the injected error of 0.1 
mls injected after 2 minutes (after attainment of steady state after 100 seconds) is 
detected in 320 seconds. In this case, the test statistic computed using Equation 8-3. The 
test statistics for 10 minutes and 30 minutes have not been used as the failure has been 
detected earlier. 
Figure 9-12 shows the perfonnance of the Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) 
algorithm for the same data set, which has been used to test the performance of the 
AIME method. It can be seen that the SGE of 0.1 nzls introduced at 210 seconds (after 
attainment of steady state), is detected in a duration of 250 seconds. 
The flowchart in Figure 9-13 gives the main steps involved in the execution of the new 
algorithm. After the initialisation of the rate detector Kalman filter it is propagated 
in 
time and updated using the AIME test statistic from the main navigation Kalman filter. 
The output of the Kalman filter i. e. velocity of the test statistic is compared with 
threshold (obtained offline). An integrity flag is set if the velocity is greater than the 
threshold. 
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Initial results from the application of the rate detector algorithm developed in Chapter 8 
to real data,, suggested the existence of residual errors in the test statistics which were 
not observed during simulation tests in Chapter 8. To cater for this, an additional bias 
state was added to the rate detector algorithm. The new set of state equations used in the 
rate detector algoritlun is then given by 
000 
p 
0a0 v 
0000 a 
-1 
0000J Lbj 
where p is the position state 
v is the velocity state for the test statistic 
a is the acceleration state and 
9-1 
b is the bias state (this is new state added as compared to the dynamic 
model shown in Equation 8-16). 
The new measurement matrix is given by 
9-2 
The new output matrix is given by 
c=[o 10 0] 9-3 
In this way, the dynamic model for the test statistics takes care of the residuals by 
modelling the bias. Hence, this is the final dynamic model proposed for the rate detector 
algorithm. If this algorithm (with the modification suggested above) is applied to the 
simulated data in Chapter 8, the estimated bias state would have been zero and the 
results would remain the same. This is because the test statistic (in the simulations in 
Chapter 7) exhibited a mean near to zero. 
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Figure 9-12: The detection of 0.1 m/s error as detected by the MSS algorithm 
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Figure 9-14: The detection of 0.1 m/s error using the rate detector algorithm 
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The new rate detector algorithm developed when applied to the same data set as used to 
test the AIME and MSS algorithms, results in the detection of the SGE in 40 seconds 
(Figure 9-14) when the error was injected at 500 seconds. This is significantly earlier 
than either the AIME or MSS methods. In a recent approach by Clot et al. (2006) a 
ramp error of 0.5 mls is detected in 60 seconds. Hence the performance of rate detector 
algorithm is superior. The approach by Clot et al. (2006) is based on Constraint 
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Testing (GLRT) which is similar to the AIMIE method as 
shown in section 5.5. 
In the next section, multiple failure detection in the real data is discussed. 
9.5. Handling of multiple SGEs in real Data 
The performance of the piggy back architecture proposed in Chapter 8 was 
demonstrated by simulation developed in Chapter 8. In this section, the algorithm is 
subjected to real data. This configuration is utilised to detect a failure in an INS and an 
injected failure in one of the satellite measurements. The configuration was shown in 
Figures 8-9,8- 10 and 8-11. As explained in Chapter 8, the INS is used to predict the 
range of one of the satellites in the piggy back architecture. Due to the errors in the INS, 
this range drifts from its original value and consequently turns into a failure. 
9.5.1. Detection of Multiple Failures 
The INS derived pseudorange measurement does not contain GPS receiver clock error 
but includes the estimation error in the orbital position (of the satellite) calculated from 
the broadcast ephemeris. Furthermore, due to growth of sensor errors the INS estimated 
position diverges which results in the growth of error in this 'pseudorange' 
measurement with time. Hence,, the test statistic for the sub-filters that contain this 
measurement crosses the threshold after some time. The 'failure' of INS derived 
pseudorange measurement occurs after 20 minutes and is detected when the test statistic 
of one of the sub-filters containing that range exceed the threshold. This is because INS 
is not being calibrated. The green line in Figure 9-15 shows this effect at around 20 
minutes. 
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A test statistic of another filter shown by the blue line is below the threshold till 22 
minutes. It is the sub-filter that does not contain the INS predicted measurement. At 22 
minutes, an error of 3 mls is injected in a GPS satellite measurement leading to 
detection in 25 seconds. However, the black dotted line (near the X-axis) representing 
the test statistic for a fault free subfilter is always below the threshold. 
Figure 9-16 shows the case when failures are introduced in INS and GPS at the same 
time. A gyro fault in the azimuth gyro of I deg1hr is introduced in the INS and a range 
error of 3 mls is injected in a satellite measurement at 5 minutes. The INS (green line) is 
declared faulty in 16 seconds while GPS measurement (blue line) is declared faulty in 
30 seconds. Although the fault is introduced at the same time, the detection time is 
different because of the different growth rates. 
Simulation results in Chapter 8 showed that the proposed configuration has the potential 
to improve both accuracy and availability due to an 'additional satellite measurement' 
derived from the output of an INS (and lever arm correction). The improvement in the 
Dilution of Precision (DOP) is presented in the next section while improvement in 
availability (as a result of the horizontal Protection limit being less than horizontal alann 
limit for a particular phase of flight) is discussed in section 9.5.3. 
9.5.2. Improvement in Dilution of Precision using Real Data 
Figure 9-17 has been generated using real GPS and INS data and shows that around 
30% improvement in HDOP is achieved by using an INS predicted satellite 
measurement (not in the line of sight of the GPS antenna) but for which data is available 
in the broadcast ephemeris. Since an integrity algorithm is characterised by its 
protection along with its detection performance, the protection limit calculations for real 
data are discussed in the next section. 
9.5.3. Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) Analysis 
The HPL for the two failures case is estimated by using the Novel Integrity Optimised 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (NIORAIM) method. This has been the 
selected RAIM method for this thesis for the computation of HPL as discussed in 
section 5.5 (see also section 8.3.3.5). It should be noted that there is no provision of 
detection of multiple failures in the NIORAIM method however it is useful in 
calculating the HPL in the presence of multiple failures. This is because it can reduce 
HPL through optimisation (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). 
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Figure 9-19: The final values of weights for the measurements after the training 
The HPLs for the AIME and the MSS algorithm cannot be used because these 
algorithms assume a single failure. However, in this thesis multiple failure scenario is 
considered because of operational limitations (see section 5.3.2). Hence, in this thesis, 
detection of multiple failures is carried out using the rate detector algorithm with piggy 
back architecture while HPL calculation is carried out using the compatible NIORAIM 
method. 
The NIORAIM method has the potential to improve the value of HPL through the 
training of weights applied to the satellite measurements (see section 5.3.2.2). In the 
NIORAIM method, satellite measurements are weighted and then the protection limit is 
calculated using these weighted measurements. In this way it is possible that the HPL is 
lowered at the expense of accuracy (Hwang and Brown, 2005c). These weights are then 
processed to reduce the protection limit by using an optimisation algorithm. In the case, 
the training algorithm does not converge, initial values of the weights are used to 
calculate the HPL. 
It can be seen from Figure 9-18, that a reduction of around 40 metres is achieved in the 
HPL by using the training algorithm. However, it can also be seen from the right hand 
side of the plot that training does not always converge and in some cases the initial 
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values of HPL (with unity weights) is used. The respective trained weights arrived at by 
the training algorithm are shown in Figure 9-19 for the six available satellite 
measurements. 
9.6. Compan'son of Simulation and Real Data 
Results 
A number of observations from the comparative analyses of the simulation and real data 
results are made in this section. These pertain to the inclusion of initial alignment of 
INS, addition of a bias state in the rate detector algorithm and the value of HPLs as 
obtained from the two types of data. 
9.6.1. Initial Alignment of INS 
This is a process by which initial conditions for an INS are calculated. In the earlier 
simulation, initial conditions were calculated from the initial orientation of the aircraft 
on the airport runway. However, for the real data, it is performed using the initial 
alignment algorithm as given by Titterton and Weston (2004). This is in effect a 
formulation of a Kalman filter having a truth model (as discussed in section 6.3.4.1) that 
describes the error states of the INS. An initial attitude and position value is used to 
initialise the Kalman filter. The errors in the initial attitude, position and velocity are 
estimated using static GPS observations. It must also be noted that in the provided data 
there is an initial phase of static data that is used for the purpose of initial alignment. 
9.6.2. Addition of a Bias State in Rate Detector Algorithm 
The proposed rate detector algorithm did not work well when used in the presence of 
real data. This was analysed further and it was concluded that this is due to the presence 
of residual bias errors in the test statistic. The incorporation of a bias state in the 
dynamic filter of the rate detector configuration led to significantly improved 
performance. This is because the additional state estimated the residual bias and is 
cancelled from the output using an appropriate output matrix (see section 9.4). The final 
form of the algorithm is shown in Figure 9-13. 
9.6.3. HPL comparison 
Although in Chapter 8, the HPL values were shown to be very high but in Chapter 9 the 
corresponding values are improved significantly (less than 400 m). This 
is because of 
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the presence of different geometries in the simulated and the real data. The simulation 
was carried out for the nominal constellation (24 satellites) while in practice there can 
be up to 30 satellites operational at a time. This has been confirmed by the dilution of 
precision values shown in Chapter 8 (Figure 8-16) and Chapter 9 (Figure 9-17). 
9.7. Summary 
This chapter has subjected existing and new algorithms (developed in Chapter 8) to real 
data. The profile of real data was discussed first followed by data validation. The 
performance of existing integrity algorithms and the proposed rate detector algorithm 
were compared using real data. It was found that the rate detector algorithm 
demonstrated by simulation in Chapter 8 did not perform well because of presence of 
residual bias in the test statistics. This led to the modification of the initial rate detector 
algorithm to include an additional bias state in the dynamic matrix of the Kalman filter. 
The results showed that the modified rate detector algorithm detects slowly growing 
errors significantly earlier than the conventional integrity algorithms. 
The piggy back architecture (proposed in Chapter 8) has also been tested with real data 
and demonstrated to be successful in isolating an INS failure in the real data. For the 
piggy back architecture, the NIORAIM method provides the best approach to 
determining protection limit values (see Chapter 5). The HPL values offered by the 
NIORAIM algorithm for simulated (see Chapter 8) and real data have also been 
compared. These HPL values are lower in the real data case because of the better 
geometry and larger number of satellites in the case of real data as compared to the 
simulation. This thesis thus proposes both the rate detector algorithm and the piggy 
back architecture for integrity monitoring of integrated systems with protection limit 
values calculated by the. NIORAIM method. 
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10. Conclusions and recommendations for 
u rther work 
A number of generic conclusions can be drawn from the research carried out on the 
integrity of integrated GPS/INS systems. There are also more specific conclusions that 
result from research on integrity monitoring in the presence of slowly growing errors. In 
order to measure the achievements of this research, this chapter first re-states the 
research objectives to facilitate the measurement of their achievement through direct 
comparison to the conclusions drawn and the recommendations for future research. 
10.1. Research Objectives 
This thesis set out to achieve the five objectives below. 
1. Review available air navigation systems to facilitate the identification of the best 
combination of navigation systems to meet the integrity requirements provided 
by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
2. Review extensively the failure modes of GPS, INS and their integration, 
categorise their behaviour and identify the worst case failure modes. 
3. Analyse the existing sensor level integrity monitoring algorithms for individual 
(GPS and INS) and integrated system architectures (GPS/INS) and propose the 
best algorithms for further analysis. 
4. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the selected sensor level integrity 
monitoring algorithms, with a particular reference to their performance in the 
cases of the worst case failure modes and multiple failure detection, and propose 
enhanced and/or new algorithms for better performance. 
5. Demonstrate (by simulation and real data) the power of the enhanced and/or new 
algoritluns to address effectively the worst case failure modes identified above. 
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10.2. Conclusions 
10.2.1. Status of Air Navigation System 
The following conclusions have been drawn from the comprehensive review in Chapter 
2, of the evolution of air navigation and air navigation systems over the last 100 years. 
Ground based air navigation systems are in the process of being replaced by 
space based systems, mainly GPS and its augmentations. GPS is the only fully 
operational space based system while GLONASS is currently being revitalised, 
with Galileo in the development phase. 
2. The ICAO has specified the required navigation performance (including 
integrity) for the different phases of flight. In the case of GPS, integrity 
requirements for some phases of flight can be met either by the use of special 
augmentation systems or Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). 
3. Although RAIM is a cost effective method for integrity monitoring, it has a 
number of limitations. To enhance RAIM performance, external aiding can be 
used, with Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) providing an excellent option for 
aiding because of its 'independent' operation and complementary nature to GPS. 
The effectiveness of the integration of GPS and INS has been shown in this 
thesis. 
10.2.2. Preferred Architecture for Integrity Monitoring of the 
Integrated System 
The techniques for the integration of GPS and INS have been reviewed in Chapters 3 
and 5, with a particular focus on integrity. In this respect following findings are 
pertinent: 
4. The traditional methods for the integration of GPS and INS mainly address the 
accuracy aspect of the integrated system, with the result that the complexity of 
the integration has a direct correlation with accuracy. However, in general, 
complex integration methods may not provide benefit in terms of integrity. This 
is because integrity is difficult to provide in the architectures that involve a level 
of feedback associated with complex architectures. 
5. A loosely coupled GPS/TNS architecture does not have access to raw 
measurements hence its integrity benefits are limited. 
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6. The key requirements for integrity monitoring are measurement redundancy and 
independence of these measurements. The tightly coupled architecture meets 
these requirements in the best manner since loosely coupled system does not 
provide measurement redundancy and there is inter-dependance of 
measurements in the ultra-tightly coupled systems. 
10.2.3. Worst Case Failure Mode 
Chapter 4 presented a detailed review of the failure modes of GPS, INS and the various 
integration architectures. The INS failure mode analysis included both conventional and 
Micro-Electro -Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology based sensors. The following 
conclusions have been drawn from the review of failure modes: 
7. In addition to failures generated at various levels of the INS and GPS, a number 
of failure modes also arise due to the process of integration. 
8. The number of failure modes that arise due to the integration process is largest 
in the case of the deeply integrated system because of its complex architecture. 
9. MEMS technology based INS failure modes are not addressed in the existing 
literature in the context of their navigation performance. However, significant 
research has been carried out on potential failure modes associated with 
materials and the manufacturing process. 
10. Slowly Growing Errors (SGE) or errors that grow slowly over time represent the 
class that is the most difficult to detect by integrity algorithms. This type of error 
is present in GPS as well as the INS. 
10.2.4. Integrity Algorithms Review and Simulation 
Chapter 5 presented a review of the existing integrity algorithms for GPS, INS and 
integrated GPS/INS systems. Chapter 7 subsequently applied the simulation platform 
developed in Chapter 6 to corroborate the findings from the review. The following 
conclusions have been drawn from the review and simulation based analysis of the 
existing integrity algorithms: 
11. The integrity monitoring techniques for INS and GPS are based on hardware 
redundancy and software monitoring, with the latter being simpler and more cost 
effective. 
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12. The integrity algorithms for integrated GPS/INS systems are in general, based 
on the basic principles of the methods used to monitor the integrity of GPS. 
13. The Multiple Solution Separation (MSS) and Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
by Extrapolation (AIME) methods are representative of the current GPS/INS 
integrity monitoring algorithms usually classified in terms of the nature of the 
test statistic and use of measurements. The MSS is a position domain snapshot 
method while the AIME is a measurement domain sequential method. 
13. The MSS and AIME algorithms are not always effective in detecting SGEs and 
when successful, take relative long detection times. For example, for an error of 
0.1 m/s the MSS's detection time is 190 sec while the corresponding duration 
for the AIME algorithm is 160 sec (see section 7.4.1.3). 
14. Furthennore, the MSS and AIME cannot isolate a failure in the INS, should one 
occur. 
15. Traditionally RAIM algorithms are designed based on the assumption of a single 
failure at a time. However, with integration and the consideration of the effects 
of the operational environment, there is a higher likelihood of multiple failures. 
Hence, current RAIM algorithms should be extended to cope with multiple 
failures. This has been accomplished in this thesis (see conclusion number 2 1). 
16. The protection limits offered by the MSS and AIME algorithms are not adequate 
for the multiple failure case. A new approach capable of determining accurate 
protection limits has been adopted in this thesis (see conclusion number 22). 
17. For the detection of multiple failures, equivalent methods exist in navigation and 
geodesy literature although with different terminologies. These have been 
exploited in this thesis to propose a new approach for tightly integrated 
GPS/INS systems (see conclusion number 2 1). 
18. The Novel Integrity Optimised (NIO)-RAIM is an effective method that can 
provide a reliable protection limit for the multiple failure case. However, there is 
no provision for the detection of multiple failures. 
19. MEMS technology based INSs are not yet ready for use in aviation because of 
poor perforinance. 
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10.2.5. Effectiveness of Proposed Algorithms 
From the weaknesses of the existing sensor level integrity monitoring algorithms 
identified through a detailed literature review and confirmed by simulation, this thesis 
has proposed an enhanced algorithm referred to as the rate detector algorithm and a new 
piggy back tightly coupled integrity monitoring architecture. The former has been 
developed to cater for the class of failures which are the most difficult to detect and the 
latter to cope with multiple failures. The new algorithms have been tested by both 
simulation (using the platform developed in Chapter 6) and real data. The following 
conclusions have been drawn with respect to the proposed algorithms: 
20. A significant improvement in the Time-To-Alert (TTA) is achieved by the 
application of the rate detector algorithm. The benefit of this is that integrated 
GPS/INS systems can be used for phases of flight with relatively stringent TTA 
requirements. The TTA for the Terminal phase is 15 sec (see Table 2-7). The 
detection time achieved for an error of 0.1 m/s is 40 sec by the proposed rate 
detector algorithm (section 9.4). Hence, for slowly growing errors which are 
slightly greater in magnitude (such as I m/s, 2 m/s) the algorithm can provide 
integrity monitoring for the terminal phases of flight if the conditions to execute 
the detection function of the integrity algorithm exist. This is because as proved 
in section 8.2.7, detection time reduces with the increase in the growth rate of 
error. 
2 1. Multiple failures can be detected effectively by the use of the new piggy back 
tightly coupled architecture. Furthermore, the new architecture has the ability to 
isolate failures in the INS. 
22. The Novel Integrity Optimised Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(NIORAIM) method is an effective method for the computation of the protection 
limits with the potential for better performance through the training of the 
weights applied to satellite measurements using an optimisation algorithm. 
However, there is no provision for the detection of multiple failures. The 
combination of the failure detection of the piggy back architecture proposed in 
this thesis and NIORAIM accounts both for multiple failure detection and the 
need for accurate computation of protection limits. 
23. The proposed piggy back architecture can provide benefit in terms of the 
improvement of user-constellation geometry, through the generation of 
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'artificial' satellite range measurements based on the receiver antenna position 
derived from INS measurements and satellite orbital data contained in the 
broadcast navigation message. 
10-3. Recommendations for Futther Research 
There are a number of issues that have arisen from this thesis to be addressed in future 
research. The simulation platform developed in this thesis could be used to solve the 
suggested research issues. 
1. MEMS technology based inertial navigation systems have the potential to 
provide cost effective navigation. Currently, the application of these systems is 
limited by poor performance (including excessive measurement noise) compared 
to conventional INS. There is the possibility that this weakness may be 
overcome through extensive modelling of the noise in the rate detector filter. 
2. In this thesis, the rate detector algorithm is used with the AIME algorithm. This 
involves the estimation of the rate of change of the measurement domain test 
statistic. However, another method that estimates the rate of change of the 
position domain test statistics can be used. This might provide a benefit in terms 
of reduction of noise in the test statistic due to the capability of the positioning 
algorithm to filter measurement noise. 
3. The fictitious range concept presented in this thesis may be extended to the use 
of multiple inertial navigation systems (INSs). Multiple low cost INSs may be 
used, each with its own fictitious range and hence contributing towards the 
enhancement of GDOP. Timely resets of these INSs will be required when their 
errors grow beyond specified thresholds. This may also help to mitigate errors 
associated with the individual MEMS technology based INSs. 
4. The effect of the improvement in the GDOP by the piggy back architecture on 
positioning accuracy requires finiher careful consideration. This should involve 
a sensitivity analysis of the measurement precision (range errors) assigned to the 
measurements generated based on the 'piggyback' concept. 
5. The calibration of INS by the use of multiple GPS antennas located at various 
locations on the aircraft can result in enhanced accuracy performance. This will 
provide a continuous solution throughout the flight. The development, testing 
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and validation of such systems are thus essential to account for flexure errors 
related to the aircraft structure. 
6. In the real data analysis (Chapter 9), multipath mitigation was not attempted. 
This will be performed by using the residuals in the position data. 
7. In the NIORAIM method (section 5-3.2.2) a lookup table is used for calculation 
of protection limits. This is required to approximate the distribution of noise in 
the position error. However, use of an exact routine can result in an improved 
performance (reduced protection limits). This is computationally intensive, but 
commercial libraries available for this purpose can be utilised (IMSL, 2006). 
8. Although tested on actual trajectory data but in post-processing mode, the 
algorithms proposed in this thesis have been developed for real time use. 
Therefore, further research should be carried out to assess their performance in a 
real-time environment. 
9. The algorithms proposed in the thesis have not been tested for the situation when 
an available satellite becomes unavailable or a new satellite becomes visible. 
This has the potential to induce transients in the Kalman filter solution. This 
problem should be addressed in future research. An interesting idea to explore 
will be the application of variable weighting of satellite measurements. 
10. Since a tightly coupled integrated system needs to reach a steady state to provide 
meaningful integrity, there are potential constraints to aspects of practical 
applications, such as in the initial phases of a flight. Future research should 
investigate ways of decreasing the time it takes to reach a steady state either 
through modelling or sensor design or both. 
From the conclusions and recommendations for further work presented above and the 
objectives in Section 10.1, it is clear that this thesis has achieved its research objectives. 
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